Conceptual overlap between moral norms and anticipated regret in the prediction of intention: implications for theory of planned behaviour research

Moral norms and anticipated regret are widely used extensions to the theory of planned behaviour, yet there is some evidence to suggest that these constructs may conceptually overlap as predictors of intention. Two health-related behaviours with distinct moral implications (Study 1: organ donation registration, N = 352 and Study 2: condom usage, N = 1815) were therefore examined to ascertain whether moral norms and anticipated regret are indeed conceptually distinct. While evidence consistent with conceptual overlap was identified in Study 1, the evidence for such overlap in Study 2 was more ambiguous. In Study 3, a meta-analysis of existing literature revealed that the relationship between moral norms and anticipated regret was moderated by the extent of the moral implications arising from the behaviour under examination. Taken together, these findings suggest that conceptual overlap between moral norms and anticipated regret is more likely to occur among behaviours with obvious moral implications. Researchers wishing to examine the predictive utility of moral norms and anticipated regret among such behaviours would therefore be advised to aggregate these measures to form a composite variable (personal norms).

Ethical trust and social moral norms simulation : a bio-inspired agent-based modelling approach

The understanding of the micro-macro link is an urgent need in the study of social systems. The complex adaptive nature of social systems adds to the challenges of understanding social interactions and system feedback and presents substantial scope and potential for extending the frontiers of computer-based research tools such as simulations and agent-based technologies. In this project, we seek to understand key research questions concerning the interplay of ethical trust at the individual level and the development of collective social moral norms as representative sample of the bigger micro-macro link of social systems. We outline our computational model of ethical trust (CMET) informed by research findings from trust, machine ethics and neural science. Guided by the CMET architecture, we discuss key implementation ideas for the simulations of ethical trust and social moral norms.

Interplay of ethical trust and social moral norms : environment modelling and computational mechanisms in agent-based social simulation

In many agent-based models theoretical and computational mechanisms are needed for model abstraction and design. However, it can be challenging to arrive at the appropriate mechanisms and models. This research on the interplay of ethical trust and social moral norms addresses that challenge via an analytical framework on the spread of moral norms, the modelling of social environment and the selection of spread mechanisms as applied to agent-based social simulation. We describe the mechanism alignment mapping, two forms of interaction modelling between the social environment and agents, and the results obtained from the simulation of our computational model. These results provide an insight into how the agent-based paradigm can be applied as a technique of investigation for normative moral processes in computational social sciences.

Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-Analytical Validation of Some Ideas of Anomie Theory

Anomie theorists have been reporting the suppression of shared welfare orientations by the overwhelming dominance of economic values within capitalist societies since before the outset of neoliberalism debate. Obligations concerning common welfare are more and more often subordinated to the overarching aim of realizing economic success goals. This should be especially valid with for social life in contemporary market societies. This empirical investigation examines the extent to which market imperatives and values of the societal community are anchored within the normative orientations of market actors. Special attention is paid to whether the shape of these normative orientations varies with respect to the degree of market inclusion. Empirical analyses, based on the data of a standardized written survey within the German working population carried out in 2002, show that different types of normative orientation can be distinguished among market actors. These types are quite similar to the well-known types of anomic adaptation developed by Robert K. Merton in “Social Structure and Anomie” and are externally valid with respect to the prediction of different forms of economic crime. Further analyses show that the type of normative orientation actors adopt within everyday life depends on the degree of market inclusion. Confirming anomie theory, it is shown that the individual willingness to subordinate matters of common welfare to the aim of economic success—radical market activism—gets stronger the more actors are included in the market sphere. Finally, the relevance of reported findings for the explanation of violent behavior, especially with view to varieties of corporate violence, is discussed.

They Say You are a Danger But You Are Not: Representations and Construction of the Moral Self in Narratives of 'Dangerous Individuals'

This article is based on an analysis of narratives of 26 offenders with mental health problems living in the United Kingdom. It explores the impact of an ascribed dangerous status and the construction of the self as moral and responsible in response to this label with reference to the literature on denial, deviance disavowal and other “techniques of neutralization” and Goffman's presentation of self. Two dominant strands are identified in relation to the construction of moral self-hood: “Not my fault” and “Good at heart” narratives. “Techniques of neutralization” are widely drawn on, particularly denial of responsibility in the “Not my fault” narratives that seek to explain anti-social behavior with reference to external forces such as a hostile environment inhibiting their ability to control their lives. In contrast, “Good at heart” narratives draw on the essentially good and moral nature of the inner-self. Both are used as evidence of sharing and adhering to moral norms in order to present an acceptable and credible self.

