Business cycle asymmetries: Loss aversion, sticky prices, and wages

In this chapter, the Smets-Wouters (2003) New Kenesian model is reformulated by introducing the loss aversion utility function developed in chapter two. The purpose of this is to understand how asymmetric real business cycles are linked to asymmetric behavior of agents in a price and wage rigidities set up. The simulations of the model reveal not only that the loss aversion in consumption and leisure is a good mechanism channel for explaining business cycle asymmetries, but also is a good mechanism channel for explaining asymmetric adjustment of prices and wages. Therefore the existence of asymmetries in Phillips Curve. Moreover, loss aversion makes downward rigidities in prices and wages stronger and also reproduces a more severe and persistent fall of the employment. All in all, this model generates asymmetrical real business cycles, asymmetric price and wage adjustment as well as hysteresis.

A DSGE model with loss aversion in consumption and leisure: an explanation for business cycles asymmetries

In this chapter, an asymmetric DSGE model is built in order to account for asymmetries in business cycles. One of the most important contributions of this work is the construction of a general utility function which nests loss aversion, risk aversion and habits formation by means of a smooth transition function. The main idea behind this asymmetric utility function is that under recession the agents over-smooth consumption and leisure choices in order to prevent a huge deviation of them from the reference level of the utility; while under boom, the agents simply smooth consumption and leisure, but trying to be as far as possible from the reference level of utility. The simulations of this model by means of Perturbations Method show that it is possible to reproduce asymmetrical business cycles where recession (on shock) are stronger than booms and booms are more long-lasting than recession. One additional and unexpected result is a downward stickiness displayed by real wages. As a consequence of this, there is a more persistent fall in employment in recession than in boom. Thus, the model reproduces not only asymmetrical business cycles but also real stickiness and hysteresis.

Do preference reversals generalise? Results on ambiguity and loss aversion

Preference reversals are frequently observed in the lab, but almost all designs use completely transparent prospects, which are rarely features of decision making elsewhere. This raises questions of external validity. We test the robustness of the phenomenon to gambles that incorporate realistic ambiguity in both payoffs and probabilities. In addition, we test a recent explanation of preference reversals by loss aversion, which would also restrict the incidence of reversals outside the lab. According to this account, reversals occur largely because the valuation task endows subject with a gamble, activating loss aversion. This contrasts with the choice task, where the reference point is pre-experiment wealth. We test this explanation by holding the reference point constant. Our evidence suggests that reversals are only slightly diminished with ambiguity. We find no evidence supporting their explanation by loss aversion.

The effect of accountability on loss aversion.

This paper investigates the effect of accountability-the expectation on the side of the decision maker of having to justify his/her decisions to somebody else-on loss aversion. Loss aversion is commonly thought to be the strongest component of risk aversion. Accountability is found to reduce the bias of loss aversion. This effect is explained by the higher cognitive effort induced by accountability, which triggers a rational check on emotional reactions at the base of loss aversion, leading to a reduction of the latter. Connections to dual-processing models are discussed.

Asymetric price adjustment and loss aversion

Ajuste assimétrico de preço é observado em diversos mercados, notavelmente varejo de gasolina: um aumento de custo é passado para os consumidores mais rápido do que uma redução. Eu desenvolvo um modelo de busca dos consumidores que gera essa predição sob aversão à perda. Uma fração dos consumidores ignora os preços no mercado e pode adquirir informação a um custo, o que permite que as firmas tenham lucro com dispersão de preços. Ajuste assimétrico de preço emerge se os consumidores são aversos a perdas em relação a um preço de referência. Custos mais altos tornam os consumidores mais dispostos a procurar, mas também diminui as chances de encontrar preços baixos, gerando uma relação custo-preço convexa.

Experimental results for Myopic Loss Aversion

This data is experimental results of "Myopic Loss Aversion: An Experimental Analysis for the Flexibility of Investment and the Frequency of Information Feedback Using Two Period Binomial Stock Model".

Testing reference dependence, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in Spanish tourism

Based on Tversky and Kahneman’s Prospect Theory, we test the existence of reference dependence, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in Spanish tourism. To do this, we incorporate the reference-dependent model into a Multinomial Logit Model with Random Parameters -which controls for heterogeneity- and apply it to a sample of vacation choices made by Spaniards. We find that the difference between reference price and actual price is considered to make decisions, confirming that reference dependence exists; that people react more strongly to price increases than to price decreases relative to their reference price, which represents evidence in favor of the loss aversion phenomenon; and that there is diminishing sensitivity for losses only, showing convexity for these negative values.

