Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Issues and Solutions for the 21st Century

A producer of 5.4 M bbl/d, totalling almost half of the consumption of the entire European Union, the Gulf of Guinea is a fundamental lifeline and maritime link between Europe, the Americas and Africa. Geographically positioned as a staging post for transit originating in Latin America and coupled with its relatively porous borders, the region is also the perfect stepping stone for contraband heading to European shores. While blessed with an enviable wealth of marine and mineral resources, the region is also plagued by an ever-increasing spectre of maritime piracy; accounting for around 30% of incidents in African waters from 2003 to 2011. It is for these reasons that this research centres around the issues of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, with a particular focus on the first two decades of the 21st century. This research looks to examine the overall picture of the present state of play in the area, before going on to provide an analysis of potential regional developments in maritime security. This research begins with the analysis of concepts/phenomena that have played a notable role in the shaping of the field of maritime security, namely Globalisation and security issues in the post-Cold War era. The ensuing chapter then focuses in on the Gulf of Guinea and the issues dominating the field of maritime security in the region. The penultimate chapter presents a SWOT analysis, undertaken as part of this research with the aim of correlating opinions from a variety of sectors/professions regarding maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The final chapter builds upon the results obtained from the abovementioned SWOT analysis, presenting a series of potential proposals/strategies that can contribute to the field of maritime security in the region over the coming years. This research draws to a close with the presentation of conclusions taken from this particular investigation, as well as a final overview of the earlier presented proposals applicable to the field of maritime security during the second decade of the 21st century.

China and India’s Maritime Geostrategies:: Implications for International Maritime Security and Scenarios for 2030

Dissertação de Mestrado em Estratégia

The European Union Maritime Security Strategy: sailing uncharted waters? EPC Commentary, 26 June 2014

On 24 June 2014 the General Affairs Council of the European Union approved the “European Union Maritime Security Strategy” (EUMSS), following the mandate by EU Heads of State or Government in their ‘Defence Summit’ last December and building on the Joint Communication “For An Open and Secure Global Maritime Domain” by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in early March. These documents come at a time of considerable transformations in ‘the world’s last global common’: the sea.

Europe’s potential in addressing maritime security in Asia: a Japanese view. EPC Commentary, 29 June 2016

The level of interest in, and concerns about, Asia’s maritime security situation have increased substantially in Europe in the past few years, reflecting growing tensions particularly in the South China Sea (SCS). China’s actions there – island-building, reclamation and militarisation – are frequently making headlines in newspapers these days, including in Europe.

Les mémorandums d’entente sur le contrôle des navires par l'État portuaire comme mécanisme de renforcement de la sécurité maritime : une approche prometteuse du transgouvernementalisme

La thèse a été réalisée en cotutelle avec l'Université Paul Céazanne (Aix Marseille III).

Whose Mare? Rule of law challenges in the field of European border surveillance in the Mediterranean. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 79/January 2015

This paper examines key developments in the field of European border surveillance in the Mediterranean. By asking, ‘Whose Mare?’, we focus on rule of law challenges stemming from these developments in a post-Lisbon EU. The developments examined are the Italian Navy-led Mare Nostrum operation, the debates over European ‘exit strategies’ for this operation and the ensuing launch of the Frontex Triton joint operation (JO). The recently adopted Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations is also presented as a key development to understand the rule of law challenges. Moreover, the adoption of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) and the development of several maritime surveillance systems in the EU highlight that a wide range of actors seeks authority over this field.

