Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency
Data(s) |
01/01/2010
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Resumo |
Conservatism, through the timelier recognition of losses in the income statement, is expected to increase firm investment efficiency through three main channels: (1) by decreasing the adverse effect of information asymmetries between outside equity holders and managers, facilitating the monitoring of managerial investment decisions; (2) by increasing managerial incentives to abandon poorly performing projects earlier and to undertake fewer negative net present-value investments; and (3) by facilitating the access to external financing at lower cost. Using a large US sample for the period 1990-2007 we find a negative association between conservatism and measures of over- and under- investment, and a positive association between conservatism and future profitability. This is consistent with firms reporting more conservative numbers investing more efficiently and in more profitable projects. Our results add to a growing stream of literature suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to undesirable economic consequences. |
Formato |
60 410561 bytes application/pdf |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa |
Relação |
Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa);10/4 |
Direitos |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
Palavras-Chave | #Inversions |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |