Mandatory and voluntary information disclosure and the effects on financial analysts: evidence from China

Purpose – This paper aims to make a comparison, different from existing literature solely focusing on voluntary earnings forecasts and ex post earnings surprise, between the effects of mandatory earnings surprise warnings and voluntary information disclosure issued by management teams on financial analysts in terms of the number of followings and the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses panel data analysis with fixed effects on data collected from Chinese public firms between 2006 and 2010. It uses an exogenous regulation enforcement to minimise the endogeneity problem. Findings – This paper finds that financial analysts are less likely to follow firms which mandatorily issue earnings surprise warnings ex ante than those voluntarily issue earnings forecasts. Moreover, ex post, they issue less accurate and more dispersed forecasts on former firms. The results support Brown et al.’s (2009) finding in the USA and suggest that the earnings surprise warnings affect information asymmetries. Practical implications – This paper justifies the mandatory earnings surprise warnings policy issued by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission in 2006. Originality/value – Mandatory earnings surprise is a unique practical regulation for publicly listed firms in China. This paper, for the first time, provides empirical evaluation on the effectiveness of a mandatory information disclosure policy in China. Consistent with existing literature on information disclosure by public firms in other countries, this paper finds that, in China, voluntary information disclosure captures more private information than mandatory information disclosure on corporate earnings ability.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

A economia da informação : rumo a um programa de pesquisa alternativo

Este trabalho tem por objetivo discutir o surgimento de um programa de pesquisa na Ciência Econômica, no que concerne a análise das assimetrias de informação, as diferenças epistemológicas e as implicações em termos de equilíbrio ótimo de Pareto, em contraponto à abordagem neoclássica standard. Em busca de tal objetivo, foi necessário destacar o método de ambos os paradigmas; todavia, era igualmente necessário discutir a filosofia/epistemologia da ciência envolvida e que serviria de base para uma abordagem relacionada a mudanças paradigmáticas na ciência. No capítulo 1, discutimos a epistemologia da ciência, a partir de três autores: Popper, Kuhn e Lakatos. Definimos o conjunto de hipóteses que podem ser associadas ao método empregado pela Escola Neoclássica, a partir da filosofia da ciência proposta por Lakatos. Em seguida, no capítulo 2, fizemos uma longa exposição do método neoclássico, definindo os axiomas inerentes às preferências bem-comportadas, apresentando algebricamente o equilíbrio geral walrasiano, exemplificando o relaxamento de hipóteses auxiliares do modelo neoclássico a partir de Friedman e, por fim, aplicando o instrumental neoclássico ao relaxamento da hipótese auxiliar de perfeição da informação, a partir do modelo desenvolvido por Grossman & Stiglitz (1976), bem como da expansão matemática desenvolvida pelo presente trabalho. Finalmente, encerramos a presente dissertação com o capítulo 3, no qual, basicamente, expomos as principais contribuições de autores como Stiglitz, Akerlof e Arrow, no que concerne a mercados permeados por informações assimétricas e comportamentos oportunistas. Procuramos mostrar as consequências para o próprio mercado, chegando a resultados em que o mesmo era extinto. Apresentamos a segunda parte do modelo de Grossman & Stiglitz, enfatizando a natureza imperfeita do sistema de preços, sua incapacidade de transmitir todas as informações sobre os bens ao conjunto dos agentes, e, por fim, discutimos tópicos variados ligados à Economia da Informação.

Overtime Working and Contract Efficiency

We present a wage-hours contract designed to minimize costly turnover given investments in specific training combined with firm and worker information asymmetries. It may be optimal for the parties to work ‘long hours’ remunerated at premium rates for guaranteed overtime hours. Based on British plant and machine operatives, we test three predictions. First, trained workers with longer tenure are more likely to work overtime. Second, hourly overtime pay exceeds the value of marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the value of marginal product. Third, the basic hourly wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.

Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency

Conservatism, through the timelier recognition of losses in the income statement, is expected to increase firm investment efficiency through three main channels: (1) by decreasing the adverse effect of information asymmetries between outside equity holders and managers, facilitating the monitoring of managerial investment decisions; (2) by increasing managerial incentives to abandon poorly performing projects earlier and to undertake fewer negative net present-value investments; and (3) by facilitating the access to external financing at lower cost. Using a large US sample for the period 1990-2007 we find a negative association between conservatism and measures of over- and under- investment, and a positive association between conservatism and future profitability. This is consistent with firms reporting more conservative numbers investing more efficiently and in more profitable projects. Our results add to a growing stream of literature suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to undesirable economic consequences.

Innovación, financiación y mercados financieros : análisis de las relaciones entre inversión en I+D, estructura de capital y señalización contable

Aquest treball té com a objectiu determinar l'existència de restriccions en el finançament de projectes empresarials de recerca i desenvolupament (R+D) i analitzar-ne les causes. Els resultats de la investigació mostren els fets següents: en primer lloc, hi ha restriccions financeres per a la realització d'inversions en R+D i es manifesten en la necessitat de les empreses de recórrer a recursos interns i a fons aliens a curt termini; en segon lloc, les restriccions esmentades fonamentalment sorgeixen a causa de dos factors, el desequilibri entre les característiques econòmiques de les inversions d'R+D i el comportament dels agents finançadors en els mercats de capitals, i l'existència d'asimetries d'informació entre agents gestors i finançadors; finalment, en tercer lloc, la formulació per part de les empreses de més informació comptable sobre l'R+D desenvolupada comporta la millora de la valoració de l'empresa en els mercats financers i, per tant, l'assignació de fons als processos d'innovació.

Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector

ABSTRACT We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about how antitrust offices can deal with this issue.

Organizational Choice and Environmental Change

We explain the choice between franchising and vertical integration by estimating a model of relative performance in a sample of 250 Spanish car distributors, controlling for self-selection and including environmental factors. The method allows us to estimate performance counterfactuals. Organizational choice seemingly aims to contain moral hazard for both distributors and manufacturers but it is subject to start-up constraints and switching costs. While the market for franchises remained underdeveloped, information asymmetries led to the opening of integrated outlets. Their subsequent conversion into franchised outlets probably involved prohibitive transaction costs. Consequently, they performed worse than would have been expected had they been independent, as confirmed by the systematic improvement observed when they were in fact converted. The timing of such conversions suggests that switching costs were prohibitive until firms developed a substantial cushion of temporary contracts, previously forbidden by regulation.

Managing competition in professional services and the burden of inertia

Professional services require certain organizational patterns in order to avoid information asymmetries and external effects. These same patterns are used within production structures involving various degrees of monopoly. However, competitive restraints are justified today only when substantial external effects are clearly present, whereas information asymmetries hardly justify such restraints because reputational investments have become widespread in the economy and are relatively efficient in overcoming such asymmetries. As a consequence, innovation in the production of externalities can make competitive constraints unnecessary.

Can SMS Technology Improve Low Take-up of Social Benefits?

Low take up of stigma-free social benefits is often blamed on information asymmetries or administrative barriers. There is limited evidence on which of these potential channels is more salient in which contexts. We designed and implemented a randomized controlled trial to assess the extent to which informational barriers are responsible for the prevalent low take-up of government benefits among Colombian conflict-driven internal refugees. We provide timely information on benefits eligibility via SMS to a random half of the displaced household that migrated to Bogot´a over a 6-month period. We show that improving information increases benefits’ take up. However, the effect is small and only true for certain type of benefits. Hence, consistent with previous experimental literature, the availability of timely information explains only part of the low-take up rates and the role of administrative barriers and bureaucratic processes should be tackled to increase the well-being of internal refugees in Colombia.

'Doctor, Doctor...' entrepreneurial diagnosis and market making

Doctor-patient jokes are universally popular because of the information asymmetries within the diagnostic relationship. We contend that entrepreneurial diagnosis is present in markets where consumers are unable to diagnose their own problems and, instead, may rely on the entrepreneur to diagnose them. Entrepreneurial diagnosis is a cognitive skill possessed by the entrepreneur. It is an identifiable subset of entrepreneurial judgment and can be modeled – which we attempt to do. In order to overcome the information asymmetries and exploit opportunities, we suggest that entrepreneurs must invest in market making innovations (as distinct from product innovations) such as trustworthy reputations. The diagnostic entrepreneur described in this paper represents a creative response to difficult diagnostic problems and helps to explain the success of many firms whose products are not particularly innovative but which are perceived as offering high standards of service. These firms are trusted not only for their truthfulness about the quality of their product, but for their honesty, confidentiality and understanding in helping customers identify the most appropriate product to their needs.

