Análise do efeito interativo de falhas em processos de manufatura através de projeto de experimentos simulados

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Ground maritime structure interaction. Recent failures in inner gravity constructions on the Spanish Coastline

A maritime construction is usually a slender line in the ocean.It is usual to see just its narrow surface strip and not analyse the large amount of submerged material the latter is supporting.Without doubt,it is the ground to which a notable load is transmitted in an environment subjected to periodic,alternating stresses,dynamic forces which the sea's media constitute. Both an outer and inner maritime construction works in a complex fashion.A granular solid(breakwater)breathes with the incident wave flow,dissipating part of the wave energy between its gaps.The backflow tries to extract the different items from the solid block,setting a balance between effective and neutral tensions that follow Terzaghui's principle. On some occasions,fluidification of the armour layer has caused the breakwater to collapse(Sines,Portugal,February 1978).On others,siphoning or liquefaction of sand supporting monoliths(vertical breakwaters)lead them to destruction or collapse(New Barcelona Harbour Mouth,Spain,November 2001). This is why the ground-force-structure interaction is a complicated analysis with joint design tools still in an incipient state. The purpose of this article is to describe two singular failures in inner maritime constructions in Spain deriving from ground problems(Malaga,July 2004and Barcelona,January 2007).They occurred recently and the causes are the subject of reflection and analysis.

Estimating interactive coefficients for analysing interactive failures

Engineering assets are often complex systems. In a complex system, components often have failure interactions which lead to interactive failures. A system with interactive failures may lead to an increased failure probability. Hence, one may have to take the interactive failures into account when designing and maintaining complex engineering systems. To address this issue, Sun et al have developed an analytical model for the interactive failures. In this model, the degree of interaction between two components is represented by interactive coefficients. To use this model for failure analysis, the related interactive coefficients must be estimated. However, methods for estimating the interactive coefficients have not been reported. To fill this gap, this paper presents five methods to estimate the interactive coefficients including probabilistic method; failure data based analysis method; laboratory experimental method; failure interaction mechanism based method; and expert estimation method. Examples are given to demonstrate the applications of the proposed methods. Comparisons among these methods are also presented.

Let's talk about failures : why was the game for children not a success?

A significant proportion of research in the field of human-computer interaction has been devoted to game design. Yet, a multitude of good ideas and enthusiastic game design initiatives exist, where the games never see the light of day. Unfortunately, the causes of these failures remain often unexplored and unpublished. The challenges faced by researchers and practitioners are particularly complex when designing games for special target groups, such as children, or for a serious purpose. The HCI community would benefit from a discussion on these issues in order to avoid researchers and practitioners to repeat mistakes. We want to learn from projects that started with a promising idea, but failed or faced severe challenges. This workshop will be the first at CHI focusing on 'failed game projects'. In particular, workshop participants are encouraged to discuss issues that typically received little attention in publications and hereby contribute to the discussion on failures in the design, development and evaluation of games for and or with children. As a result, the community will benefit from these insights and lessons-learned, which will enhance the design of future (serious) games with/for children.

Strategic Interaction and Conventions

The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.

Shear Strength Model for FRP-Strengthened RC Beams with Adverse FRP-Steel Interaction

RC beams shear strengthened with externally bonded fiber-reinforced polymer (FRP) U strips or side strips usually fail owing to debonding of the bonded FRP shear reinforcement. Because such debonding usually occurs in a brittle manner at relatively small shear crack widths, some of the internal steel stirrups intersected by the critical shear crack may not have reached yielding at beam shear failure. Consequently, the yield stress of internal steel stirrups in such a strengthened RC beam cannot be fully utilized. This adverse shear interaction between the internal steel shear reinforcement and the external FRP shear reinforcement may significantly reduce the benefit of the shear strengthening FRP but has not been considered explicitly by any of the shear strength models in the existing design guidelines. This paper presents a new shear strength model considering this adverse shear interaction through the introduction of a shear interaction factor. A comprehensive evaluation of the proposed model, as well as three other shear strength models, is conducted using a large test database. It is shown that the proposed shear strength model performs the best among the models compared, and the performance of the other shear strength models can be significantly improved by including the proposed shear interaction factor. Finally, a design recommendation is presented.

An empirical investigation of the effect of interaction justice perception on consumer intentions after complaining

This study examined how apology as interaction justice impacts on consumer perceptions of service recovery attempt.  Data was collected using hypothetical scenarios.  Two types of service failures were proposed and the impact of recovery action on each failure type was compared.  Findings include that there is direct effect of recovery action on consumer future intentions in both type of failures.  Implications and direction to the future research were proposed.

Changes in cell proliferation, but not in vascularisation are characteristic for human endometrium in different reproductive failures--a pilot study

Reproductive failure, determined as recurrent spontaneous abortions (RSA) or recurrent implantation failure (RIF) in women is not well understood. Several factors, including embryo quality, and cellular and molecular changes in endometrium may contribute to the insufficient feto-maternal interaction resulting in reproductive failure. Prior clinical studies suggest an inadequate endometrial growth and development of the endometrium, leading to a lesser endometrial thickness.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Formal analysis of human-computer interaction using model checking

Experiments with simulators allow psychologists to better understand the causes of human errors and build models of cognitive processes to be used in human reliability assessment (HRA). This paper investigates an approach to task failure analysis based on patterns of behaviour, by contrast to more traditional event-based approaches. It considers, as a case study, a formal model of an air traffic control (ATC) system which incorporates controller behaviour. The cognitive model is formalised in the CSP process algebra. Patterns of behaviour are expressed as temporal logic properties. Then a model-checking technique is used to verify whether the decomposition of the operator's behaviour into patterns is sound and complete with respect to the cognitive model. The decomposition is shown to be incomplete and a new behavioural pattern is identified, which appears to have been overlooked in the analysis of the data provided by the experiments with the simulator. This illustrates how formal analysis of operator models can yield fresh insights into how failures may arise in interactive systems.

Using Research Methods in Human Computer Interaction to Design Technology for Resilience

Research in human computer interaction (HCI) covers both technological and human behavioural concerns. As a consequence, the contributions made in HCI research tend to be aware to either engineering or the social sciences. In HCI the purpose of practical research contributions is to reveal unknown insights about human behaviour and its relationship to technology. Practical research methods normally used in HCI include formal experiments, field experiments, field studies, interviews, focus groups, surveys, usability tests, case studies, diary studies, ethnography, contextual inquiry, experience sampling, and automated data collection. In this paper, we report on our experience using the evaluation methods focus groups, surveys and interviews and how we adopted these methods to develop artefacts: either interface’s design or information and technological systems. Four projects are examples of the different methods application to gather information about user’s wants, habits, practices, concerns and preferences. The goal was to build an understanding of the attitudes and satisfaction of the people who might interact with a technological artefact or information system. Conversely, we intended to design for information systems and technological applications, to promote resilience in organisations (a set of routines that allow to recover from obstacles) and user’s experiences. Organisations can here also be viewed within a system approach, which means that the system perturbations even failures could be characterized and improved. The term resilience has been applied to everything from the real estate, to the economy, sports, events, business, psychology, and more. In this study, we highlight that resilience is also made up of a number of different skills and abilities (self-awareness, creating meaning from other experiences, self-efficacy, optimism, and building strong relationships) that are a few foundational ingredients, which people should use along with the process of enhancing an organisation’s resilience. Resilience enhances knowledge of resources available to people confronting existing problems.