Triple-aspect monism: Physiological, mental unconscious and conscious aspects of brain activity

Brain activity contains three fundamental aspects: (a) The physiological aspect, covering all kinds of processes that involve matter and/or energy; (b) the mental unconscious aspect, consisting of dynamical patterns (i.e., frequency, amplitude and phase-modulated waves) embodied in neural activity. These patterns are variously operated (transmitted, stored, combined, matched, amplified, erased, etc), forming cognitive and emotional unconscious processes and (c) the mental conscious aspect, consisting of feelings experienced in the first-person perspective and cognitive functions grounded in feelings, as memory formation, selection of the focus of attention, voluntary behavior, aesthetical appraisal and ethical judgment. Triple-aspect monism (TAM) is a philosophical theory that provides a model of the relation of the three aspects. Spatially distributed neuronal dendritic potentials generate amplitude-modulated waveforms transmitted to the extracellular medium and adjacent astrocytes, prompting the formation of large waves in the astrocyte network, which are claimed to both integrate distributed information and instantiate feelings. According to the valence of the feeling, the large wave feeds back on neuronal synapses, modulating (reinforcing or depressing) cognitive and behavioral functions.

Moderate monism, persistence and sortal concepts

Coincidence (e.g., of a statue and the piece of bronze which constitutes it) comes in two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism (about coincidence) is the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism (also known as the stage theory) is the position that even temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court. The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position (= my own position) is moderate monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained.

Culturally inclusive design in a multicultural society

Multiculturalism in design advocates that people's belief and cultures should be placed at the centre of design processes and designers should be capable of addressing cultural diversity in multiple ways of thinking. However, contemporary design discourses seem not to be philosophically inclusive and practically applicable in mulriculmral contexts. This paper theoretically reviews three predominant metaphysical conceptual thinking frameworks: Dualism, Monism and Holism in many multicultural societies and argue a possibility of the culturally inclusive design.

Complicated Presence : The Unity of Being in Parmenides and Heidegger

The attempt to refer meaningful reality as a whole to a unifying ultimate principle - the quest for the unity of Being - was one of the basic tendencies of Western philosophy from its beginnings in ancient Greece up to Hegel's absolute idealism. However, the different trends of contemporary philosophy tend to regard such a speculative metaphysical quest for unity as obsolete. This study addresses this contemporary situation on the basis of the work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Its methodological framework is Heidegger's phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to the history of philosophy. It seeks to understand, in terms of the metaphysical quest for unity, Heidegger's contrast between the first (Greek) beginning or "onset" (Anfang) of philosophy and another onset of thinking. This other onset is a possibility inherent in the contemporary situation in which, according to Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition has developed to its utmost limits and thereby come to an end. Part I is a detailed interpretation of the surviving fragments of the Poem of Parmenides of Elea (fl. c. 500 BC), an outstanding representative of the first philosophical beginning in Heidegger's sense. It is argued that the Poem is not a simple denial of apparent plurality and difference ("mortal acceptances," doxai) in favor of an extreme monism. Parmenides' point is rather to show in what sense the different instances of Being can be reduced to an absolute level of truth or evidence (aletheia), which is the unity of Being as such (to eon). What in prephilosophical human experience is accepted as being is referred to the source of its acceptability: intelligibility as such, the simple and undifferentiated presence to thinking that ultimately excludes unpresence and otherness. Part II interprets selected key texts from different stages in Heidegger's thinking in terms of the unity of Being. It argues that one aspect of Heidegger's sustained and gradually deepening philosophical quest was to think the unity of Being as singularity, as the instantaneous, context-specific, and differential unity of a temporally meaningful situation. In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger articulates the temporal situatedness of the human awareness of meaningful presence. His later work moves on to study the situational correlation between presence and the human awareness. Heidegger's "postmetaphysical" articulation seeks to show how presence becomes meaningful precisely as situated, in an event of differentiation from a multidimensional context of unpresence. In resigning itself to this irreducibly complicated and singular character of meaningful presence, philosophy also faces its own historically situated finitude. This resignation is an essential feature of Heidegger's "other onset" of thinking.

The One and The Many : In the works of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi

This paper concentrates on Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. The focus is on their ideas on change and whether the world is essentially One or if it is composed of many entities. In the first chapter I go over some general tendences in Greek and Chinese philosophy. The differences in the cultural background have an influence in the ways philosophy is made, but the paper aims to show that two questions can be brought up when comparing the philosophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. The questions are; is the world essentially One or Many? Is change real and if it is, what is the nature of it and how does it take place? For Heraclitus change is real, and as will be shown later in the chapter, quite essential for the sustainability of the world-order (kosmos). The key-concept in the case of Heraclitus is Logos. Heraclitus uses Logos in several senses, most well known relating to his element-theory. But another important feature of the Logos, the content of real wisdom, is to be able to regard everything as one. This does not mean that world is essentially one for Heraclitus in the ontological sense, but that we should see the underlying unity of multiple phenomena. Heraclitus regards this as hen panta: All from One, One from All. I characterize Heraclitus as epistemic monist and an ontological pluralist. It is plausible that the views of Heraclitus on change were the focus of Parmenides’ severe criticism. Parmenides held the view that the world is essentially one and that to see it as consisting of many entities was the error of mortals, i.e. the common man and his philosophical predecessors. For Parmenides what-is, can be approached by two routes; The Way of Truth (Aletheia) and The Way of Seeming (Doxa). Aletheia essentially sees the world as one, where even time is an illusion. In Doxa Parmenides is giving an explanation of the world seen as consisting of many entities and this is his contribution to the line of thought of his predecessors. It should be noted that a strong emphasis is given to the Aletheia, whereas the world-view given is in Doxa is only probable. I go on to describe Parmenides as ontological monist, who gives some plausibility to pluralistic views. In the work of Lao Zi world can be seen as One or as consisting of Many entities. In my interpretation, Lao Zi uses Dao in two different senses; Dao is the totality of things or the order in change. The wu-aspect (seeing-without-form) attends the world as one, whereas the you-aspect attends the world of many entities. In wu-aspect, Dao refers to the totality of things, when in you-aspect Dao is the order or law in change. There are two insights in Lao Zi regarding the relationship between wu- and- you-apects; in ch.1 it is stated that they are two separate aspects in seeing the world, the other chapters regarding that you comes from wu. This naturally brings in the question whether the One is the peak of seeing the world as many. In other words, is there a way from pluralism to monism. All these considerations make it probable that the work attributed to Lao Zi has been added new material or is a compilation of oral sayings. In the end of the paper I will go on to give some insights on how Logos and Dao can be compared in a relevant manner. I also compare Parmenides holistic monism to Lao Zi’s Dao as nameless totality (i.e. in its wu-aspect). I briefly touch the issues of Heidegger and the future of comparative philosophy.