Segmenting the Italian coffee market: marketing opportunities for economic agents working along the international coffee chain

Globalization, either directly or indirectly (e.g. through structural adjustment reforms), has called for profound changes in the previously existing institutional order. Some changes adversely impacted the production and market environment of many coffee producers in developing countries resulting in more risky and less remunerative coffee transactions. This paper focuses on customization of a tropical commodity, fair-trade coffee, as an approach to mitigating the effects of worsened market conditions for small-scale coffee producers in less developed countries. fair-trade labeling is viewed as a form of “de-commodification” of coffee through product differentiation on ethical grounds. This is significant not only as a solution to the market failure caused by pervasive information asymmetries along the supply chain, but also as a means of revitalizing the agricultural-commodity-based trade of less developed countries (LDCs) that has been languishing under globalization. More specifically, fair-trade is an example of how the same strategy adopted by developed countries’ producers/ processors (i.e. the sequence product differentiation - institutional certification - advertisement) can be used by LDC producers to increase the reputation content of their outputs by transforming them from mere commodities into “decommodified” (i.e. customized and more reputed) goods. The resulting segmentation of the world coffee market makes possible to meet the demand by consumers with preference for this “(ethically) customized” coffee and to transfer a share of the accruing economic rents backward to the Fair-trade coffee producers in LDCs. It should however be stressed that this outcome cannot be taken for granted since investments are needed to promote the required institutional innovations. In Italy FTC is a niche market with very few private brands selling this product. However, an increase of FTC market share could be a big commercial opportunity for farmers in LDCs and other economic agents involved along the international coffee chain. Hence, this research explores consumers’ knowledge of labels promoting quality products, consumption coffee habits, brand loyalty, willingness to pay and market segmentation according to the heterogeneity of preferences for coffee products. The latter was assessed developing a D-efficient design where stimuli refinement was tested during two focus groups.

Instrumentos de apoio financeiro específicos a empresas localizadas em arranjos produtivos locais: um estudo de caso do APL de Nova Friburgo

In the last decade, the debate concerning more adequate means of promoting social and economic development, through policies of firm supporting, has been gaining strength. Among several means of support, there is one that addresses issues related to credit and funding. At the same time, interest on the phenomenon of firm agglomeration, known by clustering, is increasing, as well as one of its advantages - facilitating the development and strengthening of its firms. Additionally, there can be spotted advantages on clustering that allow tailoring financial instruments, specifically to firms in it, based on collective solutions, with better conditions. This dissertation focuses on how the capture of these opportunities is being done, in the presence of specific financial products to Brazilian clusters. The present analysis is conducted from the cluster located in Nova Friburgo and Region, specialized in women underwear. This study sought to capture advantages from three main collective solutions: information systems, guarantees systems, alternative funding. These solutions address to the following issues: information asymmetries, absence of guarantees from the credit taker, limited sources of funding. Semi-structured interviews were made with members of the cluster, when it was possible to identify that the capture of advantages is in its early stages, being limited by other issues, such as: adequate degree of human capital, governance framework and process inefficiencies.

A cadeia da carne bovina no Brasil: uma análise de poder de mercado e teoria da informação

