On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

Secure many-to-one communications in wireless sensor networks

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are formed by nodes with limited computational and power resources. WSNs are finding an increasing number of applications, both civilian and military, most of which require security for the sensed data being collected by the base station from remote sensor nodes. In addition, when many sensor nodes transmit to the base station, the implosion problem arises. Providing security measures and implosion-resistance in a resource-limited environment is a real challenge. This article reviews the aggregation strategies proposed in the literature to handle the bandwidth and security problems related to many-to-one transmission in WSNs. Recent contributions to secure lossless many-to-one communication developed by the authors in the context of several Spanish-funded projects are surveyed. Ongoing work on the secure lossy many-to-one communication is also sketched.

Matching Markets under (In)complete Information

We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that for stable (matching) mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link between Nash equilibria under complete information and Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information. That is,given a common belief, a strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common belief, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information at the true profile in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism. This result may help to explain the success of stable mechanisms in these markets.

QoE-aware power management in vehicle-to-grid networks:a matching-theoretic approach

Frequency, time and places of charging and discharging have critical impact on the Quality of Experience (QoE) of using Electric Vehicles (EVs). EV charging and discharging scheduling schemes should consider both the QoE of using EV and the load capacity of the power grid. In this paper, we design a traveling plan-aware scheduling scheme for EV charging in driving pattern and a cooperative EV charging and discharging scheme in parking pattern to improve the QoE of using EV and enhance the reliability of the power grid. For traveling planaware scheduling, the assignment of EVs to Charging Stations (CSs) is modeled as a many-to-one matching game and the Stable Matching Algorithm (SMA) is proposed. For cooperative EV charging and discharging in parking pattern, the electricity exchange between charging EVs and discharging EVs in the same parking lot is formulated as a many-to-many matching model with ties, and we develop the Pareto Optimal Matching Algorithm (POMA). Simulation results indicates that the SMA can significantly improve the average system utility for EV charging in driving pattern, and the POMA can increase the amount of electricity offloaded from the grid which is helpful to enhance the reliability of the power grid.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Matching theory based travel plan aware charging algorithms in V2G smart grid networks

The frequency, time and places of charging have large impact on the Quality of Experience (QoE) of EV drivers. It is critical to design effective EV charging scheduling system to improve the QoE of EV drivers. In order to improve EV charging QoE and utilization of CSs, we develop an innovative travel plan aware charging scheduling scheme for moving EVs to be charged at Charging Stations (CS). In the design of the proposed charging scheduling scheme for moving EVs, the travel routes of EVs and the utility of CSs are taken into consideration. The assignment of EVs to CSs is modeled as a two-sided many-to-one matching game with the objective of maximizing the system utility which reflects the satisfactory degrees of EVs and the profits of CSs. A Stable Matching Algorithm (SMA) is proposed to seek stable matching between charging EVs and CSs. Furthermore, an improved Learning based On-LiNe scheduling Algorithm (LONA) is proposed to be executed by each CS in a distributed manner. The performance gain of the average system utility by the SMA is up to 38.2% comparing to the Random Charging Scheduling (RCS) algorithm, and 4.67% comparing to Only utility of Electric Vehicle Concerned (OEVC) scheme. The effectiveness of the proposed SMA and LONA is also demonstrated by simulations in terms of the satisfactory ratio of charging EVs and the the convergence speed of iteration.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

A Many-to-many 'rural hospital theorem'

We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' (Roth, 1986) generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences.

Technology market transfer plan launch of DELIVES to E.U. Market©

Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Biotecnologia

Cournot model with investments to change the market size

We present a new deterministic dynamical model on the market size of Cournot competitions, based on Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies to increase the size of the market of the firms at every period of the game. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium for the second subgame and the profit functions for both firms. Adding uncertainty to the R&D investment strategies, we get a new stochastic dynamical model and we analyse the importance of the uncertainty to reverse the initial advantage of one firm with respect to the other.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

One Un Programme 2010 Annual Report Many Strenghts, One Mission United Nations Cape Verde

This is the second annual report on the One UN Programme in Cape Verde, covering the year 2010. The report high-lights joint efforts and achievements of the UN System, the Government and Civil Society within the framework of the One Programme. It includes both programmatic and financial reporting. It gives concrete examples of the development impact of the “Cape Verde Transition Fund” -- both how those funds were used, and how they complemented additional resources available to the UN system (e.g. core funds plus contributions resulting from other resource mobilization efforts). The report shows how UN system activities have supported national priorities as defined in the Cape Verdean Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP II).

A methodology to estimate the potential to move inpatient to one day surgery.

BACKGROUND: The proportion of surgery performed as a day case varies greatly between countries. Low rates suggest a large growth potential in many countries. Measuring the potential development of one day surgery should be grounded on a comprehensive list of eligible procedures, based on a priori criteria, independent of local practices. We propose an algorithmic method, using only routinely available hospital data to identify surgical hospitalizations that could have been performed as one day treatment. METHODS: Moving inpatient surgery to one day surgery was considered feasible if at least one surgical intervention was eligible for one day surgery and if none of the following criteria were present: intervention or affection requiring an inpatient stay, patient transferred or died, and length of stay greater than four days. The eligibility of a procedure to be treated as a day case was mainly established on three a priori criteria: surgical access (endoscopic or not), the invasiveness of the procedure and the size of the operated organ. Few overrides of these criteria occurred when procedures were associated with risk of immediate complications, slow physiological recovery or pain treatment requiring hospital infrastructure. The algorithm was applied to a random sample of one million inpatient US stays and more than 600 thousand Swiss inpatient stays, in the year 2002. RESULTS: The validity of our method was demonstrated by the few discrepancies between the a priori criteria based list of eligible procedures, and a state list used for reimbursement purposes, the low proportion of hospitalizations eligible for one day care found in the US sample (4.9 versus 19.4% in the Swiss sample), and the distribution of the elective procedures found eligible in Swiss hospitals, well supported by the literature. There were large variations of the proportion of candidates for one day surgery among elective surgical hospitalizations between Swiss hospitals (3 to 45.3%). CONCLUSION: The proposed approach allows the monitoring of the proportion of inpatient stay candidates for one day surgery. It could be used for infrastructure planning, resources negotiation and the surveillance of appropriate resource utilization.

Hedging effectiveness of total returns swaps: application to the Japanese market

The development of the real estate swap market offers many opportunities for investors to adjust the exposure of their portfolios to real estate. A number of OTC transactions have been observed in markets around the world. In this paper we examine the Japanese commercial real estate market from the point of view of an investor holding a portfolio of properties seeking to reduce the portfolio exposure to the real estate market by swapping an index of real estate for LIBOR. This paper explores the practicalities of hedging portfolios comprising small numbers of individual properties against an appropriate index. We use the returns from 74 properties owned by Japanese Real Estate Investment Trusts over the period up to September 2007. The paper also discusses and applies the appropriate stochastic processes required to model real estate returns in this application and presents alternative ways of reporting hedging effectiveness. We find that the development of the derivative does provide the capacity for hedging market risk but that the effectiveness of the hedge varies considerably over time. We explore the factors that cause this variability.