Normative influences across cultures : conceptual differences and potential confounders among drivers in Australia and China

Normative influences on road user behaviour have been well documented and include such things as personal, group, subjective and moral norms. Commonly, normative factors are examined within one cultural context, although a few examples of exploring the issue across cultures exist. Such examples add to our understanding of differences in perceptions of the normative factors that may exert influence on road users and can assist in determining whether successful road safety interventions in one location may be successful in another. Notably, the literature is relatively silent on such influences in countries experiencing rapidly escalating rates of motorization. China is one such country where new drivers are taking to the roads in unprecedented numbers and authorities are grappling with the associated challenges. This paper presents results from qualitative and quantitative research on self-reported driving speeds of car drivers and related issues in Australia and China. Focus group interviews and questionnaires conducted in each country examined normative factors that might influence driving in each cultural context. Qualitative findings indicated perceptions of community acceptance of speeding were present in both countries but appeared more widespread in China, yet quantitative results did not support this difference. Similarly, with regard to negative social feedback from speeding, qualitative findings suggested no embarrassment associated with speeding among Chinese participants and mixed results among Australian participants, yet quantitative results indicated greater embarrassment for Chinese drivers. This issue was also examined from the perspective of self-identity and findings were generally similar across both samples and appear related to whether it is important to be perceived as a skilled/safe driver by others. An interesting and important finding emerged with regard to how Chinese drivers may respond to questions about road safety issues if the answers might influence foreigners’ perceptions of China. In attempting to assess community norms associated with speeding, participants were asked to describe what they would tell a foreign visitor about the prevalence of speeding in China. Responses indicated that if asked by a foreigner, people may answer in a manner that portrayed China as a safe country (e.g., that drivers do not speed), irrespective of the actual situation. This ‘faking good for foreigners’ phenomenon highlights the importance of considering ‘face’ when conducting research in China – a concept absent from the road safety literature. An additional noteworthy finding that has been briefly described in the road safety literature is the importance and strength of the normative influence of social networks (guanxi) in China. The use of personal networks to assist in avoiding penalties for traffic violations was described by Chinese participants and is an area that could be addressed to strengthen the deterrent effect of traffic law enforcement. Overall, the findings suggest important considerations for developing and implementing road safety countermeasures in different cultural contexts.

A test of three interventions to promote people's communication of their consent for organ donation

People's decision to join an organ donor registry and have a discussion with family about their organ donation preference increases the likelihood that their family will consent to donation of their organs. This study explores the effectiveness of three interventions compared to a control condition to increase individual consent (registering and discussing donation wishes) for organ donation. Australian residents who had not previously communicated their consent (N = 177) were randomly allocated to complete an online survey representing either an extended theory of planned behaviour motivational intervention (strengthening intention via attitudes, subjective norms, control, moral norms and identity), a volitional intervention using constructs from the health action process approach (strengthening the translation of intentions into action using action plans and coping plans), a combined motivational and volitional intervention, or a control condition. Registering, but not discussing, intentions increased in the motivational compared to non-motivational conditions. For joining the organ donor registry, the combination of strengthening intentions (motivational) as well as forming specific action (when, where, how, and with whom for discussing) and coping (listing potential obstacles and how these may be overcome) plans (volitional) resulted in significantly higher rates of self-reported behaviour. There was no evidence for this effect on discussion.