Direct versus indirect channels: Differentiated loss aversion in a high‐involvement, non‐frequently purchased hedonic product

Purpose – This article aims to investigate whether intermediaries reduce loss aversion in the context of a high-involvement non-frequently purchased hedonic product (tourism packages). Design/methodology/approach – The study incorporates the reference-dependent model into a multinomial logit model with random parameters, which controls for heterogeneity and allows representation of different correlation patterns between non-independent alternatives. Findings – Differentiated loss aversion is found: consumers buying high-involvement non-frequently purchased hedonic products are less loss averse when using an intermediary than when dealing with each provider separately and booking their services independently. This result can be taken as identifying consumer-based added value provided by the intermediaries. Practical implications – Knowing the effect of an increase in their prices is crucial for tourism collective brands (e.g. “sun and sea”, “inland”, “green destinations”, “World Heritage destinations”). This is especially applicable nowadays on account of the fact that many destinations have lowered prices to attract tourists (although, in the future, they will have to put prices back up to their normal levels). The negative effect of raising prices can be absorbed more easily via indirect channels when compared to individual providers, as the influence of loss aversion is lower for the former than the latter. The key implication is that intermediaries can – and should – add value in competition with direct e-tailing. Originality/value – Research on loss aversion in retailing has been prolific, exclusively focused on low-involvement and frequently purchased products without distinguishing the direct or indirect character of the distribution channel. However, less is known about other types of products such as high-involvement non-frequently purchased hedonic products. This article focuses on the latter and analyzes different patterns of loss aversion in direct and indirect channels.

Age-related striatal BOLD changes without changes in behavioral loss aversion

Loss aversion (LA), the idea that negative valuations have a higher psychological impact than positive ones, is considered an important variable in consumer research. The literature on aging and behavior suggests older individuals may show more LA, although it is not clear if this is an effect of aging in general (as in the continuum from age 20 and 50 years), or of the state of older age (e.g., past age 65 years). We also have not yet identified the potential biological effects of aging on the neural processing of LA. In the current study we used a cohort of subjects with a 30 year range of ages, and performed whole brain functional MRI (fMRI) to examine the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens (VS/NAc) response during a passive viewing of affective faces with model-based fMRI analysis incorporating behavioral data from a validated approach/avoidance task with the same stimuli. Our a priori focus on the VS/NAc was based on (1) the VS/NAc being a central region for reward/aversion processing; (2) its activation to both positive and negative stimuli; (3) its reported involvement with tracking LA. LA from approach/avoidance to affective faces showed excellent fidelity to published measures of LA. Imaging results were then compared to the behavioral measure of LA using the same affective faces. Although there was no relationship between age and LA, we observed increasing neural differential sensitivity (NDS) of the VS/NAc to avoidance responses (negative valuations) relative to approach responses (positive valuations) with increasing age. These findings suggest that a central region for reward/aversion processing changes with age, and may require more activation to produce the same LA behavior as in younger individuals, consistent with the idea of neural efficiency observed with high IQ individuals showing less brain activation to complete the same task.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Preference reversals for ambiguity aversion

This paper finds preference reversals in measurements of ambiguity aversion, even if psychological and informational circumstances are kept constant. The reversals are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they cannot be explained by context-dependent weightings of attributes. We offer an explanation based on Sugden's random-reference theory, with different elicitation methods generating different random reference points. Then measurements of ambiguity aversion that use willingness to pay are confounded by loss aversion and hence overestimate ambiguity aversion.

Efficient methods for empirical tests of behavioral economics theories in laboratory and field experiments

In the quest for a descriptive theory of decision-making, the rational actor model in economics imposes rather unrealistic expectations and abilities on human decision makers. The further we move from idealized scenarios, such as perfectly competitive markets, and ambitiously extend the reach of the theory to describe everyday decision making situations, the less sense these assumptions make. Behavioural economics has instead proposed models based on assumptions that are more psychologically realistic, with the aim of gaining more precision and descriptive power. Increased psychological realism, however, comes at the cost of a greater number of parameters and model complexity. Now there are a plethora of models, based on different assumptions, applicable in differing contextual settings, and selecting the right model to use tends to be an ad-hoc process. In this thesis, we develop optimal experimental design methods and evaluate different behavioral theories against evidence from lab and field experiments.

