Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research

Revised 2006-06

Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard

Published as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, issue 1, pages 183-194.

Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable

A model intervenes: the many faces of moral hazard

This article builds on advances in social ontology to develop a new understanding of how mainstream economic modelling affects reality. We propose a new framework for analysing and describing how models intervene in the social sphere. This framework allows us to identify and articulate three key epistemic features of models as interventions: specificity, portability and formal precision. The second part of the article uses our framework to demonstrate how specificity, portability and formal precision explain the use of moral hazard models in a variety of different policy contexts, including worker compensation schemes, bank regulation and the euro-sovereign debt crisis.

The value of information in an agency model with moral hazard

I show that the principal and the agent may each prefer that the principal or the agent has imperfect information about the principal's technology in a principal-agent environment with moral hazard. Principals expend considerable resources on data cumulation and analysis. However, such investments in information acquisition are benecial only if the agent will know that the principal is not ignorant or it allows the principal to implement a dierent action. When the principal is perfectly informed about her technology, the agent prefers to be ignorant. In addition, the value of perfect information for the agency is negative if the principal would implement the same action with either possible technology. I also investigate the dierences between ex ante and ex post contracting, and the ramications of the principal being ignorant or potentially ignorant about the technology. Finally, I determine if the principal's utility varies continuously with the degree of informativeness of the agent about the principal's technology. In this vein, I determine whether the agent's uncertainty may make the principal better o if she has the less informative technology.

Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology

We analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which the principal has private information about the technology. We characterize Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the contracting game that possess the following properties: (i) a principal with a more informative technology ends up earning less profits than a principal with a less informative one does; (ii) compared to the complete information case, the actions implemented by the privately informed principal can be distorted; (iii) the agent can end up being better off when the principal has private information.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.