Secession and liberal democracy. The case of the Basque country

The academic debate about the secession of a territory which is part of a liberal democracy state displays an initial contrast. On the one hand, practical secessionist movements usually legitimize their position using nationalist arguments linked to the principle of national self- determination. On the other hand, we find in academia few defenders of a normative principle of national self-determination. Philosophers, political scientists and jurists usually defend the status quo. And even when they do not defend it, most of them tend to leave the question of that question and secession unresolved or confused. Regarding this issue, liberal-democratic theories show a tendency to be “conservative” in relation to the political borders, regardless the historical and empirical processes of creation of current States. Probably, this feature is not far away to the fact that, since its beginning, political liberalism has not been a theory of the nation, but a theory of the state.

Are Feminism and Monotheistic Religions Compatible? & Religion and Liberal Democracy: Are They Philosophically Compatible?

Are Feminism and Monotheistic Religions Compatible? Dr. Roberta K. Ray How compatible are the three major monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) with feminism and the goal of equal rights for women in Western democracies? A special focus is on how Christian religions have functioned as a barrier to equal rights for women in the United States from Colonial period through the 21st century. Religion and Liberal Democracy: Are They Philosophically Compatible? Dr. John W. Ray American government is based on liberal democratic political theory. Based on an examination of the political philosophies of Locke, Mill, Rousseau, Hegel, Emerson and Rawls, Ray concludes that adherence to a liberal democratic political ideology is fundamentally incompatible with a religious grounding of political reality.

Populism and Liberal Democracy: Populists in Government in Austria, Italy, Poland and Switzerland

The enduring electoral success of populist parties across Europe and the increasing opportunities they have gained to access government in recent years bring once more into relief the question of whether populism and democracy are fully compatible. In this article we show how, despite playing different roles in government within very different political systems, and despite the numerous constraints placed upon them (for instance, EU membership, international law and domestic checks and balances), populist parties consistently pursued policies that clashed with fundamental tenets of liberal democracy. In particular, the idea that the power of the majority must be limited and restrained, the sanctity of individual rights and the principle of the division of powers have all come under threat in contemporary Europe. This has contributed to the continuing erosion of the liberal consensus, which has provided one of the fundamental foundations of the European project from its start.

A challenge for liberal democracy: How to understand the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 16.10.2014

The Russian intervention in Ukraine has provoked a deep crisis which will likely last for years, with profound consequences not only for Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe, but also for the internal situation in the European Union. The current Russian aggression is frequently seen as a profound violation of international law, breaking the rules that are fundamental for relations in Europe. It is perceived as perhaps a step towards rebuilding imperial Russia or, at the very least, an attempt to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, one very important aspect is virtually neglected, namely, that Russia’s Ukraine venture may have a significant impact on the future of liberal democracy in Europe and beyond.

Liberal Democracy and the Inferior 'Other'Other’: Could the peace liberal democracy promises to bring not extend to ‘Others’?

Advocates of liberal democracy argue that its principles and practices contribute directly to peace (at both inter-state and domestic levels). They rely on ideals such as the rule of law, institutional checks and balances on power, an ethos of tolerance, and free market economics to deliver the liberal peace. Liberals, however, overlook three important features embedded in the construction of liberal democracy which can serve to facilitate political violence: 1) the fixed and thus non-negotiable nature of liberal democracy’s core principles, 2) the inferior manner in which it conceives ‘Other’ social orders that do not share its core principles, and 3) the urge to proselytise Others. Together, these constitutive qualities can facilitate moves by leaders of Other groups to argue that liberal democracy threatens ‘their’ preferred identity, and thus its promised peaceful outcomes can be put in doubt.

La despenalización del aborto en una sociedad liberal : el caso colombiano

El presente artículo pretende exponer un debate de filosofía política sobre un problema moral álgido: el aborto. Partiendo de la base de que en todas las democracias occidentales una cuestión central en esta discusión tiene que ver con quién es, en último término, el que debe o puede decidir sobre la legalidad del mismo, lo que aquí se analiza es el problema de diseño y legitimidad constitucional con que se responde en una democracia liberal a esta controversia. Reconociendo que no son pocas las ocasiones en que este controvertido debate moral ha dividido profundamente a la sociedad, el presente artículo tiene como objetivo específico explicar brevemente cuál fue el mecanismo utilizado para lograr la “despenalización” del aborto en Colombia, para luego analizar la justicia del procedimiento, las pretensiones de quienes promovieron la acción de constitucionalidad y, así mismo, la decisión de la Corte Constitucional a la luz del modelo de justicia de John Rawls, especialmente a la luz del concepto de consenso traslapado. Lo anterior, con el propósito de defender la postura de que, al menos en el modelo jurídico-político colombiano, existen serios reparos frente a quienes consideran que la Corte Constitucional es el órgano democráticamente competente para cerrar el debate respecto al aborto.

Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia – Claim and Reality

This article discusses democratic elements in early Islamic sources and in the programs of the Algerian FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) and ANNAHDA in Tunesia. According to historic writings, Islam includes the principles of democratic consensus, consultation, and freedom of opinion, and an understanding that the sources of Islamic jurisdiction are subject to interpretation, that the sharia can be changed, and that religious authorities’ power to issue instructions on worldly matters is limited. These are the type of expectations that fundamentalist parties arouse when they speak of an Islamic caliphate as a state system. Against this background, an examination of the political system proposed until 1992 by the Algerian FIS shows that this system would have resulted in a very restrictive form of Islam. An investigation of the political system of the Tunisian fundamentalist leader Rached al-Ghannouchi reveals that the system he proposes may be designated as an Islamic democracy, since it takes into account separation of powers and pluralism of political parties. The head of state would be subject to the law in the same manner as the people. However, it is no liberal democracy, as he categorically rejects secularism, intends to punish apostates, and is only willing to allow political parties that are based on the religion of Islam. His state would only be a state of those citizens who follow Islam, completely neglecting secularist groups. Social conflicts and unrest are thus predetermined.

A Better Place to Be: Republicanism as an Alternative to the Authoritarianism-Democracy Dichotomy

ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: A BETTER PLACE TO BE: REPUBLICANISM AS AN ALTENATIVE TO THE AUTHORITARIANISM-DEMOCRACY DICHOTOMY Christopher Ronald Binetti, Doctor of Philosophy, and 2016 Dissertation directed by: Dr. Charled Frederick Alford, Department of Government and Politics In this dissertation, I argue that in modern or ancient regimes, the simple dichotomy between democracies and autocracies/dictatorships is both factually wrong and problematic for policy purposes. It is factually wrong because regimes between the two opposite regime types exist and it is problematic because the either/or dichotomy leads to extreme thinking in terms of nation-building in places like Afghanistan. In planning for Afghanistan, the argument is that either we can quickly nation-build it into a liberal democracy or else we must leave it in the hands of a despotic dictator. This is a false choice created by both a faulty categorization of regime types and most importantly, a failure to understand history. History shows us that the republic is a regime type that defies the authoritarian-democracy dichotomy. A republic by my definition is a non-dominating regime, characterized by a (relative) lack of domination by any one interest group or actor, mostly non-violent competition for power among various interest groups/factions, the ability of factions/interest groups/individual actors to continue to legitimately play the political game even after electoral or issue-area defeat and some measure of effectiveness. Thus, a republic is a system of government that has institutions, laws, norms, attitudes, and beliefs that minimize the violation of the rule of law and monopolization of power by one individual or group as much as possible. These norms, laws, attitudes, and beliefs ae essential to the republican system in that they make those institutions that check and balance power work. My four cases are Assyria, Persia, Venice and Florence. Assyria and Persia are ancient regimes, the first was a republic and then became the frightening opposite of a republic, while the latter was a good republic for a long time, but had effectiveness issues towards the end. Venice is a classical example of a medieval or early modern republic, which was very inspirational to Madison and others in building republican America. Florence is the example of a medieval republic that fell to despotism, as immortalized by Machiavelli’s writings. In all of these examples, I test certain alternative hypotheses as well as my own.

Capital cities of federations. On the way to analysing the normative base of their asymmetrical status

Federal Capitals often have special statutes. Compared with member states, they often enjoy a lower degree of self-government and a lesser share in the governing of the federation. Why do actors choose such devices, and how can they be justified in a liberal democracy? Surprisingly, the burgeoning literature on asymmetric federalism (to which our research group has contributed significantly) has overlooked this important feature of a de iure asymmetry, perhaps because political theory up to now has concentrated on cases of multicultural and plurinational federations. However, comparative literature is also rare. This paper is the first step to filling in this gap by comparing some federal capitals. The Federal District model (Washington) is compared to capitals organized as member-states (Berlin and Brussels), and capitals that are cities belonging to a single member state (Ottawa in Ontario). The different features of de iure asymmetry will thereby be highlighted. Some light will be shed on the possible motives, reasons and justifications for the choice of each respective status. The paper opens the door to further research on such status questions by analysing public and parliamentary debates, for example. It paves the way for more thorough research. Sicne the author has been awarded a grant by the Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, this research will be carried out soon.

Tutkimusretki Venäjän uusvanhaan sieluun

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

The Rationality of Revolution.

Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).