A dimensão marítima da segurança nacional : os desafios do Arquipélago de Cabo Verde

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar os principais desafios à segurança marítima na subregião da África Ocidental, particularmente nas ilhas de Cabo Verde. Incidir-se-á, igualmente, sob as principais iniciativas adotadas a nível regional e nacional, bem como, as implicações desses novos desafios na estratégia de segurança nacional de Cabo Verde e os efeitos das ações cooperativas na segurança marítima deste arquipélago. Argumenta-se que apesar dos vários benefícios e potencialidades de exploração do espaço marítimo, existem, atualmente, diversas ameaças e vulnerabilidades, como a criminalidade organizada transnacional, mormente, o tráfico ilícito de drogas e de armas. De igual modo, a pirataria marítima, o terrorismo marítimo, a pesca ilegal e a poluição marítima colocam sérios problemas securitários aos Estados costeiros. No contexto dessas novas ameaças e face às limitações atuais do Direito Internacional Marítimo e à falta de pragmatismo de políticas nacionais e regionais, um possível caminho para combater as atividades ilícitas no mar é através de uma visão partilhada de interesses comuns e a tomada de decisões compartilhadas a todos os níveis. Para se atingir o desiderato proposto, além de se apoiar numa ampla revisão de bibliografia existente sobre a segurança marítima e relatórios elaborados por organismos regionais e internacionais, baseia-se também em leis e documentos oficiais de Cabo Verde relativos à segurança marítima.

La piratería de Nigeria como una amenaza a la seguridad marítima del Golfo de Guinea (2007-2012). Una aproximación desde el crimen organizado

Desde finales de los 70 la piratería se convirtió en un problema para Nigeria. Con el tiempo adquirió características del crimen organizado y en 2010 se transformó en un problema transnacional, afectando a Estados del golfo de Guinea. Así, a través de una base conceptual, el estudio de caso concluyó que los factores internos –como la pobreza, debilidad estatal y marginalización- y externos –siendo ellos la falta de políticas internas destinadas a las aguas y la ausencia de estrategias marítimas en la región- de la piratería, crearon una dinámica para que dicha actividad se convirtiera en una amenaza a la seguridad marítima del golfo de Guinea, tomando como referencia a Benín y Togo. Siguiendo la línea argumentativa, se demuestra que la búsqueda de una solución a la delincuencia marítima ha generado interacciones de seguridad que sugieren las primeras fases de un posible complejo de seguridad regional.

The European Union’s Response to Piracy: Are the Lessons Learned in the Horn of Africa a Model for the Gulf of Guinea? EU Diplomacy Paper/2015

The European Union (EU) is seen as the leading actor in successfully fighting piracy around the Horn of Africa. As a global trade power with strong economic interests, the EU is also challenged by similar maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis to assess the potential transfer of successful EU instruments from the Horn of Africa to the piracy situation in West African waters. This paper examines to what extent the EU can draw on its experience made in the Horn of Africa to deter piracy in West African waters. Based on qualitative research interviews, lessons learned from East Africa are identified and subsequently applied to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The results show that the EU is only partially drawing on its experience made in the Horn of Africa. One the one hand, it is rather reluctant to use crisis management instruments such as naval operations. On the other hand, the EU is drawing on its successful leadership in international political and military cooperation from around the Horn of Africa in order to make more effective use of available resources in the Gulf of Guinea.

Maritime and port security in South America: the situation in mid-2004

The current issue of the Bulletin is based on a document prepared by the ECLAC Transport Unit, Natural Resources and Infrastructure Division, on maritime and port security in South America: implementation of measures, general status as of mid-2004 (in Spanish only). This is a joint activity of the Technical Coordination Committee of the presidential initiative for Regional Infrastructure Integration in South America (IIRSA) and ECLAC. This document served as an input for a meeting on this subject held by representatives of the authorities of South American countries in Montevideo, Uruguay, on 22 June 2004. In this issue the results are presented of two recent surveys conducted by the users, operators and governmental authorities of the region on the new maritime and port security measures of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). An effort was made, on the one hand, to ascertain the existing level of awareness of the measures and the perceptions of impact, the potential costs and responsibility for the cost of the measures, and on the other hand to ascertain the degree of progress in their implementation, for which the deadline was 1 July 2004.

Maritime and port security in South America: implementation costs

This edition of the Bulletin is based on a document prepared by ECLAC and the Technical Coordination Committee of the presidential initiative for Regional Infrastructure Integration in South America (IIRSA), which is composed of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Andean Development Corporation (ADC) and the Financial Fund for the Development of the River Plate Basin (FONPLATA). The document was prepared as a joint activity on maritime and port security in South America in the context of the IIRSA sectoral integration process in relation to operational systems for maritime transport. It served as an input for the meeting on that subject held by representatives of the authorities of the South American countries in Montevideo, Uruguay, on 22 June 2004.This edition presents the results of the implementation cost assessment for the new compulsory regulations for maritime and port security of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and also considers the costs of the voluntary measures.

