Canons of professional ethics [and] Canons of judicial ethics,

Cover title

State bar act, by-laws, rules of procedure relative to disbarment, discipline and reinstatement, rules of professional conduct, canons of judicial ethics. Issued February, 1936.

Mode of access: Internet.

Código de ética judicial en Argentina. ¿Una respuesta a las demandas de transparencia de la sociedad?

El proyecto de Código de Ética Judicial, que emerge de la convocatoria de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (2004) y promueve una reforma judicial, es analizado desde un diagnóstico que enfatiza el carácter cultural de causas sistémicas de la crisis político-económica de diciembre 2001 en Argentina, donde la matriz institucional y los mecanismos de selección/financiamiento de los partidos políticos destacan la presencia de “clientelismo” y “corrupción”, determinando –con la “anomia social”– la llamada “corrupción gris”. Tales variables definen un patrón cultural de “labilidad” en los límites entre lo permitido-no permitido y lo ético-no ético.Desde los años noventa, la tendencia a judicializar el conflicto político, y una Magistratura con ausencia de debate interno y de activismo judicial, tornaron oportuno analizarla desde cinco ejes temáticos: 1) el debate orgánico dado en la Magistratura; 2) el marco general legislativo; 3) la Magistratura como exponente de valores culturales; 4) la transferencia de responsabilidades del ámbito político al judicial; 5) la mediatización de la labor del juez.De las conclusiones deviene crucial este enfoque que indaga las características de esta herramienta que la propia corporación judicial le propone a la sociedad: el Código de Ética Judicial.-----The Code of Judicial Ethics bill, which has emerged from the Argentine Supreme Court call in 2004 and which promotes a judicial reform, will be analized here from a point of view emphasizing the cultural nature of the general cause of the political and financial crisis that took place in December 2001 in Argentina, where the institutional matrix and the political parties’ mechanisms for selecting candidates and raising funds for campaign financing show that there exists a kind of ‘clientism’ and ‘corruption’, which brings about –within a state of ‘social anomy’– the so-called ‘grey corruption.’ These variables define a cultural pattern which is characterized by a ‘general state of uncertainty’ when it comes to deciding what is allowed or not allowed, and what is ethical or unethical.The tendency present since the nineties to judicialize the political conflict, together with a judiciary where there is neither internal debate nor judicial activism, have both made it appropriate to analize this matter from five points of discussion: (1) the internal debate in the judiciary; (2) the general legislative framework; (3) the judiciary as an exponent of cultural values; (4) the handing over of responsibilities from the political sphere to the judicial one; and (5) the media interfering with the judge’s work.From the resultant conclusions, we will infer that this approach becomes crucial, an approach that looks into the features of this tool that the judiciary itself proposes to the society: the Code of Judicial Ethics.

Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal.

Shipping list no.: 93-0569-P.

A conduta judicial ética teórica e aplicada contida em princípios e regras deontológicos abrangidos pelo sistema constitucional

Research on Legal Deontology dedicated to theoretical and applied ethics on judicial conduct grounded in legal principles and rules set out in the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Organic Law of the National Judiciary, also contemplating propositional instruments covered by the constitutional system, which conveys behavioural paradigms inserted in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, in the Universal Statute of the Judge and in the Latin-American Code of Judicial Ethics, as well as highlight the influence of those instruments in the Brazilian Ethical Code of the Magistrates and in the official complementary training of judges in charge of Judiciary Schools. The study provides the theoretical influxes of moral norm, passing by behavioural social norm to consolidate the ideal standards of judicial conduct into legal standards and related instruments. The Legal Deontology directed to the ethical judicial conduct is confronted with the stereotype that society expressed in relation to the judge's person, who is the political agent that interprets the law for making decisions which directly influences the realization of access to justice, that is constitutionally guaranteed to all. Core values inserted in the constitutional system intended to discipline the judicial conduct are presented and analysed under a critical view, since they are enclosed in prescriptive language that conveys behavioural aspects open to interpretation and which compliance is revealed as a proposition focused on promoting a better solution of interest’s conflicts under the responsibility of those who constitute the distinctive corporation of the Judiciary. The theme’s contextualization also focuses on applied ethics, based on the approach of normative and propositional instruments of deontological content, still focusing on the study of real cases examined by the Brazilian National Council of Justice, as part of its correctional goals.

Draft report and tentative recommendations /

"June 1993."