Tiede ja tutkijan sosiaalinen vastuu : Joseph Ben-Davidin, Roger Sperryn ja Knut Erik Tranøyn käsitykset tieteestä ja tutkijan sosiaalisesta vastuusta

Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility. Joseph Ben-David's, Roger Sperry's and Knut Erik Tranøy's Views of Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility The aim of the study was to investigate, whether or not there is any connection between Jewish sociologist Joseph Ben-David's, American neuroscientist Roger Sperry's and Norwegian philosopher Knut Erik Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility. The sources of information were their writings concerning this topic. Ben-David has a classical view of science. He thinks that the Mertonian norms of scientific activity, first written in 1942, are still valid in modern science. With the help of these norms Ben-David defends the view that science is morally neutral. Ben-David thinks that a scientist has a limited social responsibility. A scientist only reports on the new results, but he is not responsible for applying the results. In any case Ben-David's ideas are no longer valid. Sperry has a scientistic view of science. According to Sperry, science is the source of moral norms and also the best guide for moral action. The methods of natural sciences "show" how to solve moral problems. A scientist's personal views of science and social responsibility are not important. However Sperry's view is very problematic on the ethical side. Tranøy stresses the scientist's social responsibility. A scientist has common norms with the society from with he or she comes. This is why a scientist has the right, and also the responsibility, to discuss social and ethical questions between science and society. Tranøy's view has some ethical and practical problems, but it is valid in principle. Finally, Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of both science and the scientist's social responsibility have a connection: the view of science corresponds to the certain view of scientist's social responsibility. The result of this study is: Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's view of science have an ethical starting point as its fundamental presupposition, which include certain views of scientific knowledge, good and the scientist's ethical responsibilities. The connection between Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility means that their views of epistemology, meta-ethics and the scientist's ethical responsibilities have a connection to their views of the scientist's social responsibility. The results of this study can help the scientific community to organize the social responsibility of a scientist and deepen the conversation concerning the scientist's social responsibility.

La percepción de los valores morales

Resumen: El autor aborda un tema que a veces pasa inadvertido aun para muchos adherentes al iusnaturalismo: el conocimiento de la ley natural. Mientras abundan estudios que centran sus argumentos en la existencia de esta normativa supra positiva o que ahondan su ontología y extensión, sin embargo a veces no se repara en una cuestión liminar que resulta necesario dilucidar: ¿cómo se conocen los principios y las conclusiones de la ley natural?, ¿es naturalmente conocida?, ¿qué se entiende por “naturalmente”? Sobre el contenido de la ley natural el documento afirma que “no es un conjunto cerrado y completo de normas morales, sino la fuente de inspiración constante, presente y operativa de las diversas etapas de la economía de la salvación”. El término “percepción” hace referencia a una “experiencia” y que por tanto es exterior. Se concluye entonces que consiste en un conocimiento objetivo (no innato) de los preceptos morales, más allá de la presencia natural de un hábito que permite su captación (sindéresis).

Thémis desnudada: a questão da justiça em Hans Kelsen

Embora Hans Kelsen tenha desenvolvido suas ideias sobre a justiça em diversos artigos e capítulos de livros, o jusfilósofo nunca edificou uma obra mais profunda, monográfica ou sistemática sobre a questão do justo. Suas considerações, o mais das vezes proferidas incidentalmente quando da análise e crítica das teorias do direito natural, se encontram, a bem dizer, dispersas por diversas produções. A leitura integral e conjunta de seus estudos, entretanto, permite a identificação da mesma e coerente concepção de filosofia moral que perpassa todos os seus escritos, concepção esta que sugere a relatividade, subjetividade e irracionalidade da questão do justo. Sem o propósito de ser uma biografia intelectual ou uma psicanálise do conhecimento das conclusões kelsenianas sobre o problema da justiça, o objetivo da presente dissertação, além da tentativa de realizar uma exposição sistemática da própria teoria da justiça de Kelsen  dispersa por uma multiplicidade de trabalhos, nem todos disponíveis ou publicados em língua portuguesa , consiste na análise dos pressupostos e justificativas teórico-filosóficos que, utilizados pelo jusfilósofo como embasamento de suas inferências sobre o tema, o conduzem a afirmar a incognoscibilidade de qualquer conceito absoluto, objetivo e universal de justiça, ou a viabilidade de uma razão prática. A meta maior desta dissertação, portanto, é o estabelecimento e elucidação das premissas extraídas por Kelsen do pensamento teórico-filosófico de Max Weber, Immanuel Kant (além dos neokantismos de Marburgo e Baden), Wittgenstein, e dos neopositivistas do Círculo de Viena, para rejeitar lógico-gnosiologicamente as concepções absolutistas do justo, bem como a possibilidade de discutir ou definir racionalmente a justiça e as normas morais dela decorrentes. A partir de elementos colhidos dessas diferentes correntes intelectuais, Kelsen desacredita, com base na distinção entre enunciados sobre fatos (racionais e verificáveis) e proposições relativas a valores (irracionais e não verificáveis), a capacidade humana de cognição dos valores em geral e, mais ainda, a existência e cognoscibilidade de valores absolutos  em sua ótica, requisitos imprescindíveis para a exequibilidade de qualquer sistema objetivo de moralidade ou para especulações racionais sobre a justiça.

