Bayesian Analysis for a Theory of Random Consumer Demand: The Case of Indivisible Goods

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a \"regular\" \"L-utility\" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and posterior uncertainty in terms of distributions over the indefinite-dimensional parameter set of a flexible functional form. We propose a class of proper priors on the parameter set. The priors are flexible, in the sense that they put positive probability in the neighborhood of any L-utility function that is regular on a large subset bar(X) of X; and regular, in the sense that they assign zero probability to the set of L-utility functions that are irregular on bar(X). We propose methods of Bayesian inference for an environment with indivisible goods, leaving the more difficult case of indefinitely divisible goods for another paper. We analyse individual choice data from a consumer experiment described in Harbaugh et al. (2001).

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not necessarily strict, we use an exogenous profile of tie-breakers to resolve any ties in individuals' preferences and apply Gale's top trading cycle algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences. We provide a foundation of these simple extensions of Gale's top trading cycle algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences. We show that Gale's top trading cycle algorithm with fixed tie-breaking is characterized by individual rationality, strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency. Our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a 'good and simple' rule for the resulting strict preferences. This reinforces the market-based approach even in the presence of indifferences because always competitive allocations are chosen.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

A Convex Optimization Framework for Almost Budget Balanced Allocation of a Divisible Good

We address the problem of allocating a single divisible good to a number of agents. The agents have concave valuation functions parameterized by a scalar type. The agents report only the type. The goal is to find allocatively efficient, strategy proof, nearly budget balanced mechanisms within the Groves class. Near budget balance is attained by returning as much of the received payments as rebates to agents. Two performance criteria are of interest: the maximum ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, and the expected budget surplus, within the class of linear rebate functions. The goal is to minimize them. Assuming that the valuation functions are known, we show that both problems reduce to convex optimization problems, where the convex constraint sets are characterized by a continuum of half-plane constraints parameterized by the vector of reported types. We then propose a randomized relaxation of these problems by sampling constraints. The relaxed problem is a linear programming problem (LP). We then identify the number of samples needed for ``near-feasibility'' of the relaxed constraint set. Under some conditions on the valuation function, we show that value of the approximate LP is close to the optimal value. Simulation results show significant improvements of our proposed method over the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism without rebates. In the special case of indivisible goods, the mechanisms in this paper fall back to those proposed by Moulin, by Guo and Conitzer, and by Gujar and Narahari, without any need for randomization. Extension of the proposed mechanisms to situations when the valuation functions are not known to the central planner are also discussed. Note to Practitioners-Our results will be useful in all resource allocation problems that involve gathering of information privately held by strategic users, where the utilities are any concave function of the allocations, and where the resource planner is not interested in maximizing revenue, but in efficient sharing of the resource. Such situations arise quite often in fair sharing of internet resources, fair sharing of funds across departments within the same parent organization, auctioning of public goods, etc. We study methods to achieve near budget balance by first collecting payments according to the celebrated VCG mechanism, and then returning as much of the collected money as rebates. Our focus on linear rebate functions allows for easy implementation. The resulting convex optimization problem is solved via relaxation to a randomized linear programming problem, for which several efficient solvers exist. This relaxation is enabled by constraint sampling. Keeping practitioners in mind, we identify the number of samples that assures a desired level of ``near-feasibility'' with the desired confidence level. Our methodology will occasionally require subsidy from outside the system. We however demonstrate via simulation that, if the mechanism is repeated several times over independent instances, then past surplus can support the subsidy requirements. We also extend our results to situations where the strategic users' utility functions are not known to the allocating entity, a common situation in the context of internet users and other problems.

Essays on the Provision of Health and Education

This thesis consists of three independent chapters that all deal with questions relevant for the provision of health and education and contribute to the field of economic theory. Both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 address the broad problem of public provision of scarce and indivisible goods. Therein, the role of wealth distribution and the impact wealth has on the assignment of the goods is of particular interest. Chapter 3 addresses quality concerns for the provision of health services that occur if quality cannot be observed precisely and cannot be contracted on.

Experts vs. Discounters: Consumer Free Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters; we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free-riding on experts' advice; and we discuss policy options to solve the free-riding consumers–cheating experts problem.

The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.

Damaged goods: riskiness and LGBT young peoples’ interactions with police

For some time now, research has suggested lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) young people are ‘at-risk’ of victimisation and legally ‘risky’. Relatively few studies have examined how ‘risk factor’ research influences the everyday lives of LGBT young people. This paper reports how the experiences of police by 35 LGBT young people in Brisbane, Queensland reflected discourses about LGBT riskiness and how danger informed their interactions with police in public spaces. The participants specifically note how looking at-risk or looking risky affected their experiences of policing. The paper will conclude with recommendations for improved future policing practice.

