Computing Markov-Perfect Optimal Policies in Business-Cycle Models

Time-inconsistency is an essential feature of many policy problems (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). This paper presents and compares three methods for computing Markov-perfect optimal policies in stochastic nonlinear business cycle models. The methods considered include value function iteration, generalized Euler-equations, and parameterized shadow prices. In the context of a business cycle model in which a scal authority chooses government spending and income taxation optimally, while lacking the ability to commit, we show that the solutions obtained using value function iteration and generalized Euler equations are somewhat more accurate than that obtained using parameterized shadow prices. Among these three methods, we show that value function iteration can be applied easily, even to environments that include a risk-sensitive scal authority and/or inequality constraints on government spending. We show that the risk-sensitive scal authority lowers government spending and income-taxation, reducing the disincentive households face to accumulate wealth.

Asset Prices, Business Cycles, and Markov-Perfect Fiscal Policy when Agents are Risk-Sensitive

We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent fiscal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond finance deficits. Households and the fiscal authority have risk sensitive preferences. We find that outcomes are affected importantly by the household's risk sensitivity, but not by the fiscal authority's. Further, while household risk-sensitivity induces a strong precautionary saving motive, which raises capital and lowers the return on assets, its effects on fluctuations and the business cycle are generally small, although more pronounced for negative shocks. Holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate and raise the return on equity, increasing the equity premium. Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little effect on the provision of government services, it does cause the fiscal authority to lower the income tax rate. An additional contribution of this paper is to present a method for computing Markov-perfect equilibria in models where private agents and the government are risk-sensitive decisionmakers.

Time-consistent fiscal policy under heterogeneity: Conflicting or common interests?

This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect tax-spending policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main fi ndings are: (i) it is optimal for a benevolent government, which cares equally about its citizens, to tax capital heavily and to subsidise labour; (ii) a Pareto improving means to reduce ine¢ ciently high capital taxation under discretion is for the government to place greater weight on the welfare of capitalists; (iii) capitalists and workers preferences, regarding the optimal amount of "capitalist bias", are not aligned implying a conflict of interests.

Dynamic linear economies with social interactions

Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to e.g., peer effects in school performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium in pure strategies), ergodicity, and welfare results. Also, we characterize equilibria in terms of agents' policy function, spatial equilibrium correlations and social multiplier effects, depending on the nature of interactions. Most importantly, we study formally the issue of the identification of social interactions, with special emphasis on the restrictions imposed by dynamic equilibrium conditions.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Local Interactions

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are "close" to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular forms of externalities, their presence typically suggests government action. I survey and discuss existing theoretical work on economies with local interactions and point to areas for further research.

On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.

Rebellion, repression and welfare

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.

The Policy Iteration Algorithm for Average Continuous Control of Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes

The main goal of this paper is to apply the so-called policy iteration algorithm (PIA) for the long run average continuous control problem of piecewise deterministic Markov processes (PDMP`s) taking values in a general Borel space and with compact action space depending on the state variable. In order to do that we first derive some important properties for a pseudo-Poisson equation associated to the problem. In the sequence it is shown that the convergence of the PIA to a solution satisfying the optimality equation holds under some classical hypotheses and that this optimal solution yields to an optimal control strategy for the average control problem for the continuous-time PDMP in a feedback form.

Realised and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules in an Estimated Markov-Switching DSGE Model of the United Kingdom

This paper investigates underlying changes in the UK economy over the past thirtyfive years using a small open economy DSGE model. Using Bayesian analysis, we find UK monetary policy, nominal price rigidity and exogenous shocks, are all subject to regime shifting. A model incorporating these changes is used to estimate the realised monetary policy and derive the optimal monetary policy for the UK. This allows us to assess the effectiveness of the realised policy in terms of stabilising economic fluctuations, and, in turn, provide an indication of whether there is room for monetary authorities to further improve their policies.

Cooperative off-policy prediction of markov decision processes in adaptive networks

We apply diffusion strategies to propose a cooperative reinforcement learning algorithm, in which agents in a network communicate with their neighbors to improve predictions about their environment. The algorithm is suitable to learn off-policy even in large state spaces. We provide a mean-square-error performance analysis under constant step-sizes. The gain of cooperation in the form of more stability and less bias and variance in the prediction error, is illustrated in the context of a classical model. We show that the improvement in performance is especially significant when the behavior policy of the agents is different from the target policy under evaluation.

A generalized multi-period mean-variance portfolio optimization with Markov switching parameters

In this paper, we deal with a generalized multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection problem with market parameters Subject to Markov random regime switchings. Problems of this kind have been recently considered in the literature for control over bankruptcy, for cases in which there are no jumps in market parameters (see [Zhu, S. S., Li, D., & Wang, S. Y. (2004). Risk control over bankruptcy in dynamic portfolio selection: A generalized mean variance formulation. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 49, 447-457]). We present necessary and Sufficient conditions for obtaining an optimal control policy for this Markovian generalized multi-period meal-variance problem, based on a set of interconnected Riccati difference equations, and oil a set of other recursive equations. Some closed formulas are also derived for two special cases, extending some previous results in the literature. We apply the results to a numerical example with real data for Fisk control over bankruptcy Ill a dynamic portfolio selection problem with Markov jumps selection problem. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Forward-looking versus recursive-dynamic modeling in climate policy analysis: A comparison

This paper develops a multi-regional general equilibrium model for climate policy analysis based on the latest version of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. We develop two versions so that we can solve the model either as a fully inter-temporal optimization problem (forward-looking, perfect foresight) or recursively. The standard EPPA model on which these models are based is solved recursively, and it is necessary to simplify some aspects of it to make inter-temporal solution possible. The forward-looking capability allows one to better address economic and policy issues such as borrowing and banking of GHG allowances, efficiency implications of environmental tax recycling, endogenous depletion of fossil resources, international capital flows, and optimal emissions abatement paths among others. To evaluate the solution approaches, we benchmark each version to the same macroeconomic path, and then compare the behavior of the two versions under a climate policy that restricts greenhouse gas emissions. We find that the energy sector and CO(2) price behavior are similar in both versions (in the recursive version of the model we force the inter-temporal theoretical efficiency result that abatement through time should be allocated such that the CO(2) price rises at the interest rate.) The main difference that arises is that the macroeconomic costs are substantially lower in the forward-looking version of the model, since it allows consumption shifting as an additional avenue of adjustment to the policy. On the other hand, the simplifications required for solving the model as an optimization problem, such as dropping the full vintaging of the capital stock and fewer explicit technological options, likely have effects on the results. Moreover, inter-temporal optimization with perfect foresight poorly represents the real economy where agents face high levels of uncertainty that likely lead to higher costs than if they knew the future with certainty. We conclude that while the forward-looking model has value for some problems, the recursive model produces similar behavior in the energy sector and provides greater flexibility in the details of the system that can be represented. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

How Optimal is US Monetary Policy?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov switching in shock variances, the inflation target and/or rule parameters, the data preferred description of policy is that the US Fed operates under discretion with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. Parameter estimates are similar to those obtained under simple rules, except that the degree of habits is significantly lower and the prevalence of cost-push shocks greater. Moreover, we find that the greatest welfare gains from the ‘Great Moderation’ arose from the reduction in the variances in shocks hitting the economy, rather than increased inflation aversion. However, much of the high inflation of the 1970s could have been avoided had policy makers been able to commit, even without adopting stronger anti-inflation objectives. More recently the Fed appears to have temporarily relaxed policy following the 1987 stock market crash, and has lost, without regaining, its post-Volcker conservatism following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000.