O Deus de Espinosa: substância una ou múltipla? Um estudo sobre a possibilidade do monismo

Esta pesquisa terá como objetivo compreender a tese do monismo, isto é, a tese de que existe uma única substância cuja unidade é garantida pela compatibilidade entre sua natureza absolutamente infinita e a multiplicidade real dos seus infinitos atributos. Mas o monismo não é aceito por todos os intérpretes como não problemático, o que, se comprovado, levaria o sistema de Espinosa à ruína. No primeiro capítulo, através da crítica de um destes intérpretes, Ferdinand Alquié, será colocado o problema do monismo. De acordo com este intérprete, Espinosa não consegue estabelecer racionalmente a possibilidade da substância absoluta. Veremos que, não conseguindo conceber como os infinitos atributos podem constituir a essência de uma substância que seja única, Alquié conclui que a tese do monismo é incompatível com a estrutura argumentativa do primeiro livro da Ética. Após a exposição do problema do monismo apresentado a partir de Alquié, será realizada uma tentativa de resgatar a coerência interna da obra de Espinosa. Este estudo visará explicitar os conceitos de substância e atributo, procurando acompanhar as duas etapas da construção do monismo ao longo das onze primeiras proposições da Ética, a saber: (1) a prova de que há uma única substância por atributo; (2) a prova de que há uma única substância para todos os atributos. Para avançar na compreensão dos problemas ontológicos envolvidos na construção do monismo, e de como a posição de Espinosa só pode ser compreendida a partir de uma transformação profunda dos conceitos herdados do cartesianismo, a pesquisa privilegiará as interpretações magistrais propostas por Martial Gueroult (Spinoza, I, Dieu; Aubier-Montaigne, Paris, 1968) e Gilles Deleuze (Spinoza et le problème de l'expression; Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1968). Estes intérpretes realizam cada um ao seu modo uma genealogia da substância absolutamente infinita e apresentam soluções que permitem pensar a tese do monismo como coerente. Estas soluções serão apresentadas e avaliadas para que se saiba em que medida elas conseguem expor o problema do monismo e solucioná-lo de maneira plausível.

Secularism and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Germany: The Rise of the Fourth Confession

Negotiating the boundaries of the secular and of the religious is a core aspect of modern experience. In mid-nineteenth-century Germany, secularism emerged to oppose church establishment, conservative orthodoxy, and national division between Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Yet, as historian Todd H. Weir argues in this provocative book, early secularism was not the opposite of religion. It developed in the rationalist dissent of Free Religion and, even as secularism took more atheistic forms in Freethought and Monism, it was subject to the forces of the confessional system it sought to dismantle. Similar to its religious competitors, it elaborated a clear worldview, sustained social milieus, and was integrated into the political system. Secularism was, in many ways, Germany's fourth confession. While challenging assumptions about the causes and course of the Kulturkampf and modern antisemitism, this study casts new light on the history of popular science, radical politics, and social reform.

Pós-brutalismo das paixões ao povoado refractário: dissertação

Dissertação submetida à Escola Superior de Teatro e Cinema para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Teatro - especialização em Encenação,

La logique et les logiques : la question du pluralisme

Partant des travaux séminaux de Boole, Frege et Russell, le mémoire cherche à clarifier l‟enjeu du pluralisme logique à l‟ère de la prolifération des logiques non-classiques et des développements en informatique théorique et en théorie des preuves. Deux chapitres plus « historiques » sont à l‟ordre du jour : (1) le premier chapitre articule l‟absolutisme de Frege et Russell en prenant soin de montrer comment il exclut la possibilité d‟envisager des structures et des logiques alternatives; (2) le quatrième chapitre expose le chemin qui mena Carnap à l‟adoption de la méthode syntaxique et du principe de tolérance, pour ensuite dégager l‟instrumentalisme carnapien en philosophie de la Logique et des mathématiques. Passant par l‟analyse d‟une interprétation intuitive de la logique linéaire, le deuxième chapitre se tourne ensuite vers l‟établissement d‟une forme logico-mathématique de pluralisme logique à l‟aide de la théorie des relations d‟ordre et la théorie des catégories. Le troisième chapitre délimite le terrain de jeu des positions entourant le débat entre monisme et pluralisme puis offre un argument contre la thèse qui veut que le conflit entre logiques rivales soit apparent, le tout grâce à l‟utilisation du point de vue des logiques sous-structurelles. Enfin, le cinquième chapitre démontre que chacune des trois grandes approches au concept de conséquence logique (modèle-théorétique, preuve-théorétique et dialogique) forme un cadre suffisamment général pour établir un pluralisme. Bref, le mémoire est une défense du pluralisme logique.