Luxury fashion: The role of innovation as a key contributing factor in the development of luxury fashion goods and sustainable fashion design

Luxury is a quality that is difficult to define as the historical concept of luxury appears to be both dynamic and culturally specific. The everyday definition explains a ‘luxury’ in relation to a necessity: a luxury (product or service) is defined as something that consumers want rather than need. However, the growth of global markets has seen a boom in what are now referred to as ‘luxury brands’. This branding of products as luxury has resulted in a change in the way consumers understand luxury goods and services. In their attempts to characterize a luxury brand, Fionda & Moore in their article “The anatomy of a Luxury Brand” summarize a range of critical conditions that are in addition to product branding “... including product and design attributes of quality, craftsmanship and innovative, creative and unique products” (Fionda & Moore, 2009). For the purposes of discussing fashion design however, quality and craftsmanship are inseparable while creativity and innovation exist under different conditions. The terms ‘creative’ and ‘innovative’ are often used inter-changeably and are connected with most descriptions of the design process, defining ‘design’ and ‘fashion’ in many cases. Christian Marxt and Fredrik Hacklin identify this condition in their paper “Design, product development, innovation: all the same in the end?”(Marxt & Hacklin, 2005) and suggest that design communities should be aware that the distinction between these terms, whilst once quite definitive, is becoming narrow to a point where they will mean the same thing. In relation to theory building in the discipline this could pose significant problems. Brett Richards (2003) identifies innovation as different from creativity in that innovation aims to transform and implement rather than simply explore and invent. Considering this distinction, in particular relation to luxury branding, may affect the way in which design can contribute to a change in the way luxury fashion goods might be perceived in a polarised fashion market, namely suggesting that ‘luxury’ is what consumers need rather than the ‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ fashion that the current market dynamic would indicate they want. This paper attempts to explore the role of innovation as a key contributing factor in luxury concepts, in particular the relationship between innovation and creativity, the conditions which enable innovation, the role of craftsmanship in innovation and design innovation in relation to luxury fashion products. An argument is presented that technological innovation can be demonstrated as a common factor in the development of luxury fashion product and that the connection between designer and maker will play an important role in the development of luxury fashion goods for a sustainable fashion industry.

Luxury fashion : the significance of luxury fashion goods for sustainable fashion design

This paper extends the work of “Luxury fashion : the role of innovation as a key contributing factor in the development of luxury fashion goods and sustainable fashion design” (Finn, 2011). The discussion here begins with the observation that post consumer textile waste remains a major obstacle in realising a model of sustainable fashion design and production however, amongst the millions of tonnes of textile and clothing sent to landfill each year there is little evidence of authentic luxury branded goods ending life as landfill. The sustainable fashion movement often support approaches such as fashion up-cycle, re-cycle and cradle to cradle solutions. This paper argues that the priority should be to break the cycle of consumerism as an immediate intervention in ongoing unsustainable (and in some cases unethical) practices involved in the production of fashion goods. The connections between maker and consumer are explored through object analysis and the findings raise questions of the separation between luxury fashion goods and fashion goods that bear luxury fashion branding. This paper suggests that unethical and subversive exploitation of these connections may be used to promote increased consumerism while at the same time purporting exclusivity and superior craftsmanship.

Verifiability in Markets for Credence Goods

Theory predicts that efficiency prevails on credence goods markets if customers are able to verify which quality they receive from an expert seller. In a series of experiments with endogenous prices we observe that variability fails to result in efficient provision behavior and leads to very similar results as a setting without variability. Some sellers always provide appropriate treatment even if own money maximization calls for over- or undertreatment. Overall our endogenous price-results suggests that both inequality aversion and a taste for efficiency play an important role for experts provision behavior. We contrast the implications of those two motivations theoretically and discriminate between them empirically using a �xed-price design. We then classify experimental experts according to their provision behavior.

Tax concessions for charities : competitive neutrality, the tax base and "public goods" choice

It is argued that concerns arise about the integrity and fairness of the taxation regime where charitable organizations, which avail themselves of the tax exemption status while undertaking commercial activities, compete directly with the for-profit sector. The appropriateness of the tax concessions granted to charitable organizations is considered in respect of income derived from commercial activities. It is principally argued that the traditional line of reasoning for imposing limitations on tax concessions focuses on an incorrect underlying inquiry. Traditionally, it is argued that limitations should be imposed because of unfair competition, lack of competitive neutrality, or an arbitrary decision relating to a lack of deserving. However, it is argued that a more appropriate question from which to base any limitations is one which considers the value attached to the integrity of the taxation regime as a whole, and the tax base specifically compared to the public good of charities. When the correct underlying question is asked, sound taxation policy ensues, as a less arbitrary approach may be adopted to limit the scope of tax concessions available to charitable organizations.