The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?

This paper aims at analyzing the effects of lobbying over economic growth and primarily welfare. We model explicitly the interaction between policy-makers and firms in a setup where the latter undertakes political contributions to the former in exchange for more restrictive market regulations which induce exit and enhance the profitability of the market. In a sectorial equilibrium, despite stimulating growth, lobbying restricts the market structure and reduces welfare when compared to the free-entry outcome. However, once general equilibrium considerations are taken into account, we find that lobbying may improve welfare over a welfare maximizing free-entry equilibrium, by means of an expansion in aggregate demand. This introduces a new paradigm in the literature about the effects of lobbying over economic performance.

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.

Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism

This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. An equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer his lobby to cease to exist. I show the existence of an equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. Therefore, the lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. However, the competition between those extreme lobbies results in a more moderate policy outcome relative to that initially preferred by the pro- or anti-policy government. Lobbies therefore guard against extremism, while acting as moderators of the government's preferences. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: common agency; endogenous lobbying; extremism.

Lobbying, innovation and protectionist cycles

This paper explains why trade liberalizations occur in developing countries,and why they are often reversed. It does so by focusing on the use oflobbying for protection by import competing firms as a means to postponecostly product quality upgrades to keep up with foreign competitors. Giventhe availability of a political market for import tariffs, domestic firmswill lobby for a sequence of tariffs that insulate domestic profits from awidening quality gap, thereby allowing adjustment to be postponed. But asthe contributions required by the government grow with the size of thequality gap, it will be optimal to adjust quality and to decrease thelobbying effort at some time, leading to liberalization and technologicalcatch-up. But then the equilibrium tariff will again be small and "cheap",and it will pay to start lobbying anew, until the next quality adjustment.Therefore, cycles in protection will occur as a result of the use oflobbying as a substitute for innovation. The model thus sheds new light onthe impact of the costs of protection on the effectiveness of the lobbyingeffort over time, and on their implications for the timing and the timehorizon of trade reforms in developing countries.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Lobbying: a Citizen's Guide, March 6, 2013

Lobbying is encouraging the passage, defeat, or modification of legislation. Lobbyists convey views and information to legislators in order to persuade them to act upon an idea for legislation. This is a guide to citizens about lobbying In Iowa.

Lobbying as a Part of Business Management

Lobbying by companies and the management techniques of lobbying have been fairly unknown territory. This study explains different theories related to lobbying including major political, economic and mathematical theories and their connections to lobbying. Existing lobbying networks in the European Union, especially at the European Union level, are explained. Lobbying organisations in the European Union are interconnected. Networks start at a local level, and have connections to national, European Union, international and sometimes to the global level. Relationships between business strategy and lobbying are studied with emphasis on issues management. Business strategy is often seen stemming from business environment analysis and stakeholder management. The issues management concept bridges aspects of business environment analysis and stakeholder management into a project type of management approach. The study includes two different empirical parts. A sample of public policy managers representing the European chemical industry was interviewed, and a chemical industry specific lobbying framework was built. This framework was then tested using a questionnaire sent to European public issues managers representing some of the largest European companies. Based on the results of the questionnaire, a generic framework on how large, European companies manage lobbying in general terms was developed.

CORPORATE GRASSROOTS LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union has gone through significant changes in the past 20 years. The importance of public opinion in politics has increased and the new technologies are empowering the wider public to express its opinions. The purpose of this study is to explore how corporations use the tactic of grassroots lobbying in the European Union environment. The research objectives were addressed through qualitative research methods. Six expert interviews were conducted to find new perspectives and to deepen the understanding of the research objectives. Following the data collection, the research material was transcribed and analysed. In the analysis, the data was organized based on concepts and themes found from the literature review. The empirical findings on grassroots lobbying in the EU were presented. It was found that when a company is selecting grassroots lobbying tactic, the familiarity of the tactic, organizational culture, financial resources and amount of stakeholders seem to have an impact to the selection. The issues that are successfully lobbied through the grassroots-lobbying tactic were seen to be those, which have high and direct impact on lives of people, arouse strong feelings and are not very complex. Furthermore, when deciding on the timing of a campaign, in the EU it was found that a company should take into account the long policy process and limited capabilities to mobilise people. Targeting the object of the campaign and selecting the channels used in a grassroots- lobbying campaign were seen to be in function of identifying the key decision-makers on the issue. The decisions of who to mobilise and the mobilisation channels were considered to be dependant on who the campaign is trying to influence. Also, it was found that when the implementing a grassroots lobbying campaign in the EU environment, the special features such as multiple cultures and languages should be taken into account. This study has provided novel practical insights for corporate grassroots lobbying in the EU environment and furthermore successfully contributed to the academic research in the field.

Corporate grassroots lobbying in the European Union

The European Union has gone through significant changes in the past 20 years. The importance of public opinion in politics has increased and the new technologies are empowering the wider public to express its opinions. The purpose of this study is to explore how corporations use the tactic of grassroots lobbying in the European Union environment. The research objectives were addressed through qualitative research methods. Six expert interviews were conducted to find new perspectives and to deepen the understanding of the research objectives. Following the data collection, the research material was transcribed and analysed. In the analysis, the data was organized based on concepts and themes found from the literature review. The empirical findings on grassroots lobbying in the EU were presented. It was found that when a company is selecting grassroots lobbying tactic, the familiarity of the tactic, organizational culture, financial resources and amount of stakeholders seem to have an impact to the selection. The issues that are successfully lobbied through the grassroots-lobbying tactic were seen to be those, which have high and direct impact on lives of people, arouse strong feelings and are not very complex. Furthermore, when deciding on the timing of a campaign, in the EU it was found that a company should take into account the long policy process and limited capabilities to mobilise people. Targeting the object of the campaign and selecting the channels used in a grassrootslobbying campaign were seen to be in function of identifying the key decision-makers on the issue. The decisions of who to mobilise and the mobilisation channels were considered to be dependant on who the campaign is trying to influence. Also, it was found that when the implementing a grassroots lobbying campaign in the EU environment, the special features such as multiple cultures and languages should be taken into account. This study has provided novel practical insights for corporate grassroots lobbying in the EU environment and furthermore successfully contributed to the academic research in the field.