The Implications of U.S. China military cooperation : a workshop /

Mode of access: Internet.

Tanzanian scepticism of a militarised East African Federation and underlying military concerns

Attitudes towards a regional military force are of paramount importance when exploring public support for regional integration. Until now, however, scholarly research has not considered the influence of attitudes towards a regional military mechanism in the sub-Saharan African context. Using Afrobarometer data, we demonstrate that military concerns are vital when exploring Tanzanian attitudes towards the proposed political federation of the East African Community (EAC), the East African Federation (EAF). More specifically, opposition to military cooperation strongly influences Tanzanian scepticism of the EAF. This finding is highly relevant given that referendums in the participating member states must be passed to facilitate political integration. Heightened opposition towards military cooperation raises the possibility of the public rejecting a politically integrated EAC. This poses a potential obstacle to the implementation of joint security policies and crucial mechanisms to provide a more stable region at large. We account for alternative explanations of Tanzanian opinion formation and reflect on the strength of military-orientated concerns for investigating public support for the East African project specifically and regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa more widely.

Russia's interest in the Mistral: the political and military aspects. OSW Commentary No. 41, 2010-10-11

The negotiations over Russia’s purchase of French Mistral-class multipurpose assault ships, which were intensified in 2010, have gained a significant political dimension. The prospects of such a spectacular acquisition of large and expensive assault ships from one of NATO’s member states are being used by Russia to demonstrate that it has opened a new stage of relations with Western Europe. Paris has welcomed Russia’s desire to embark on military cooperation; for France, the Mistral deal has become a convenient tool to prove that relations with Russia are becoming increasingly normal, and that Russia poses no threat to the European security.

Wipert von Blücher und Finnland : Alternativpolitik und Diplomatie im 'Dritten Reich'

This dissertation explores the role of the German minister to Helsinki, Wipert von Blücher (1883-1963), within the German-Finnish relations of the late 1930s and the Second World War. Blücher was a key figure – and certainly one of the constants – within German Finland policy and the complex international diplomacy surrounding Finland. Despite representing Hitler’s Germany, he was not a National Socialist in the narrower sense of the term, but a conservative civil servant in the Wilhelmine tradition of the German foreign service. Along with a significant number of career diplomats, Blücher attempted to restrict National Socialist influence on the exercise of German foreign policy, whilst successfully negotiating a modus vivendi with the new regime. The study of his political biography in the Third Reich hence provides a highly representative example of how the traditional élites of Germany were caught in an cycle of conformity and, albeit tacit, opposition. Above all, however, the biographical study of Blücher and his behaviour offers an hitherto unexplored approach to the history of the German-Finnish relations. His unusually long tenure in Helsinki covered the period leading up to the so-called Winter War, which left Blücher severely distraught by Berlin’s effectively pro-Soviet neutrality and brought him close to resigning his post. It further extended to the German-Finnish rapprochement of 1940/41 and the military cooperation of both countries from mid-1941 to 1944. Throughout, Blücher developed a diverse and ambitious set of policy schemes, largely rooted in the tradition of Wilhelmine foreign policy. In their moderation and commonsensical realism, his designs – indeed his entire conception of foreign policy – clashed with the foreign political and ideological premises of the National Socialist regime. In its theoretical grounding, the analysis of Blücher’s political schemes is built on the concept of alternative policy and indebted to A.J.P. Taylor’s definition of dissent in foreign policy. It furthermore rests upon the assumption, introduced by Wolfgang Michalka, that National Socialist foreign policy was dominated by a plurality of rival conceptions, players, and institutions competing for Hitler’s favour (‘Konzeptionen-Pluralismus’). Although primarily a study in the history of international relations, my research has substantially benefited from more recent developments within cultural history, particularly research on nobility and élites, and the renewed focus on autobiography and conceptions of the self. On an abstract level, the thesis touches upon some of the basic components of German politics, political culture, and foreign policy in the first half of the 20th century: national belonging and conflicting loyalties, self-perception and representation, élites and their management of power, the modern history of German conservatism, the nature and practice of diplomacy, and, finally, the intricate relationship between the ethics of the professional civil service and absolute moral principles. Against this backdrop, the examination of Blücher’s role both within Finnish politics and the foreign policy of the Third Reich highlights the biographical dimension of the German-Finnish relationships, while fathoming the determinants of individual human agency in the process.

'"To have its cake and eat it too:" US policy toward South Africa during the Kennedy administration

The assumption that US policy toward Africa was characterized by continuity during the cold war has recently been challenged by scholars who argue that President John F. Kennedy embarked on an African policy that was distinct from his predecessors. This may be true for black Africa, but Kennedy’s support for African nationalism did not extend to South Africa. This article reveals that Kennedy’s cold war priorities ensured continuity in US policy toward the apartheid state and, in some cases, additional cooperation as cold war crises increased the perceived importance of South Africa as an ideological and strategic ally and bastion against communism on a rapidly changing continent. This article also explores the role South Africa’s apartheid government played in this cold war alliance. The ruling National Party recognized its importance to US foreign policy goals and used this to stave off serious American criticism of its racial policies, deflect attention in the United Nations, and ensure continued economic and military cooperation with the United States.

Diplomacia de Defesa: o Diálogo da Força ou a Força do Diálogo?

