An experimental analysis of information acquisition in prediction markets

We study which factors in terms of trading environment and trader characteristics determine individual information acquisition in experimental asset markets. Traders with larger endowments, existing inconclusive information, lower risk aversion, and less experience in financial markets tend to acquire more information. Overall, we find that traders overacquire information, so that informed traders on average obtain negative profits net of information costs. Information acquisition and the associated losses do not diminish over time. This overacquisition phenomenon is inconsistent with predictions of rational expectations equilibrium, and we argue it resembles the overdissipation results from the contest literature. We find that more acquired information in the market leads to smaller differences between fundamental asset values and prices. Thus, the overacquisition phenomenon is a novel explanation for the high forecasting accuracy of prediction markets.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Coordination chemistry for information acquisition and processing

In the 21st century, information has become the most valuable resource that is available to modern societies. Thus, great efforts have been made to develop new information processing and storage techniques. Chemistry can offer a wide variety of computing paradigms that are closely related to the natural processes found in living organisms (e.g., in the nervous systems of animals). Moreover, these phenomena cannot be reproduced easily by solely using silicon-based technology. Other great advantages of molecular-scale systems include their simplicity and the diversity of interactions that occur among them. Thus, devices constructed using chemical entities may be programmed to deal with different information carriers (photons, electrons, ions, and molecules), possibly surpassing the capabilities of classic electronic circuits.

On insurance markets with endogenous information acquisition: A robust mechanism design approach

Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Optimal Reporting Systems With Investor Information Acquisition

This paper analyzes a manager's optimal ex-ante reporting system using a Bayesian persuasion approach (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) in a setting where investors affect cash flows through their decision to finance the firm's investment opportunities, possibly assisted by the costly acquisition of additional information (inspection). I examine how the informativeness and the bias of the optimal system are determined by investors' inspection cost, the degree of incentive alignment between the manager and the investor, and the prior belief that the project is profitable. I find that a mis-aligned manager's system is informative

only when the market prior is pessimistic and is always positively biased; this bias decreases as investors' inspection cost decreases. In contrast, a well-aligned manager's system is fully revealing when investors' inspection cost is high, and is counter-cyclical to the market belief when the inspection cost is low: It is positively (negatively) biased when the market belief is pessimistic (optimistic). Furthermore, I explore the extent to which the results generalize to a case with managerial manipulation and discuss the implications for investment efficiency. Overall, the analysis describes the complex interactions among determinants of firm disclosures and governance, and offers explanations for the mixed empirical results in this area.

Efficient Prices at Any Cost: Does Algorithmic Trading Deter Information Acquisition?

I demonstrate a powerful tension between acquiring information and incorporating it into asset prices, the two core elements of price discovery. As a salient case, I focus on the transformative rise of algorithmic trading (AT) typically associated with improved price efficiency. Using a measure of the relative information content of prices and a comprehensive panel of 37,325 stock-quarters of SEC market data, I establish instead that algorithmic trading strongly decreases the net amount of information in prices. The increase in price distortions associated with the AT “information gap” is roughly $42.6 billion/year for U.S. common stocks around earnings announcement events alone. Information losses are concentrated among stocks with high shares of algorithmic liquidity takers relative to algorithmic liquidity makers, suggesting that aggressive AT powerfully deters fundamental information acquisition despite its importance for translating available information into prices.

Political information choices in a media saturated environment : credibility or convenience?

