Out of their minds: legal theory in neural networks

This paper examines the use of connectionism (neural networks) in modelling legal reasoning. I discuss how the implementations of neural networks have failed to account for legal theoretical perspectives on adjudication. I criticise the use of neural networks in law, not because connectionism is inherently unsuitable in law, but rather because it has been done so poorly to date. The paper reviews a number of legal theories which provide a grounding for the use of neural networks in law. It then examines some implementations undertaken in law and criticises their legal theoretical naïvete. It then presents a lessons from the implementations which researchers must bear in mind if they wish to build neural networks which are justified by legal theories.

Shared authority: courts and legislatures in legal theory

This book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.

The role of the BNDES in the Brazilian development financing: contributions from the paper “towards a legal theory of finance” of Katharina Pistor

This paper aims to verify the main contributions and adjustments that the paper “Towards a Legal Theory of Finance” from Katharina Pistor may bring to the role of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) in the Brazilian development financing. In order to do so, I work with two questions in this paper: (i) such theory presents elements which allow analyzing the role of the BNDES and from there, if it is required, adjustments can be made in the governance of the BNDES? and (ii) there are academics and scholars that, together with the theory, also contribute with the improvement of the BNDES role in the development of Brazil?

Birth of the European individual : Outline of a theory of legal practice

The modern subject is what we can call a self-subjecting individual. This is someone in whose inner reality has been implanted a more permanent governability, a governability that works inside the agent. Michel Foucault s genealogy of the modern subject is the history of its constitution by power practices. By a flight of imagination, suppose that this history is not an evolving social structure or cultural phenomenon, but one of those insects (moth) whose life cycle consists of three stages or moments: crawling larva, encapsulated pupa, and flying adult. Foucault s history of power-practices presents the same kind of miracle of total metamorphosis. The main forces in the general field of power can be apprehended through a generalisation of three rationalities functioning side-by-side in the plurality of different practices of power: domination, normalisation and the law. Domination is a force functioning by the rationality of reason of state: the state s essence is power, power is firm domination over people, and people are the state s resource by which the state s strength is measured. Normalisation is a force that takes hold on people from the inside of society: it imposes society s own reality its empirical verity as a norm on people through silently working jurisdictional operations that exclude pathological individuals too far from the average of the population as a whole. The law is a counterforce to both domination and normalisation. Accounting for elements of legal practice as omnihistorical is not possible without a view of the general field of power. Without this view, and only in terms of the operations and tactical manoeuvres of the practice of law, nothing of the kind can be seen: the only thing that practice manifests is constant change itself. However, the backdrop of law s tacit dimension that is, the power-relations between law, domination and normalisation allows one to see more. In the general field of power, the function of law is exactly to maintain the constant possibility of change. Whereas domination and normalisation would stabilise society, the law makes it move. The European individual has a reality as a problem. What is a problem? A problem is something that allows entry into the field of thought, said Foucault. To be a problem, it is necessary for certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it . Entering the field of thought through problematisations of the European individual human forms, power and knowledge one is able to glimpse the historical backgrounds of our present being. These were produced, and then again buried, in intersections between practices of power and games of truth. In the problem of the European individual one has suitable circumstances that bring to light forces that have passed through the individual through centuries.

A 'deleterious' effect? : Australian legal education and the production of the legal identity

A body of critical legal scholarship argues that, by the time they have completed their studies, students who enter legal education holding social ideals and intending to use their legal education to achieve social change, have become cynical about the ability of the law to do so and no longer possess such ideals. This is explained by critical scholars to be the result of a process of ideological indoctrination, aimed at ensuring that graduates uphold the narrow and conservative interests of the legal profession and capitalist society, being exercised by law schools acting as adjuncts of the legal profession, and exercised upon the passive body of the law student. By using Foucault’s work on knowledge, power, and the subject to interrogate the assumptions upon which this narrative is based, this thesis intends to suggest a way of thinking differently to the approach taken by many critical legal scholars. It then uses an analytics of government (based on Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’) to consider the construction of the legal identity differently. It examines the ways in which the governance of the legal identity is rationalised, programmed, and implemented, in three Queensland law schools. It also looks at the way that five prescriptive texts to ‘surviving’ law school suggest students establish and practise a relation to themselves in order to construct their own legal identities. Overall, this analysis shows that governance is not simply conducted in the profession’s interests, but occurs due to a complex arrangement of different practices, which can lead to the construction of skilled legal professional identities as well as ethical lawyer-citizens that hold an interest in justice. The implications of such an analytics provide the basis for original ways of understanding legal education, and legal education scholarship.

Post-colonial law : legal establishments from past empires are illegitimate

The extant literature covering the plights of indigenous people resident to the African continent consistently targets colonial law as an obstacle to the recognition of indigenous rights. Whereas colonial law is argued to be archaic and in need of review, which it is, this article argues the new perspective that colonial law is illegitimate for ordering the population it presides over – specifically in Africa. It is seen, in five case studies, that post-colonial legal structures have not considered the legitimacy of colonial law and have rather modified a variety of statutes as country contexts dictated. However, the modified statutes are based on an alien theoretical legality, something laden with connotations that hark to older and backward times. It is ultimately argued that the legal structures which underpin ex-colonies in Africa need considerable revision so as to base statutes on African theoretical legality, rather than imperialistic European ones, so as to maximise the law’s legitimacy.

In search of Chinese jurisprudence : does Chinese legal tradition have a place in China's future?

Questions the extent to which Westerrn commercial laws adopted by China, particularly in its Company Laws of 1993 and 1995, are comptaible with China's different cultural and legal traditions. Suggests that Western concepts of the rule of law and of corporate governance are alient to China. Outlines the development of the Western legal tradition. based on Judaeo-Christian beliefs and legal rationalism. Compares this with the deveopment of the Chinese legal tradtion, based on Confucianism and legalism. Proposes ways in which the two traditions could be reconciled more effectively.