Moral action and natural law in Kant, and some developments.

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A new and extensive analytical examination of the elements of mental science: containing evidences of difference, distinguishing between elements of mind which lie at the foundation of mental action, and elements of mind which lie at the foundation of moral action.

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Moral e Ética: uma leitura psicológica

Após um século de reflexões e investigações, como era de se esperar, a Psicologia Moral apresenta sinais de esgotamento de seus referenciais teóricos clássicos. Consequentemente, novas perspectivas se abrem, entre elas a abordagem teórica que leva o nome de 'personalidade ética', cuja tese é: para compreendermos os comportamentos morais (deveres) dos indivíduos, precisamos conhecer a perspectiva ética (vida boa) adotadas por eles. Entre os invariantes psicológicos de realização de uma 'vida boa', está a necessidade de 'expansão de si próprio'. Como tal expansão implica ter 'representações de si' de valor positivo, entre elas poderão estar aquelas relacionadas à moral. Se estiverem, o sujeito experimentará o sentimento de dever, do contrário, a motivação para a ação moral será inexistente ou fraca.

A identidade moral e a integridade são preditoras da motivação moral?

Com o objetivo de analisar os componentes que induzem o comportamento moral, apoiámo-nos nas teorias psicológicas que admitem a importância do papel das emoções e da identidade na motivação para a ação moral, contrariamente ao que era defendido pelas teorias construtivistas, que apenas referiam a cognição como motor do funcionamento moral. Deste modo elegemos a identidade moral e a integridade como variáveis que podem estar associadas à motivação moral. Participaram 91 adultos emergentes, com idades compreendidas entre os 18 e os 25 anos (M = 20,63; Dp = 2,33), 14 do género masculino e 77 do género feminino. Para avaliar a motivação moral, a identidade moral e a integridade utilizámos respetivamente a PMAM, EIM e EI. Os objetivos foram verificar se existem diferenças individuais na consciência moral e nas emoções atribuídas a atos de transgressão, se a intensidade das emoções auto-atribuídas varia em função da consciência moral, e se a identidade moral e a integridade estão associadas à motivação moral. Os resultados mostram que existem diferenças individuais tanto na consciência moral como na atribuição de emoções. Os sujeitos avaliaram as transgressões de cuidado, não cuidar de parente e infidelidade, com emoções mais negativas e com maior utilização de consciência moral de transgressão, do que as transgressões anti-sociais, fraude e mentira. Verificámos também que a intensidade emocional varia em função da consciência moral. As categorias de Transgressão Identitária e Transgressão estão associadas com emoções mais negativas e as de Transgressão Relativizada e Não Transgressão estão relacionadas com emoções menos negativas. Foi ainda encontrada associação entre a identidade moral e integridade com a motivação moral, mas apenas para as transgressões anti-sociais.

Informação e ação moral

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Violence as Situational Action

Violence comes in many forms and occurs in many different circumstances for many different reasons. Is it really possible to develop a single theory that can explain all these disparate acts? In this paper, we argue it is. We will make the case that acts of violence are essentially moral actions and therefore can, and should, be analysed and explained as such. We will maintain that all acts of violence can be explained within the general framework of a theory of moral action. We will present just such a theory – Situational Action Theory – and demonstrate how it can be applied to the explanation and study of violence.

Um estudo sobre o status moral dos animais desde uma perspectiva deontológica

The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.

Um estudo sobre o status moral dos animais desde uma perspectiva deontológica

The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.

La loi morale et le sentiment de respect : les deux ressorts de l’action morale chez Kant

Le présent texte porte sur la question du ressort ou mobile (« Triebfeder ») de l’action morale chez Kant. L’interprétation qui y est soutenue consiste à dire qu’il n’y a pas qu’un seul ressort de ce type chez Kant, comme le soutiennent maints commentateurs, mais plutôt deux : la loi morale et le sentiment de respect. Le nerf argumentatif de cette thèse réside dans la prise en compte systématique des aspects des facultés de l’esprit humain impliquées dans la question du ressort moral chez Kant. Deux éléments jouent ici un rôle particulièrement important : (i) les deux sens explicites attribués par Kant au mot « volonté », mot qui peut signifier (a) la raison pratique et (b) la faculté de désirer, et (ii) la division de la faculté de désirer en (a) (libre) arbitre et (b) raison pratique. Plus d’une douzaine d’interprétations, réparties sur plus d’un siècle, sont analysées de manière critique, et deux modifications du manuscrit allemand de la « Critique de la raison pratique » sont proposées pour le chapitre « Des ressorts de la raison pure pratique ».

Desenhos animados televisivos, ética e Educação Física nos anos iniciais do ensino fundamental: diálogos possíveis

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O lugar e a especificidade da educação na filosofia prática de Kant

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Kant and Darwin

The central theses of Kant's critical philosophy are sometimes said to have been overtaken by evolutionary biology. This paper considers how far this proposition can be sustained. I argue that the ‘architectonic’ or ‘system-building’ character of the mind, the categories and the forms of intuition, can indeed be seen as the outcome of a particular evolutionary lineage in a Darwinian world. I argue, further, that the principal motive energizing the critical philosophy is the 'nightmare' of physical determinism. An alternative escape route from this particular nightmare is rehearsed. If this route is taken, the intricate arguments of the Critiques are unnecessary to save moral action in a world of things. Nonetheless, insofar as 'first philosophy' necessarily starts from within the philosopher's own subjectivity, Kant's work retains its power. I suggest that the Kantian and the Darwinian interpretations are to an extent complementary. If this is so, some form of evolutionarily-informed dual-aspect psychoneural identity theory could combine the essence of the two interpretations.

Form, Intention, and Indexing: The Liminal and Integrated Conceptions of Work in Knowledge Organization

This paper proposes a dual conception of work in knowledge organization. The first part is a conception of work as liminal, set apart from everyday work. The second is integrated, without separation. This talk is the beginning of a larger project where we will characterize work in knowledge organization, both as it is set out in our literature (Šauperl, 2004; Hjørland 2003 Wilson, 1968), and in a philosophical argument for its fundamental importance in the activities of society (Shera, 1972; Zandonade, 2004).But in order to do this, we will co-opt the conception of liminality from the anthropology of religion (Turner, 1967), and Zen Buddhist conceptions of moral action, intention, and integration (Harvey, 2000 and cf., Harada, S., 2008).The goal for this talk is to identify the acts repeated (form) and the purpose of those acts (intention), in knowledge organization, with specific regard to thresholds (liminal points) of intention present in those acts.We can then ask the questions: Where is intention in knowledge organization liminal and where is it integrated? What are the limits of knowledge organization work when considered at a foundational level of the intention labor practices? Answering such questions, in this context, allows us to reconsider the assumptions we have about knowledge organization work and its increasingly important role in society. As a consequence, we can consider the limits of classification research if we see the foundations of knowledge organization work when we see forms and intentions. I must also say that incorporating Zen Buddhist philosophy into knowledge organization research seems like it fits well with ethics and ethical responses the practice of knowledge organization. This is because 20th Century Western interpretations of Zen are often rooted in ethical considerations. This translates easily to work.