Maritime resources for security and trade; final report to the Secretary of Commerce.

Mode of access: Internet.

Finnish Critical Industries, Maritime Transport Vulnerabilities and societal Implications

Maritime transports are very essential for Finland as over 80% of the foreign trade in the country is seaborne and possibilities to carry out these transports by are limited. Any disruption in maritime transports has negative consequences to many sectors in the Finnish economy. Maritime transport thus represents critical infrastructure for Finland. This report focuses on the importance of maritime transports on security of supply in Finland and for the so called critical industries in particular. The report summarizes the results of the Work Package 2 of the research project STOCA – “Study of cargo flows in the Gulf of Finland in emergency situations”. The aim of the research was to analyze the cargo flows and infrastructure that are vital for maintaining security of supply in Finland, as well as the consequences of disruptions in the maritime traffic for the Finnish critical industries and for the Finnish society. In the report we give a presentation of the infrastructure and transport routes which are critical for maintaining security of supply in Finland. We discuss import dependency of the critical industries, and the importance of the Gulf of Finland ports for Finland. We assess vulnerabilities associated with the critical material flows of the critical industries, and possibilities for alternative routings in case either one or several of the ports in Finland would be closed. As a concrete example of a transport disruption we analyze the consequences of the Finnish stevedore strike at public ports (4.3.–19.3.2010). The strike stopped approximately 80% of the Finnish foreign trade. As a result of the strike Finnish companies could not export their products and/or import raw materials, components and spare parts, or other essential supplies. We carried out personal interviews with representatives of the companies in Finnish critical industries to find out about the problems caused by the strike, how companies carried out they transports and how they managed to continue their operations during the strike. Discussions with the representatives of the companies gave us very practical insights about companies’ preparedness towards transport disruptions in general. Companies in the modern world are very vulnerable to transport disruptions because companies regardless of industries have tried to improve their performance by optimizing their resources and e.g. by reducing their inventory levels. At the same time they have become more and more dependent on continuous transports. Most companies involved in foreign trade have global operations and global supply chains, so any disruption anywhere in the world can have an impact on the operations of the company causing considerable financial loss. The volcanic eruption in Iceland in April 2010 stopping air traffic in the whole Northern Europe and most recently the earth quake causing a tsunami in Japan in March 2011 are examples of severe disruptions causing considerable negative impacts to companies’ supply chains. Even though the Finnish stevedore strike was a minor disruption compared to the natural catastrophes mentioned above, it showed the companies’ vulnerability to transport disruptions very concretely. The Finnish stevedore strike gave a concrete learning experience of the importance of preventive planning for all Finnish companies: it made them re-think their practical preparedness towards transport risks and how they can continue with their daily operations despite the problems. Many companies realized they need to adapt their long-term countermeasures against transport disruptions. During the strike companies did various actions to secure their supply chains. The companies raised their inventory levels before the strike began, they re-scheduled or postponed their deliveries, shifted customer orders between production plants among their company’s production network or in the extreme case bought finished products from their competitor to fulfil their customers’ order. Our results also show that possibilities to prepare against transport disruptions differ between industries. The Finnish society as a whole is very dependent on imports of energy, various raw materials and other supplies needed by the different industries. For many of the Finnish companies in the export industries and e.g. in energy production maritime transport is the only transport mode the companies can use due to large volumes of materials transported or due to other characteristics of the goods. Therefore maritime transport cannot be replaced by any other transport mode. In addition, a significant amount of transports are concentrated in certain ports. From a security of supply perspective attention should be paid to finding ways to decrease import dependency and ensuring that companies in the critical industries can ensure the continuity of their operations.

Maritime transport liberalization and the challenges to further its implementation in Chile

Includes bibliography