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in a patient's best interests : Australian judicial deliberations

•Intractable disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity are rare but challenging. Judicial resolution may be needed in some of these cases. •A central concept for judicial (and clinical) decision making in this area is a patient's “best interests”. Yet what this term means is contested. •There is an emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence that sheds light on when life-sustaining treatment will, or will not, be judged to be in a patient's best interests. •Treatment that is either futile or overly burdensome is not in a patient's best interests. Although courts will consider patient and family wishes, they have generally deferred to the views of medical practitioners about treatment decisions.

Patents, Ethics and Stem Cell Research : The Case of hESC Innovation in Australia, Europe and the United States

Embryonic stem cells offer potentially a ground-breaking insight into health and diseases and are said to offer hope in discovering cures for many ailments unimaginable few years ago. Human embryonic stem cells are undifferentiated, immature cells that possess an amazing ability to develop into almost any body cell such as heart muscle, bone, nerve and blood cells and possibly even organs in due course. This remarkable feature, enabling embryonic stem cells to proliferate indefinitely in vitro (in a test tube), has branded them as a so-called miracle cure . Their potential use in clinical applications provides hope to many sufferers of debilitating and fatal medical conditions. However, the emergence of stem cell research has resulted in intense debates about its promises and dangers. On the one hand, advocates hail its potential, ranging from alleviating and even curing fatal and debilitating diseases such as Parkinson s, diabetes, heart ailments and so forth. On the other hand, opponents decry its dangers, drawing attention to the inherent risks of human embryo destruction, cloning for research purposes and reproductive cloning eventually. Lately, however, the policy battles surrounding human embryonic stem cell innovation have shifted from being a controversial research to scuffles within intellectual property rights. In fact, the ability to obtain patents represents a pivotal factor in the economic success or failure of this new biotechnology. Although, stem cell patents tend to more or less satisfy the standard patentability requirements, they also raise serious ethical and moral questions about the meaning of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in European and to an extent American and Australian patent laws. At present there is a sort of a calamity over human embryonic stem cell patents in Europe and to an extent in Australia and the United States. This in turn has created a sense of urgency to engage all relevant parties in the discourse on how best to approach patenting of this new form of scientific innovation. In essence, this should become a highly favoured patenting priority. To the contrary, stem cell innovation and its reliance on patent protection risk turmoil, uncertainty, confusion and even a halt on not only stem cell research but also further emerging biotechnology research and development. The patent system is premised upon the fundamental principle of balance which ought to ensure that the temporary monopoly awarded to the inventor equals that of the social benefit provided by the disclosure of the invention. Ensuring and maintaining this balance within the patent system when patenting human embryonic stem cells is of crucial contemporary relevance. Yet, the patenting of human embryonic stem cells raises some fundamental moral, social and legal questions. Overall, the present approach of patenting human embryonic stem cell related inventions is unsatisfactory and ineffective. This draws attention to a specific question which provides for a conceptual framework for this work. That question is the following: how can the investigated patent offices successfully deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells? This in turn points at the thorny issue of application of the morality clause in this field. In particular, the interpretation of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in Australian, American and European legislative and judicial precedents. The Thesis seeks to compare laws and legal practices surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australia and the United States with that of Europe. By using Europe as the primary case study for lessons and guidance, the central goal of the Thesis then becomes the determination of the type of solutions available to Europe with prospects to apply such to Australia and the United States. The Dissertation purports to define the ethical implications that arise with patenting human embryonic stem cells and intends to offer resolutions to the key ethical dilemmas surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells and other morally controversial biotechnology inventions. In particular, the Thesis goal is to propose a functional framework that may be used as a benchmark for an informed discussion on the solution to resolving ethical and legal tensions that come with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australian, American and European patent worlds. Key research questions that arise from these objectives and which continuously thread throughout the monograph are: 1. How do common law countries such as Australia and the United States approach and deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in their jurisdictions? These practices are then compared to the situation in Europe as represented by the United Kingdom (first two chapters), the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Patent Office decisions (Chapter 3 onwards) in order to obtain a full picture of the present patenting procedures on the European soil. 2. How are ethical and moral considerations taken into account at patent offices investigated when assessing patentability of human embryonic stem cell related inventions? In order to assess this part, the Thesis evaluates how ethical issues that arise with patent applications are dealt with by: a) Legislative history of the modern patent system from its inception in 15th Century England to present day patent laws. b) Australian, American and European patent offices presently and in the past, including other relevant legal precedents on the subject matter. c) Normative ethical theories. d) The notion of human dignity used as the lowest common denominator for the interpretation of the European morality clause. 3. Given the existence of the morality clause in form of Article 6(1) of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions which corresponds to Article 53(a) European Patent Convention, a special emphasis is put on Europe as a guiding principle for Australia and the United States. Any room for improvement of the European morality clause and Europe s current manner of evaluating ethical tensions surrounding human embryonic stem cell inventions is examined. 4. A summary of options (as represented by Australia, the United States and Europe) available as a basis for the optimal examination procedure of human embryonic stem cell inventions is depicted, whereas the best of such alternatives is deduced in order to create a benchmark framework. This framework is then utilised on and promoted as a tool to assist Europe (as represented by the European Patent Office) in examining human embryonic stem cell patent applications. This method suggests a possibility of implementing an institution solution. 5. Ultimately, a question of whether such reformed European patent system can be used as a founding stone for a potential patent reform in Australia and the United States when examining human embryonic stem cells or other morally controversial inventions is surveyed. The author wishes to emphasise that the guiding thought while carrying out this work is to convey the significance of identifying, analysing and clarifying the ethical tensions surrounding patenting human embryonic stem cells and ultimately present a solution that adequately assesses patentability of human embryonic stem cell inventions and related biotechnologies. In answering the key questions above, the Thesis strives to contribute to the broader stem cell debate about how and to which extent ethical and social positions should be integrated into the patenting procedure in pluralistic and morally divided democracies of Europe and subsequently Australia and the United States.

