Els jocs cooperatius desenvolupats a l'àrea d'educació física milloren les relaciones que s'estableixen entre alumnes de cicle superior de primària

Introducció: Teodorico (2004) ens diu que amb el joc cooperatiu els alumnes poden valorar, compartir i reflexionar sobre la relació que estableixen amb els altres companys. Per això, l’objectiu de la meva investigació és avaluar l’efecte que pot tenir l’aplicació d’una unitat de programació, centrada en el joc cooperatiu, en la relació que s’estableix entre els alumnes de 5è de primària, focalitzant l’atenció amb el líder i el menys acceptat del grup-classe. Mètodes: La intervenció s’avalua amb un disseny quasi-experimental pre-post amb grup control. I des del punt de vista dels dissenys observacionals podem parlar d’un disseny de seguiment, idiogràfic i multidimensional. El total de la mostra d’aquesta investigació era de 48 alumnes, dividit en el grup experimental (25) i en el grup control (23). La durada de la intervenció va ser de 8 setmanes i es va utilitzar un qüestionari ad hoc per la confecció dels sociograma i un instrument observacional ad hoc de les relacions de grup-classe. Resultats: El grup experimental estava format per 4 grups d’alumnes, al final de la unitat només se’n formaven 2, en canvi, el grup control, tan abans com després, estava format pels mateixos grups d’alumnes. Un dels menys acceptats del grup experimental ha millorat la relació amb alguns dels companys, en canvi els menys acceptat del grup control no ha millorat cap tipus de relació. Conclusions: Crec que els jocs cooperatius són una bona eina educativa per intentar millorar les relacions, ja que amb més temps crec que els resultats d’aquesta investigació haguessin sigut més positius.

La influència dels jocs cooperatius en la millora de les relacions interpersonals i la cohesió d'un grup

Actualment la tasca que desenvolupa l’escola és procurar que tots els infants es desenvolupin integralment, independentment de les característiques. En aquest marc sorgeix l’escola inclusiva, la qual ha d’estar preparada per atendre a tots i fer que aprenguin alumnes diferents al màxim de les seves possibilitats. Perquè això sigui real, l’escola ha de buscar noves maneres per a què els alumnes puguin aprendre no tan sols contingut sinó també valors, habilitats socials, cognitives, lingüístiques, entre moltes altres. Es per aquest motiu que la recerca vol portar a la pràctica i comprovar si mitjançant una eina lúdica, com són els jocs cooperatius, es milloren algunes habilitats socials i la cohesió d’un grup classe, en el qual també es té en compte la integració social d’una nena diagnosticada amb Trastorns Generalitzats del Desenvolupament (TGD) i, concretament, presenta trets autistes. Aquesta activitat educativa proporciona contextos nous on interactuar i desenvolupar bones pautes de relació per a tots així com també afavoreix la cohesió de grup, les relacions interpersonals i la integració d’infants amb dificultats en la interacció social.

Els jocs cooperatius com a eina de prevenció del conflicte. 'Los juegos cooperativos como herramienta de prevención del conflicto'.

Documento electrónico de 6 páginas en formato PDF. Resumen tomado de la propia comunicación

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities

[eng] We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to amalgamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meaningful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are closed.

The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities

[eng] We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to amalgamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meaningful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are closed.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

Direct and indirect subsidies in markets with system goods in the presence of externalities. Preliminary version

This paper derives a model of markets with system goods and two technological standards. An established standard incurs lower unit production costs but causes a negative externality. The paper derives the conditions for policy intervention and compares the effect of direct and indirect cost-reducing subsidies in two markets with system goods in the presence of externalities. If consumers are committed to the technology by purchasing one of the components, direct subsidies are preferable. For a medium-low cost difference between technological standards and a low externality cost it is optimal to provide a direct subsidy only to the first technology adopter. As the higher the externality cost raises, the more technology adopters should be provided with direct subsidies. This effect is robust in all extensions. In the absence of consumers commitment to a technological standard indirect and direct subsidies are both desirable. In this case, the subsidy to the first adopter is lower then the subsidy to the second adopter. Moreover, for the low cost difference between technological standards and low externality cost the fi rst fi rm chooses a superior standard without policy intervention. Finally, a perfect compatibility between components based on different technological standards enhances an advantage of indirect subsidies for medium-high externality cost and cost difference between technological standards. Journal of Economic Literature Classi fication Numbers: C72, D21, D40, H23, L13, L22, L51, O25, O33, O38. Keywords: Technological standards; complementary products; externalities; cost-reducing subsidies; compatibility.

The Lottery Blotto Game

In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win that battle. We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations pro le that players might have. Something that is not possible for the original Blotto game. JEL: C72, D74, H56. KEYWORDS: Colonel Blotto game; lottery contest function.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.