Being attuned to intergroup differences in mergers: The role of aligned leaders for low-status groups

The present research focused on responses of low-status group members to a merger with a high-status group. A study was conducted (N = 153) in which the alignment of the leader for the merged group (ingroup vs. outgroup) and leader behavior (equality, outgroup favoritism, ingroup favoritism, complementarity) were manipulated. The authors predicted that the leader, by his or her behavior, would play an important role in defining the new relationship between premerger groups. Overall, low-status ingroup leaders were evaluated more positively than high-status outgroup leaders. Ingroup leaders were evaluated more favorably and were more likely to engender a common identity in the merged group than were outgroup leaders when leaders behaved in an ingroup-favoring or complementary fashion. In contrast, evaluations of ingroup and outgroup leaders did not differ when the leader stressed equality or was outgroup favoring. The findings demonstrate the important role leaders can play in accentuating or de-emphasizing premerger status differences.

Mergers and acquisitions as strategies of business expansion in the pharmaceutical industry

Introduction: The present paper deals with the issue of the increasing usage of corporation mergers and acquisitions strategies within pharmaceutical industry environment. The aim is to identify the triggers of such business phenomenon and the immediate impact on the financial outcome of two powerful biopharmaceutical corporations: Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline, which have been sampled due to their successful approach of the tactics in question. Materials and Methods: In order to create an overview of the development steps through mergers and acquisitions, the historical data of the two corporations has been consulted, from their official websites. The most relevant events were then associated with adequate information from the financial reports and statements of the two corporations indulged by web-based financial data providers. Results and Discussions: In the past few decades Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline have purchased or merged with various companies in order to monopolize new markets, diversify products and services portfolios, survive and surpass competitors. The consequences proved to be positive although this approach implies certain capital availability. Conclusions: Results reveal the fact that, as far as the two sampled companies are concerned, acquisitions and mergers are reactions at the pressure of the highly competitive environment. Moreover, the continuous diversification of the market’s needs is also a consistent motive. However, the prevalence and the eminence of mergers and acquisition strategies are conditioned by the tender offer, the announcer’s caliber, research and development status and further other factors determined by the internal and external actors of the market.

Mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector: An empirical review of the impact of merger announcement on abnormal returns

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more efficiency and may even lead to efficiency losses. These mergers lead to lower total welfare, suggesting that a regulator should be careful in assuming that possible efficiency gains of a merger will be effiectively realised. Moreover, the paper offers a possible explanation for merger failures.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Endogenous Mergers of Complements with Mixed Bundling

This paper studies endogenous mergers of complements with mixed bundling, by allowing both for joint and separate consumption. After merger, partner fi…rms decrease the price of the bundled system. Besides, when markets for individual components are suffi…ciently important, partner …firms raise prices of stand-alone products, exploiting their monopoly power in local markets and making substitute 'mix-and-match' composite products less attractive to consumers. Even though these effects favor the pro…fitability of mergers, merging is not always an equilibrium outcome. The reason is that outsiders respond by cutting their prices to retain their market share, and mergers can be unprofitable when competition is intense. From a welfare analysis, we observe that the number of mergers observed in equilibrium may be either excessive (when markets for individual components are important) or suboptimal (when markets for individual components are less important). Keywords: complements; merger; mixed bundling; separate consumption JEL classi…fication: L13; L41; D43

Managerial incentives for mergers

We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take notonly product market but also takeover decisions. We show that the optimalcontract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under bothquantity and price competition. This result is in contrast to the previousliterature and hinges on the fact that with a more aggressive manager rivalfirms earn lower profits and are willing to sell out at a lower price. \\However, as a side--effect of such a contract, the manager might take overmore rivals than would be profitable.

Expertise and finance: Mergers motivated by technological change

This paper argues that a large technological innovation may lead to a merger wave by inducing entrepreneurs to seek funds from technologically knowledgeable firms -experts. When a large technological innovation occurs, the ability of non-experts (banks) to discriminate between good and bad quality projects is reduced. Experts can continue to charge a low rate of interest for financing because their expertise enables them to identify good quality projects and to avoid unprofitable investments. On the other hand, non-experts now charge a higher rate of interest in order to screen bad projects. More entrepreneurs, therefore, disclose their projects to experts to raise funds from them. Such experts are, however, able to copy the projects and disclosure to them invites the possibility of competition. Thus the entrepreneur and the expert may merge so as to achieve product market collusion. As well as rationalizing mergers, the model can also explain various forms of venture financing by experts such as corporate investors and business angels.

Spatial market expansion through mergers

In this paper we present a model that studies firm mergers in a spatial setting. A new model is formulated that addresses the issue of finding the number of branches that have to be eliminated by a firm after merging with another one, in order to maximize profits. The model is then applied to an example of bank mergers in the city of Barcelona. Finally, a variant of the formulation that introduces competition is presented together with some conclusions.