Esta tese analisou a cadeia da carne bovina no Brasil com o objetivo de identificar a existência de assimetrias nas relações comerciais entre seus agentes (pecuaristas, frigoríficos e supermercados). Foram investigadas duas formas de assimetria: a diferença de conteúdo informacional entre os agentes econômicos, no mercado futuro de boi gordo da BM&F e a possibilidade de exercício de poderes de mercado e de barganha nas relações comerciais dentro dessa cadeia. A análise de poder de mercado baseou-se na estrutura analítica de Crespi, Gao e Peterson (2005), e permitiu inferir que existe poder de mercado na aquisição de bois pelos frigoríficos, o que vai ao encontro dos resultados observados em outros oligopólios de estrutura caracterizada por um mercado pulverizado na ponta fornecedora e por um processo local, isto é, na própria região, de escoamento da produção. Implementou-se uma análise complementar sobre a estrutura de formação do preço do boi, na qual identificou-se que São Paulo é a região formadora dos preços. A relação entre frigoríficos e supermercados foi analisada através do modelo momentum threshold autoregression (M-TAR) e observou-se que os supermercados apropriam-se das reduções observada no preço do atacado e repassam ao varejo eventuais aumentos de preços no atacado. Portanto, é possível concluir que os supermercados têm poder de barganha junto aos frigoríficos, o que era esperado, pelo fato de esses estabelecimentos adquirirem volumes significativos e se posicionarem como principais canais de distribuição da carne. E, por fim, verificou-se a existência de assimetrias informacionais entre os participantes do mercado futuro de boi gordo da BM&F, mensurada por meio de uma análise sobre a relação entre a volatilidade dos preços futuros e as posições por tipo de participante. Os resultados encontrados corroboraram a hipótese de que os frigoríficos têm mais informação, no mercado futuro, que os demais agentes.

A emergência da governança socioambiental no mercado internacional de biocombustíveis

O esgotamento das reservas de energia fóssil e o processo de mudanças climáticas causadas pelas emissões de GEEs posicionaram os biocombustíveis como a principal fonte alternativa de energia renovável disponível para uso em transportes no curto e médio prazos. Contudo, a presença de externalidades e assimetrias de informação dificultam a verificação da sustentabilidade neste setor. Assim, a emergência do mercado internacional de biocombustíveis mostra-se condicionada pela construção de instituições que garantam a sustentabilidade da produção e consumo desses produtos. O processo de construção das instituições de governança socioambiental é afetado por fatores de ordem técnica, política e institucional. Apoiado em aportes teóricos do institucionalismo econômico e sociológico, o presente estudo buscou analisar que elementos afetam este processo considerando a trajetória de mercados já estabelecidos que apresentam caraterísticas análogas ao setor de biocombustíveis (alimentos orgânicos e produtos florestais). A forma como legislações nacionais, acordos internacionais e sistemas de certificação privada se desenvolveram e interagiram nesses setores apresenta aderência com o processo de construção do mercado de biocombustíveis observado até o momento. Dentre os resultados encontrados, observa-se tendência à convergência entre padrões de sustentabilidade em diferentes legislações nacionais e sistemas de certificação privados devido às externalidades de rede que conferem maior valor a padrões adotados por uma gama mais ampla de usuários. A União Europeia desponta como o principal formador de padrões de sustentabilidade, dado seu perfil importador e o estabelecimento de critérios mais amplos nas legislações dos Estados Membros, geralmente implementada via integração de mecanismos de governança públicos e privados (meta-standards). Apesar do expressivo potencial de consumo, os EUA apresentam menor influência nesse processo devido a considerável capacidade de produção doméstica e a priorização de elementos estratégicos (segurança energética e desenvolvimento rural) no desenho de suas políticas de sustentabilidade para combustíveis de biomassa. Na esfera privada, o desenvolvimento de sistemas de certificação apresenta-se condicionado por elementos técnicos, como a eficiência em cobrir critérios relevantes e os custos incorridos neste processo; e políticos, relacionados à capacidade de legitimição dos atores envolvidos em cada um destes programas de certificação. Também se observa que caraterísticas tecnológicas e organizacionais das cadeias de produção de biocombustíveis afetam a expansão de sistemas de certificação, condicionando tanto os custos para o estabelecimento da cadeia de custódia como a capacidade de coordenação de ações setoriais visando a adoção de práticas sustentáveis que facilitem a obtenção da certificação. Essa relação fica evidente em novas nações que buscam estabelecer um setor bioenergético e enfrentam dificuldades em integrar a agricultura familiar à modelos de produção que respeitem critérios socioambientais vigentes no mercado internacional. A pesquisa revelou a necessidade de um entendimento mais aprofundado da interconexão de novas rotas tecnológicas e atores adentrando no mercado internacional de biocombustíveis. A compreensão dos riscos e potencialidades de novas formas de interação pública e privada na governança socioambiental apresenta-se como um campo prolífico para futuros estudos neste setor e em outros em que atributos ambientais se mostrem relevantes.