Technical and economic factors in applying the enhanced coalbed methane recovery process

Geological sequestration of CO2 is a technically feasible and potentially economic option for significantly and safely reducing greenhouse gas emissions, with CO2 injection already practiced in Canada and the USA to enhance crude oil production. The Enhanced Coalbed Methane (ECBM) process is seen as the next most economical sequestration options. The authors estimate an incremental methane recovery factor from 20% to 50%, depending on coal rank and seam depth. Others have estimated the potential to increase worldwide CBM production, utilising ECBM, by 18 Trillion cubic meters, while simultaneously sequestering 345 Giga tonnes of CO2. This paper presents technical and economic factors to consider for developing a commercial ECBM project. Technical factors include: geostructural and hydrogeological issues, geochemical reactions, stressed and competitive sorption, counter-diffusion, effective and relative 4-D coal permeability and methane recovery levels. Key economic factors are injectant acquisition price, sale price of methane and the level of carbon credits.

Efficient Prices at Any Cost: Does Algorithmic Trading Deter Information Acquisition?

I demonstrate a powerful tension between acquiring information and incorporating it into asset prices, the two core elements of price discovery. As a salient case, I focus on the transformative rise of algorithmic trading (AT) typically associated with improved price efficiency. Using a measure of the relative information content of prices and a comprehensive panel of 37,325 stock-quarters of SEC market data, I establish instead that algorithmic trading strongly decreases the net amount of information in prices. The increase in price distortions associated with the AT “information gap” is roughly $42.6 billion/year for U.S. common stocks around earnings announcement events alone. Information losses are concentrated among stocks with high shares of algorithmic liquidity takers relative to algorithmic liquidity makers, suggesting that aggressive AT powerfully deters fundamental information acquisition despite its importance for translating available information into prices.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Case study preparation: The whatsApp acquisition from Facebook

The purpose of this work project is to analyze the acquisition of WhatsApp from Facebook occurred on 19th February 2014. The main research has the aim to understand if the price tag of $19 billion paid by Mark Zuckerberg was fair. Along the reaction of Facebook’s EPS on the keydays after the purchase, a balanced assessment of the acquisition was obtained and discussed. Results suggest that the price tag could be reasonable. However, taking into account the industry in which the two companies operate, where competition is quite intense, Facebook should assess this deal in a longerterm perspective.

The Impact of a Corporate Name Change on Stock Price and Trading Volume of Canadian Companies

This thesis examines the impact of a corporate name change on stock price and trading volume of Canadian companies around the announcement date, the approval date, and the adoption date over the time period from 1997 to 2011. Name changes are classified into six categories: major and minor, structural and pure, diversified and focused, accompanied with a change in ticker symbol and without a change in ticker symbol, “Gold” name addition and deletion, and different reasons for name changes (e.g., merger and acquisition, change of structure, change of strategy, and better image). The thesis uses the standard event study methodology to perform abnormal return and trading volume analyses. In addition, regression analysis is employed to examine which type of a name change has the largest impact on cumulative abnormal returns. Sample stocks exhibit a significant positive abnormal return one-day prior to the approval day and one day after the adoption date. Around the approval date we observe significant abnormal returns for stocks with a structural name change. On the day after the adoption date we document abnormal returns for stocks with major, minor, structural, pure, focused, and ticker symbol name changes. If a merger or acquisition is the reason for a name change, companies tend to experience a significant positive abnormal return one-day before the approval date and on the adoption date. If a change of structure is the reason for a name change, companies exhibit a significant positive abnormal return on the approval date and a significant negative abnormal return on the adoption date. In case of a change of strategy as the reason for a name change, companies show a significant negative abnormal return around the approval date and a significant positive abnormal return around the adoption date.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

Enhancing the trust of location acquisition systems for critical applications and location-based security services

This paper identifies a number of critical infrastructure applications that are reliant on location services from cooperative location technologies such as GPS and GSM. We show that these location technologies can be represented in a general location model, such that the model components can be used for vulnerability analysis. We perform a vulnerability analysis on these components of GSM and GPS location systems as well as a number of augmentations to these systems.