This thesis examines the ways in which citizens find out about socio-political issues. The project set out to discover how audience characteristics such as scepticism towards the media, gratifications sought, need for cognition and political interest influence information selection. While most previous information choice studies have focused on how individuals select from a narrow range of media types, this thesis considered a much wider sweep of the information landscape. This approach was taken to obtain an understanding of information choices in a more authentic context - in everyday life, people are not simply restricted to one or two news sources. Rather, they may obtain political information from a vast range of information sources, including media sources (e.g. radio, television, newspapers) and sources from beyond the media (eg. interpersonal sources, public speaking events, social networking websites). Thus, the study included both media and non-news media information sources. Data collection for the project consisted of a written, postal survey. The survey was administered to a probability sample in the greater Brisbane region, which is the third largest city in Australia. Data was collected during March and April 2008, approximately four months after the 2007 Australian Federal Election. Hence, the study was conducted in a non-election context. 585 usable surveys were obtained. In addition to measuring the attitudinal characteristics listed above, respondents were surveyed as to which information sources (eg. television shows, radio stations, websites and festivals) they usually use to find out about socio-political issues. Multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to explore patterns of influence between the audience characteristics and information consumption patterns. The results of this analysis indicated an apparent difference between the way citizens use news media sources and the way they use information sources from beyond the news media. In essence, it appears that non-news media information sources are used very deliberately to seek socio-political information, while media sources are used in a less purposeful way. If media use in a non-election context, such as that of the present study, is not primarily concerned with deliberate information seeking, media use must instead have other primary purposes, with political information acquisition as either a secondary driver, or a by-product of that primary purpose. It appears, then, that political information consumption in a media-saturated society is more about routine ‘practices’ than it is about ‘information seeking’. The suggestion that media use is no longer primarily concerned with information seeking, but rather, is simply a behaviour which occurs within the broader set of everyday practices reflects Couldry’s (2004) media as practice paradigm. These findings highlight the need for more authentic and holistic contexts for media research. It is insufficient to consider information choices in isolation, or even from a wider range of information sources, such as that incorporated in the present study. Future media research must take greater account of the broader social contexts and practices in which media-oriented behaviours occur. The findings also call into question the previously assumed centrality of trust to information selection decisions. Citizens regularly use media they do not trust to find out about politics. If people are willing to use information sources they do not trust for democratically important topics such as politics, it is important that citizens possess the media literacy skills to effectively understand and evaluate the information they are presented with. Without the application of such media literacy skills, a steady diet of ‘fast food’ media may result in uninformed or misinformed voting decisions, which have implications for the effectiveness of democratic processes. This research has emphasized the need for further holistic and authentically contextualised media use research, to better understand how citizens use information sources to find out about important topics such as politics.

Development of a data mining-based analysis framework for multi-attribute construction project information

Data mining techniques extract repeated and useful patterns from a large data set that in turn are utilized to predict the outcome of future events. The main purpose of the research presented in this paper is to investigate data mining strategies and develop an efficient framework for multi-attribute project information analysis to predict the performance of construction projects. The research team first reviewed existing data mining algorithms, applied them to systematically analyze a large project data set collected by the survey, and finally proposed a data-mining-based decision support framework for project performance prediction. To evaluate the potential of the framework, a case study was conducted using data collected from 139 capital projects and analyzed the relationship between use of information technology and project cost performance. The study results showed that the proposed framework has potential to promote fast, easy to use, interpretable, and accurate project data analysis.

