Karl Popper versus Theodor Adorno: lições de um confronto histórico

Karl Popper versus Theodor Adorno: Lessons from a historical confrontation. In 1961, during the Congress of the German Society of Sociology, two great theoretical references of the XX century faced in a historical debate about the logic of the social sciences. In addition to methodological issues strict sense, the confrontation became known as a debate between positivism and dialectic. The article first deals with the theoretical trajectories of Popper and Adorno and the relation of their theories with their political and ideological certainties. On one hand, the trajectory of the Popperian epistemology is examined, its contributions and vigorous attacks on Marx in what he called 'poverty of historicism" and false predictive Marxist world, and, on the other hand, the role of Adorno in the Frankfurt School, his criticism of totalitarianism and the defense of a critical emancipatory reason. The article also deals with the confrontation itself, the exposure of Popper's twenty-seven theses that culminate with the situation logic and the method of the economy as exemplary for the social sciences and Adorno's critical perspective of sociology and society as non-separable objects. In conclusion we show how the articulation of theory with the weltanschauung of each author helps to clarify the terms of the debate and how the confrontation contributed unequivocally to the dynamics of scientific progress and for the critical history of the ideas.

El hombre que amaba las etiquetas : Karl Popper.

El artículo analiza el pensamiento de Kart Popper, cuyas ideas se enfrentaron al positivismo lógico, al marxismo, al psicoanálisis y a la Escuela de Frankfurt. Expone sus teorías de los tres mundos y las soluciones que plantea ante las teorías científicas.

A crítica do conceito de verdade na filosofia da ciência de Karl Popper e o ensino de ciências

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Popper's Explications of Ad hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Scientific Practice

Popper's explications of 'ad hoc' in relation to hypotheses and explanations turn out to be either trivial, confused or mistaken. One such explication I discuss at length is circularity; another is reduction in empirical content. I argue that non-circularity is preferable to non-ad hocness for an acceptable explanation or explanans, and I isolate some persistent errors in his analysis. Second, Popper is barking up the wrong tree in proscribing reductions in empirical content in novel hypotheses. Such reductions may constitute scientific progress. He fails to show that ad hoc hypothesis are the threat to science he claims.

Popper and his Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: a close shave for the Law of Gravitation?

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). Further, on the evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others) presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect.

Popper e o convencionalismo

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

No more than Conjectures: Popper and the Ethics of Scientific Enterprise

Karl Popper dealt with both problems Yurevich (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 43(2), 2009, doi:10.1007/s12124-008-9082-7) deals: the crisis in Psychology and in the discourse about the nature of science. Although he failed to provide a complete response for both problems, his proposals can yet be fruitful to the reflection on these matters in the context of the present discussion. He offers some tentative answers to what could be considered a healthy epistemic activity, something Yurevich does not provide. More interestingly, some of the Popper proposals seem to fit, and in some extent correct, the quest for ""collaborative work"" proposed by Zittoun et al. (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 43(2), 2009, doi:10.1007/s12124-008-9082-7) as a way of transforming crisis in development.

What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses?

The received view of an ad hoc hypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-adhocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These points are obscured largely because the received view fails to adequately separate psychology from methodology or to recognise ambiguities in the use of 'ad hoc'.

Design, Science and Conceptual Analysis

Philosophers expend considerable effort on the analysis of concepts, but the value of such work is not widely appreciated. This paper principally analyses some arguments, beliefs, and presuppositions about the nature of design and the relations between design and science common in the literature to illustrate this point, and to contribute to the foundations of design theory.

Ockham's Razor: The Discovery of Neptune

The discovery of Neptune in September 1846 is a good example of scientific rationality but it has proven to be surprisingly difficult to explain how this is so from the perspective of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and several other commentators who have been influenced by these thinkers. I try briefly to explain how to avoid these difficulties and understand the achievement of the astronomers who predicted the location of the new planet, Urbain J. J. Leverrier and John Couch Adams.

Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction

Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, say, counter-corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-corroborationist alternative is beside the point. However, as whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we are not required to act in the past, and his argument for rejecting the second presupposes induction.

Thomas Kuhn e o relativismo

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em História e Filosofia das Ciências

Ciência, senso comum e revoluções científicas: ressonâncias e paradoxos

Revisa alguns aspectos da constituição do conhecimento científico, como, por exemplo, sua definição, sua relação com a filosofia, com a religião e com o mito; segundo, descreve algumas características de eventos que se desenvolveram e ainda se desenvolvem a partir de novos conceitos em torno da própria ciência, tais como o (novo) senso comum e algumas discussões (Thomas Kuhn e Karl Popper) sobre as revoluções científicas. Estabelece que a gênese científica relaciona-se às manifestações cotidianas, modificando-se e distinguindo-se em suas múltiplas interpretações.