The district reports, containing cases decided in the various judicial districts of the state of Pennsylvania. v. 1-30; 1892-1921.

Mode of access: Internet.

Judicial (in)activism in Australia's secular commonwealth

his article addresses two aspects of Australia's soft secular government. The first aspect explains how, and asks why, judges have been inactive in helping to draw the contours of secular government in Australia. The principal reason is that much of the social regulation that provokes the interest of faith-based groups is the constitutional concern of the States, and no State Constitution claims to coordinate relations between church and state. Moreover, the electorate has twice refused to pass referenda, in 1944 and 1988, for extending a constitutional demand of secular governance to the States. However, this is not so for the Commonwealth. It falls under the restrictions of section 116 of the federal Constitution, which states: The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion ('the establishment clause') or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion ('the free exercise clause'), and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth. As will be explained, while methods of legal interpretation suggest that section 116's establishment clause could place mild demands of non-discrimination on the federal Parliament, judicial inactivity in policing such demands on the Commonwealth, paradoxically, has arguably been secured by judicial activism in the High Court. A second aspect of secular government addressed is the High Court's disposal of 'the separation of church and state' as a constitutional principle in Australia. The contrast, of course, is to the United States, where for sixty years 'separation' has been given uneven recognition as a rule of constitutional law, and has undoubtedly driven the development of hard forms of secular governance in that country. The centrepiece of American secular government is the 1971 decision in Lemon v Kurtzman, where the US Supreme Court held that valid legislation had to pass three tests, ie: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion .. . finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. The third 'entanglement' prong of Lemon is the modern, less ambitious, form of the 'wall of separation', prohibiting too close an engagement between church and state. As this paper will demonstrate, 'entanglement's' destiny shows how unlikely it is that 'separation' can survive as a meaningful constitutional principle in the USA. And, it will also be argued that 'separation' has even poorer prospects for import to Australia.

The gendered effects of family migration law: contextual interpretation as a possible judicial remedy

At all normative levels, family migration law can disproportionally and negatively affect immigrant women’s rights in this field, producing gendered effects. In some cases, such effects are related to the normative and judicial imposition of unviable family-related models (e.g., the ʻgood mother ̕ the one-breadwinner family, or a rigid distinction between productive and reproductive work). In other cases, they are due to family migration law’s overlooking of the specific needs and difficulties of immigrant women, within their families and in the broader context of their host countries’ social and normative framework.To effectively expose and correct this gender bias, in this article I propose an alternative view of immigrant women’s right to family life, as a cluster of rights and entitlements rather than as a mono-dimensional right. As a theoretical approach, this construction is better equipped to capture the complex experiences of immigrant women in the European legal space, and to shed light on the gendered effects generated not by individual norms but by the interaction of norms that are traditionally assigned to separated legal domains (e.g., immigration law and criminal law). As a judicial strategy, this understanding is capable of prompting a consideration by domestic and supranational courts of immigrant women not as isolated individuals, but as ‘individuals in context’. I shall define this type of approach as ‘contextual interpretation’, understood as the consideration of immigrant women in the broader contexts of their families, their host societies and the normative frameworks applicable to them. Performed in a gendersensitive manner, a contextual judicial interpretation has the potential to neutralize the gendered effects of certain family migration norms. To illustrate these points, I will discuss selected judicial examples offered by the European Court on Human Rights, as well as from domestic jurisdictions of countries with a particularly high incidence of immigrant women (Italy and Spain).