A Diplomacia de Defesa, apesar de existir com outros nomes e formas há já muitas décadas, só há relativamente pouco tempo lhe foi atribuída o espaço e o reconhecimento devido, quer em termos políticos, quer académicos. O presente trabalho pretende reconhecer o contributo da Diplomacia de Defesa para a concretização de importantes objetivos de política externa e apresentar uma definição que reflete não apenas a forma como é exercida mas, também, aquilo que realmente é: o emprego não violento de meios e recursos militares pelo Ministério da Defesa Nacional e pelas Forças Armadas, em atividades de cooperação com países aliados, parceiros e outros estrategicamente relevantes. O objetivo final da Diplomacia de Defesa não é apenas promover a cooperação bilateral e multilateral no âmbito da Defesa de uma forma altruísta, mas estabelecer parcerias benéficas do interesse dos países envolvidos e, nessa perspetiva, a Diplomacia de Defesa é uma aplicação direta de soft power. E porque o hard power gera soft power, a eficácia do soft power depende, evidentemente, da credibilidade do hard power. O uso da Diplomacia de Defesa como uma ferramenta da diplomacia já não deve ser, assim, uma escolha, mas uma componente necessária na análise das questões globais devendo ser reconhecida - e não temida - como um multiplicador de força de política externa.

The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

La cooperación militar entre China y Rusia y su incidencia en la seguridad de Asia Central durante el periodo 2001-2008

Durante los últimos diez años, la cooperación militar entre China y Rusia ha buscado proteger los intereses nacionales de ambos Estados, los cuales se encuentran estrechamente relacionados con las dinámicas en materia de seguridad de Asia Central.

Incidencia de los cambios en el entorno regional en la reformulación de la agenda de seguridad japonesa y en el mantenimiento del Tratado Nipo-Americano. Periodo 2001-2010

El objetivo general de la presente monografía es analizar la incidencia de los cambios en el entorno regional en la reformulación de la agenda de seguridad de Japón y en el Tratado de Seguridad Nipo-Americano durante el periodo 2001-2010. Para llevar a cabo este objetivo es necesario abordar, como un primer capítulo, los cambios en el escenario regional que representan un desafío para la seguridad de Japón. En el segundo capítulo, se describirá el alcance y ajustes que ha tenido la alianza Nipo-Americana; finalmente, en el tercer capítulo se explicará como Japón ha reformulado su agenda de seguridad en respuesta a los nuevos desafíos regionales.

LA COOPERACIÓN BILATERAL EN MATERIA MILITAR ENTRE EE.UU. Y EGIPTO Y SU INCIDENCIA EN LA SEGURIDAD FRONTERIZA CON ISRAEL (2002-2008).

Este estudio de caso se realiza con el ánimo de analizar la cooperación militar existente entre Estados Unidos y Egipto durante el periodo de 2002 a 2008. De esta manera, se busca conocer la incidencia que dicha cooperación tuvo en la seguridad fronteriza de Egipto e Israel. Para tal fin a lo largo del trabajo se procederá a exponer los principales aspectos del programa de cooperación analizado, se identificaran las principales amenazas a la seguridad fronteriza de Egipto y de Israel y se describirán las principales acciones que en el marco de dicho programa de cooperación militar se han tomado para hacerles frente a estas.

El dilema de la política exterior de la España nacionalista hacia la Alemania nazi: una estrategia de cooperación militar y de diplomacia secreta (1936 - 1945)

RESUMEN El interés de este estudio de caso es explicar de qué manera la España de Francisco Franco logra articular en su Política Exterior dos importantes estrategias, la cooperación militar y la diplomacia secreta, hacia la Alemania de Adolf Hitler desde el estallido de la Guerra Civil española en 1936 hasta el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en 1945. Se identifican las características de esta Política Exterior en la medida que se conocen los aspectos más importantes de la relación bilateral hispano-alemán, para así explicar cómo la articulación de estas posturas estratégicas le permitieron al Caudillo lograr sus objetivos políticos y, al mismo tiempo, salir indemne de esta Guerra. De esta forma, la perspectiva teórica del Realismo de las Relaciones Internacionales permite identificar las variables más importantes de la Política Exterior de España hacia Alemania a medida que Franco va definiendo su Interés Nacional.

Georgia y Rusia: la identidad como factor delimitador de los intereses y políticas de ambos estados con sus efectos en la Guerra de Osetia del Sur en 2008

Esta monografía se centra en evaluar mediante un enfoque constructivista, y a partir de una serie de hechos históricos, cómo la identidad construida por Rusia y Georgia fue el detonante de la Guerra de Osetia del Sur en 2008. Para tal objetivo, se partirá del supuesto que este conflicto fue el resultado de las diferencias entre ambos actores que desarrollaron una serie de políticas antagónicas, enmarcadas en una cultura de anarquía hobbesiana la cual se configuró tras la Revolución de las Rosas y la posterior llegada de Mijaíl Saakashvili al poder, puesto que Georgia se convertiría en el principal aliado de occidente en el Cáucaso, basado en un rol anti ruso y disidente de la influencia del Kremlin en la zona, divergiendo con el liderazgo de Rusia el cual se fundamenta en una identidad construida a raíz de su pasado imperial y hegemónico.

Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy- lessons for the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 38, January 2014

Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.

Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

Trading off sovereignty. The outcome of Belarus's integration with Russia in the security and defence field. OSW Commentary No. 107, 2013-04-25

Although the Republic of Belarus is constitutionally designated as a neutral country1, it is in fact closely connected with Russia’s own security and defence architecture. Within the Union State of Belarus and Russia, the armed forces are integrated to an extent unequalled in the world. A legacy of the Soviet division of labour, the Belarusian defence industry complex remains structurally dependent on Russia, which is its main raw material provider, outlet for exports and intermediary on world markets. Bilateral military cooperation also builds on the perception of common threats and partly shared security interests. Hence it unfolds regardless of the disputes that sporadically sour relations between Minsk and Moscow, standing out as the main achievement of the Union State – if not the only one.