Enlightenment and mission in early nineteenth century South Africa

In the early 19th century the London Missionary Society’s activities in South Africa were the subject of great scandal and a source of disrepute. The behaviour and attitudes of the first wave of LMS missionaries had challenged, and caused outrage, to both the political and moral norms of the colony. The radical attitudes and unconventional private lives of many of the early missionaries had also clearly shocked the Directors in Europe. In these controversies, and in the manner that the Society dealt with them, there can be read a contestation about not only the character, but also the purpose of mission activity. Was the Missionary task to work for political stability, to spread European values and help prepare a compliant and educated workforce? Or was it to save ‘lost souls’ and turn people away from idolatry and sin? Or, again, was it to fight for the oppressed, to liberate slaves and oppose tyranny? These debates were framed in complex and contradictory ways by a larger discussion that was informed by the new ideas and agendas that had emerged in the 18th century, commonly referred to as ‘The Enlightenment’. This paper traces the contours of an engagement between ‘Evangelical’ values and ‘Enlightenment’ principles through an exploration of the issues of the day such as: abolitionism, women’s rights, civilization and savagery. [From the Author]

Averroes y las cosas justas por naturaleza

En su comentario a la Ética a Nicómaco, Averroes se ocupó del pasaje donde Aristóteles distingue entre las cosas que son justas por naturaleza y aquéllas que lo son en virtud de la ley (V, 7 1134b18-1135a5). Su comentario es particularmente breve, pero plantea algunas dificultades importantes, como su alusión a un derecho naturale legale, que, según Leo Strauss, vendría a ser simplemente un derecho positivo de aceptación general. En este artículo se busca caracterizar lo justo natural y lo justo positivo en el comentario de Averroes y mostrar el alcance de la variación de los criterios propios de la justicia positiva.

Imagining Others

It is often argued that the ability to imagine what others think and feel is central to moral functioning. In this paper, I consider to what extent this is true. I argue that neither the ability to think of others as having representational mental states, nor the ability to imagine being in their position, is necessary for moral understanding or moral motivation. I go on to argue that the area in which thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings appears to play the largest role is that of supererogatory actions. Being able to get on well with others seems to be importantly predicated on our ability to think about their thoughts and feelings and being able to take up their perspective. However, when it comes to grosser moral norms and restrictions, such as harm norms, there is little reason to think that thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings plays a central role in understanding such norms or being motivated by them.

Imagination et perception morale

Dans cette thèse en psychologie morale, je m’intéresse au rôle de l’imagination dans la perception morale. Je soutiens que l’imagination y a une fonction épistémique dans la mesure où – en s’accompagnant ou non d’émotions – elle nous révèle des normes, des valeurs ou des vertus morales qui seraient autrement passées inaperçues. En simulant des croyances et des perceptions, l’imagination nous permet d’accéder à ces caractéristiques d’une situation moralement pertinentes, mais perceptuellement non saillantes. J’identifie trois modes de « perception morale imaginative » : 1) la prise de perspective qui consiste à endosser le point de vue d’autrui, 2) le cadrage imaginatif qui désigne le fait de voir un élément d’une situation comme autre qu’il n’est et, 3) la comparaison imaginative qui, grâce à la pensée contrefactuelle, éclaire le monde actuel à partir d’un monde possible imaginé. Chacun de ces modes contribue à enrichir notre connaissance morale, et partant, à améliorer notre délibération morale. J’appuie ma démonstration sur des travaux récents en philosophie de la psychologie, en psychologie cognitive et sociale, en neuropsychologie et, bien évidemment, en psychologie morale.