Financiamento da Educação Superior no Pará: uma análise dos cursos de contrato na Universidade Federal do Pará no período de 2000 a 2008

Esse estudo apresenta resultados de uma pesquisa que investigou os contratos estabelecidos, no período de 2000 a 2008, entre a Universidade Federal do Pará (UFPA) e prefeituras do interior do estado do Pará, para a oferta de cursos de licenciatura plena, financiado com os recursos do Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério (FUNDEF), para os professores das redes municipais de ensino. Para compreender essa problemática, elaboramos os seguintes questionamentos: Como está estruturada a política de financiamento implementada pelo governo federal, para as IFES, ao longo desse período, e quais são as suas relações com a reforma do Estado e da Educação Superior, no país? Qual a política de financiamento do processo de interiorização da Universidade Federal do Pará e qual a sua relação com a política de oferta de cursos de contrato? Qual o montante dos recursos públicos municipais provenientes dos contratos celebrados entre Universidade Federal do Pará e as prefeituras do interior do estado, no período destacado? Como foram aplicados os recursos advindos dos contratos celebrados entre a Universidade Federal do Pará e as prefeituras do interior do estado?Adotamos como metodologia a abordagem quanti-qualitativa e utilizamos dados documentais. Como resultado, percebemos que, a Reforma do Estado, resultante da crise financeira do capital, implicou em reconfigurações do papel do Estado na educação, especialmente no que tange à legislação da educação superior e à política de financiamento para esse nível de ensino. Por isso, a universidade pública brasileira vive uma crise institucional, que se manifesta, especialmente, na estagnação orçamentária dos recursos do Governo Federal para sua manutenção. Os recursos disponibilizados pelo fundo público federal para custearem as despesas com Educação Superior não têm dado conta da crescente demanda de jovens que buscam esse nível de ensino. Ficou evidenciado na pesquisa que os cursos de contrato são uma estratégia de qualificação de profissionais locais com complementação de recursos para manutenção dos campi do interior e para complementação salarial dos professores que atuam nesses cursos.

Le Sipylos et ses monuments : ancienne Smyrne (Navlochon) : monographie historique & topographique : contenant une carte, quatre planches lithographiées et deux photographies /

Errata: p. [3] at end.

Eustratiou kai allōn tinōn episēmōn hypomnēmata eis ta deka tōn tou Aristotelous Ēthikon Nikmacheiōn biblia meta tou hypokeimenou = Evstratii et aliorvm insignivm peripateticorvm commentaria in libros decem Aristotelis De moribvs ad Nicomachvm, vna dvm textv svis in locis adiecto.

Guide letters.

Planning and design of outdoor sports facilities /

"Matching funds were obtained from the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force."

Athēnai kai hē perix chōra : dokimion patridographias pros chrēsin tōn scholeiōn kai pros idian meletēn met' eikonōn kai pros idian meletēn /

Mode of access: Internet.

Marketing Dynamics of a Hotel Tax: The Case of Chautauqua County, New York

Imposing a hotel tax in Chautauqua County, New York, which has natural attractions and the proximity of viable markets, might be highly likely to contribute significantly to the economic climate for the county. The authors examine the likely impact of hotel taxes, review hotel tax rates in cities across the country and in New York State, recommend revenue distribution, and propose a process by which hotel tax revenues can be equitably and efficiently disbursed

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.

AN ANALYSIS OF SMALL BUSINESS LOAN GUARANTEE FUNDS

Small businesses are considered important engines for job growth and economic development by policy makers worldwide. One of the most commonly cited constraints of small businesses is a lack of access to capital. To address this constraint, small business loan guarantee programs have been established in over 100 countries. There are a variety of types of guarantee funds, with the most significant differences being which borrowers are eligible for guarantees, and how borrowers are approved for guarantees. There is currently no clear delineation between types of programs and the economic conditions they operate in, though some trends are becoming apparent. However, these trends may not be leading to the best economic outcomes possible. By better matching the structure of the guarantee fund to the economic conditions it operates in, the program’s success in meeting economic development goals may be greatly improved. Many programs in developing countries may not be taking advantage of bank expertise and may be limiting the scope of their effectiveness. At the same time, programs in developed countries may be wasting resources by scattering their efforts too thinly and subsidizing less competitive firms to the detriment of local economic development.