Essays in economics of information

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en économie de l'information. Le premier chapitre sert d'introduction et les Chapitres 2 à 4 constituent le coeur de l'ouvrage. Le Chapitre 2 porte sur l’acquisition d’information sur l’Internet par le biais d'avis de consommateurs. En particulier, je détermine si les avis laissés par les acheteurs peuvent tout de même transmettre de l’information à d’autres consommateurs, lorsqu’il est connu que les vendeurs peuvent publier de faux avis à propos de leurs produits. Afin de comprendre si cette manipulation des avis est problématique, je démontre que la plateforme sur laquelle les avis sont publiés (e.g. TripAdvisor, Yelp) est un tiers important à considérer, autant que les vendeurs tentant de falsifier les avis. En effet, le design adopté par la plateforme a un effet indirect sur le niveau de manipulation des vendeurs. En particulier, je démontre que la plateforme, en cachant une partie du contenu qu'elle détient sur les avis, peut parfois améliorer la qualité de l'information obtenue par les consommateurs. Finalement, le design qui est choisi par la plateforme peut être lié à la façon dont elle génère ses revenus. Je montre qu'une plateforme générant des revenus par le biais de commissions sur les ventes peut être plus tolérante à la manipulation qu'une plateforme qui génère des revenus par le biais de publicité. Le Chapitre 3 est écrit en collaboration avec Marc Santugini. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions les effets de la discrimination par les prix au troisième degré en présence de consommateurs non informés qui apprennent sur la qualité d'un produit par le biais de son prix. Dans un environnement stochastique avec deux segments de marché, nous démontrons que la discrimination par les prix peut nuire à la firme et être bénéfique pour les consommateurs. D'un côté, la discrimination par les prix diminue l'incertitude à laquelle font face les consommateurs, c.-à-d., la variance des croyances postérieures est plus faible avec discrimination qu'avec un prix uniforme. En effet, le fait d'observer deux prix (avec discrimination) procure plus d'information aux consommateurs, et ce, même si individuellement chacun de ces prix est moins informatif que le prix uniforme. De l'autre côté, il n'est pas toujours optimal pour la firme de faire de la discrimination par les prix puisque la présence de consommateurs non informés lui donne une incitation à s'engager dans du signaling. Si l'avantage procuré par la flexibilité de fixer deux prix différents est contrebalancé par le coût du signaling avec deux prix différents, alors il est optimal pour la firme de fixer un prix uniforme sur le marché. Finalement, le Chapitre 4 est écrit en collaboration avec Sidartha Gordon. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions une classe de jeux où les joueurs sont contraints dans le nombre de sources d'information qu'ils peuvent choisir pour apprendre sur un paramètre du jeu, mais où ils ont une certaine liberté quant au degré de dépendance de leurs signaux, avant de prendre une action. En introduisant un nouvel ordre de dépendance entre signaux, nous démontrons qu'un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la plus dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, compléments stratégiques et isotoniques, soit substituts stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. De même, un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la moins dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, substituts stratégiques et isotoniques, soit compléments stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. Nous établissons également des conditions suffisantes pour qu'une structure d'information donnée, information publique ou privée par exemple, soit possible à l'équilibre.

Buyer information and brand Choice behavior in markets with asymmetries

This thesis Entitled Buyer information and brand choice behaviour in markets with asymmetries.The period of transition set in by globalization and liberalization has ensued a onsiderable degree of homogeneity with western societies with respect to quantity and quality of goods and services.The study is aimed at finding out how the buyers adapt to the prevalent complex and dynamic market configuration by taking an archetypical situation of information gathering and brand- choice decision of select household consumer durables.The study was based on a set of 301 sample respondents who were either first time purchasers or repeat purchasers for household use, of the items under study in the sample area comprising of rural, urban and semi-urban areas. Data were collected using interview schedule and analysis of the same was done with standard statistical computer programs.Buyer confidence as perceived by buyers with respect to information acquisition and brand-choice represents the felt competence to effectively function in the market.In general, lower levels of education, income and occupation showed lower levels of search. The oldest were also low searchers. The repeat purchasers of the product searched less than the first purchasers. The most important source of information was word of mouth or information from others followed by television advertisements. The least important source of information was billboards, displays and similar forms of advertisements.The second factor is characterized by items representing ‘social attributes’ like, use by many others, use by peers, recommendation by significant others and reputation of the brand. The third factor represents ‘susceptibility to incentives and promotions’.

Find the difference! : eye tracking study on information seeking behavior using an online game

With the advent of digital era web applications have become inevitable part of our lives. We are using the web to manage even the financially or ethically sensitive issues. For this reason exploration of information seeking behavior is an exciting area of research. Current study provides insight on information seeking behavior using a classic ‘Find the Difference’ game. 50 university students between the age of 19 and 26 participated in the study. Eye movement data were recorded with a Tobii T120 device. Participants carried out 4 continuous tasks. Each task included two pictures side by side with 7 hidden differences. After finishing the tasks, participants were asked to repeat the game with the same picture set. This data collection methodology allows the evaluation of learning curves. Additionally, participants were asked about their hand preference. For the purpose of analysis the following metrics were applied: task times (including saccades), fixation count and fixation duration (without saccades). The right- and left-hand side on each picture was selected as AOI (Area of Interest) to detect side preference in connection with hand preference. Results suggest a significant difference between male and female participants regarding aggregated task times (male 58.37s respectively female 68.37s), deviation in the number of fixations and fixation duration (apparently female have less but longer fixations) and also in the distribution of fixations between AOIs. Using eyetracking data current paper highlights the similarities and differences in information acquisition strategies respectively reveals gender and education (Arts vs. Sciences) dependent characteristics of interaction.