We look at evidence from controlled laboratory experiments. Subjects are presented with choices between monetary gambles or lotteries. Different decision-making theories evaluate the choices differently and would make distinct predictions about the subjects' choices. Theories whose predictions are inconsistent with the actual choices can be systematically eliminated. Behavioural theories can have multiple parameters requiring complex experimental designs with a very large number of possible choice tests. This imposes computational and economic constraints on using classical experimental design methods. We develop a methodology of adaptive tests: Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Designs (BROAD) that sequentially chooses the "most informative" test at each stage, and based on the response updates its posterior beliefs over the theories, which informs the next most informative test to run. BROAD utilizes the Equivalent Class Edge Cutting (EC²) criteria to select tests. We prove that the EC² criteria is adaptively submodular, which allows us to prove theoretical guarantees against the Bayes-optimal testing sequence even in the presence of noisy responses. In simulated ground-truth experiments, we find that the EC² criteria recovers the true hypotheses with significantly fewer tests than more widely used criteria such as Information Gain and Generalized Binary Search. We show, theoretically as well as experimentally, that surprisingly these popular criteria can perform poorly in the presence of noise, or subject errors. Furthermore, we use the adaptive submodular property of EC² to implement an accelerated greedy version of BROAD which leads to orders of magnitude speedup over other methods.

We use BROAD to perform two experiments. First, we compare the main classes of theories for decision-making under risk, namely: expected value, prospect theory, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and moments models. Subjects are given an initial endowment, and sequentially presented choices between two lotteries, with the possibility of losses. The lotteries are selected using BROAD, and 57 subjects from Caltech and UCLA are incentivized by randomly realizing one of the lotteries chosen. Aggregate posterior probabilities over the theories show limited evidence in favour of CRRA and moments' models. Classifying the subjects into types showed that most subjects are described by prospect theory, followed by expected value. Adaptive experimental design raises the possibility that subjects could engage in strategic manipulation, i.e. subjects could mask their true preferences and choose differently in order to obtain more favourable tests in later rounds thereby increasing their payoffs. We pay close attention to this problem; strategic manipulation is ruled out since it is infeasible in practice, and also since we do not find any signatures of it in our data.

In the second experiment, we compare the main theories of time preference: exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, "present bias" models: quasi-hyperbolic (α, β) discounting and fixed cost discounting, and generalized-hyperbolic discounting. 40 subjects from UCLA were given choices between 2 options: a smaller but more immediate payoff versus a larger but later payoff. We found very limited evidence for present bias models and hyperbolic discounting, and most subjects were classified as generalized hyperbolic discounting types, followed by exponential discounting.

In these models the passage of time is linear. We instead consider a psychological model where the perception of time is subjective. We prove that when the biological (subjective) time is positively dependent, it gives rise to hyperbolic discounting and temporal choice inconsistency.

We also test the predictions of behavioral theories in the "wild". We pay attention to prospect theory, which emerged as the dominant theory in our lab experiments of risky choice. Loss aversion and reference dependence predicts that consumers will behave in a uniquely distinct way than the standard rational model predicts. Specifically, loss aversion predicts that when an item is being offered at a discount, the demand for it will be greater than that explained by its price elasticity. Even more importantly, when the item is no longer discounted, demand for its close substitute would increase excessively. We tested this prediction using a discrete choice model with loss-averse utility function on data from a large eCommerce retailer. Not only did we identify loss aversion, but we also found that the effect decreased with consumers' experience. We outline the policy implications that consumer loss aversion entails, and strategies for competitive pricing.

In future work, BROAD can be widely applicable for testing different behavioural models, e.g. in social preference and game theory, and in different contextual settings. Additional measurements beyond choice data, including biological measurements such as skin conductance, can be used to more rapidly eliminate hypothesis and speed up model comparison. Discrete choice models also provide a framework for testing behavioural models with field data, and encourage combined lab-field experiments.

A reason for unreason: returns-based beliefs in game theory

Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-based beliefs’ approach: the expected returns of a particular strategy in proportion to total expected returns of all strategies. Using a decision analytic solution concept, Luce’s (1959) probabilistic choice model, and ‘hyperpriors’ for ambiguity in players’ cooperability, our approach explains empirical observations in various classes of games including the Prisoner’s and Traveler’s Dilemmas. Testing the closeness of fit of our model on Selten and Chmura (2008) data for completely mixed 2 × 2 games shows that with loss aversion, returns-based beliefs explain the data better than other equilibrium concepts.

从赌博游戏中的损失厌恶行为看情感预测与体验在决策中的作用

In Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson and Gilbert’s (2006) study on affective forecast, they found that people have a tendency to overestimate affective reactions in gains and losses, and people expect losses to have greater hedonic impact than gains of equal magnitude. Because of thus affective forecasting error, people prefer to irrationally avoid losses. Loss aversion is then seen as both a wealth-maximizing error and an affect-maximizing error. The present study examined the relationships among affective forecast, affective experience and loss aversion, and tested Kermer et al.’s (2006) conclusion that people’s loss aversion is an affective forecasting error. In experiment 1, we examined the relationship between affective forecast and loss aversion. Kermer et al.’s (2006) hypothesized that when people expect losses to have greater hedonic impact than gains, they will accept the gambling task, and when people expect gains to have greater hedonic impact than losses, they will refuse the gambling task. We found that (1) individuals with lower loss aversion had a greater tendency to accept a gambling task than those with higher loss aversion; (2) individuals with lower loss aversion expected losses and gains to have smaller affective impacts than those with higher loss aversion. Thus, people never exactly calculated their forecasting affective. In experiment 2, we examined the relationship between affective forecast and affective experience. Consistent with Kermer et al.’s (2006) finding, we found that our participants tended to overestimate affective reactions in gains as well as losses. More interestingly, Kermer et al.’s (2006) found that participants’ predictions for a loss were significantly more distant from experienced emotions than were their predictions for a win, we, however, found the opposite —participants’ predictions for a win were significantly more distant from the experienced emotions than were their predictions for a loss. These experiments further validated the relations between affection and decision making, and contributed to our understanding on the affective reactions to future events. Our study imply that it was not the exact calculation of affective forecast on decision outcomes, but rather the magnitude of affection on outcomes, that influenced people’s affective decision making. It indicated that those with lower magnitude of affection would less like to avoid losses, and thus more like to accept a gambling task.

海洛因成瘾者决策障碍及其行为机制的研究----短视行为及冲动、强迫和药物在决策中的作用

Addiction can be investigated from the perspective of decision making. Addicts usually make incorrect decisions when facing drug-related cues or they are driven to drugs, resulting in repeated drug seeking and taking. The present study adopted temporal discounting as behavioral task and on the basis of the fact that heroin addicts discounted more steeply than health participants (addicts preferred to choose immediate but smaller reward, regarded as myopia) which was consistent with previous research, three questions was raised and being concentrated on in this study. The first question was whether the character of myopia would be revealed in a somewhat complicated task? We designed a card game in which the participants were tested whether they would play the trump card in order to win a trick but not the whole game. Addicts played the trump card significantly earlier than controls did, indicating they focused on immediate single trick but not the game. Moreover, the performance in the card game and temporal discounting correlated significantly, suggesting addicts would display myopic decision not only in simply task like temporal discounting but also in task more complicated and similar to daily-life decision. Secondly, the present study adopted various kinds of temporal discounting tasks. In previous research, temporal discounting gain task was usually adopted. In the present study, we also adopted temporal discounting loss task. In either gain or loss task, there are two delayed amounts. Results showed in each decision condition addicts made poorer performance compared with control but in larger amount condition, addicts actually improved their decision performance. Meanwhile, addicts did not show loss aversion due to their close discount rates in gain and loss task while for controls, the discount rates were much lower in loss task than those in gain task. Thus we demonstrated that addicts were insensitive to negative outcomes by the method of temporal discounting. Finally, we investigated three mechanisms which exerted impacts on decision making. We adopted Go/NoGo task to test impulsivity and found addicts commits more errors (higher impulsivity) than controls did. We also designed a behavioral task which could be used to test drug-related compulsive behavior on human participants. Results showed addicts produced stereotyped key-pressing behavior when presented with drug-related cues. Furthermore, it was found participants with higher impulsivity displayed poorer performance in decision making but addicts with higher compulsivity only made poorer performance in smaller amount decision and the correlation between compulsivity and decision making was relative weak. In order to investigate the role of susceptibility and effect of drugs, we adopted years of abusing heroin as the indictor and discovered addicts with longer history of heroin abusing made poorer performance in smaller amount condition than addicts with shorter history. Also, the earlier the addicts began to use drug, the worse they would do in the smaller amount decision. The results here indicated drug itself could exert impact on decision making in certain condition. The present study revealed three characters of heroin addicts from the aspect of decision making: (1) focusing upon current benefit due to they preferred to choose immediate gain and delayed loss; (2) showed no loss aversion compared with healthy participants (3) inability to inhibit inappropriate response particularly when facing drug-related cue. These characters contribute to the facts that addicts seek and take drugs repeatedly while ignoring the negative consequences caused by abusing drugs.