L’impact de la rémunération variable sur l’intention de rester via l’engagement organisationnel : étude longitudinale dans le secteur des TIC.

Notre mémoire a pour objectif d’étudier l’impact différencié de la rémunération variable individuelle et collective sur l’intention de rester. De plus, nous nous intéressons au rôle de l’engagement organisationnel dans la relation entre la rémunération variable et l’intention de rester. Pour ce faire, nous avons formulé quatre hypothèses basées sur la littérature et certaines théories. La première hypothèse avance que la rémunération variable individuelle fait accroître l’intention de rester des travailleurs. La deuxième stipule que la rémunération variable collective fait accroître l’intention de rester. La troisième indique que la rémunération variable individuelle fait accroître davantage l’intention de rester que la rémunération variable collective sur l’intention de rester. Enfin, la quatrième hypothèse suggère que l’engagement organisationnel agit à titre de variable médiatrice dans la relation entre la rémunération variable et l’intention de rester. Notre étude s’appuie sur des données longitudinales colligées dans le cadre d’une enquête portant sur « les liens entre la rémunération, la formation et le développement des compétences avec l’attraction et la rétention des employés clés ». L’enquête a été réalisée auprès de nouveaux travailleurs d’une entreprise internationale du secteur des technologies de l’information et des communications (TIC) à Montréal. Les données ont été colligées en trois temps entre le 1er avril 2009 et le 30 septembre 2010. Nos résultats soutiennent qu’effectivement la rémunération variable individuelle et collective font augmenter l’intention de rester des travailleurs. De plus, nous trouvons que la rémunération variable individuelle et la rémunération variable collective ont un impact équivalent sur l’intention de rester. Enfin, bien que l’engagement organisationnel soit un prédicteur important de l’intention de rester, celui-ci n’agit pas à titre de variable médiatrice dans la relation entre la rémunération variable et l’intention de rester. Finalement, notre étude permet d’élaborer certaines pistes pour améliorer l’intention de rester des travailleurs.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.

Improving retail banking staff incentive systems

This Work Project seeks to analyze the viability, utility and best way of implementing mechanisms of double accounting and of insertion of low (or null) sales objectives in an incentives program. The main findings are that both processes are possible and to a certain extent advisable, although in very specific ways and with some limitations. Double accounting processes are especially effective between different segments and networks and should have a greater impact in the first evaluation periods of each case and the null objectives, albeit usable, are recommended to be always substituted by positive objectives, even if quite small. Moreover, it is concluded that the formal structure of the incentives program influences significantly these concepts, namely concerning the duration of the evaluation periods and the interaction of the objectives of different entities for both the vertical (hierarchic) and horizontal (individual and collective) levels.

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Retirement incentives, individual heterogeneity and labour transitions of employed and unemployed workers

In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the labour market decisions of workers close toretirement with respect to the incentives created by public regulations. We improve upon the extensiveprior literature on the effect of pension incentives on retirement in two ways. First, bymodeling the transitions between employment, unemployment and retirement in a simultaneousmanner, paying special attention to the transition from unemployment to retirement (which is particularlyimportant in Spain). Second, by considering the influence of unobserved heterogeneity inthe estimation of the effect of our (carefully constructed) incentive variables.Using administrative data, we find that, when properly defined, economic incentives have astrong impact on labour market decisions in Spain. Unemployment regulations are shown to be particularlyinfluential for retirement behaviour, along with the more traditional determinants linked tothe pension system. Pension variables also have a major bearing on both workers reemploymentdecisions and on the strategic actions of employers. The quantitative impact of the incentives, however,is greatly affected by the existence of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. Its omissionleads to sizable biases in the assessment of the sensitivity to economic incentives, a finding thathas clear consequences for the credibility of any model-based policy analysis. We confirm theimportance of this potential problem in one especially interesting instance: the reform of earlyretirement provisions undertaken in Spain in 2002. We use a difference-in-difference approach tomeasure the behavioural reaction to this change, finding a large overestimation when unobservedheterogeneity is not taken into account.

“Why share in uncertain conditions?” Factors of individual level knowledge sharing in offshoring cases

The objective of this Master’s Thesis was to research factors influencing and enhancing individual level knowledge sharing in offshore projects which often involve uncertainty of the knowledge provider’s own future. The purpose was to understand why individuals are willing to share their knowledge under these kinds of circumstances. In addition the goal was to identify obstacles to interpersonal knowledge sharing in order to understand how to mitigate their influence. The research was conducted as a qualitative multiple case study in a global IT company, and the data was gathered using semi-structured personal theme interviews within two different offshore projects. In order to a gain a wider perspective on the matter, some management representatives were interviewed as well. Data was analysed with the inductive content analysis method. Results of the study indicate that individuals are willing to share their knowledge despite of uncertainty if they are motivated, if they are provided with opportunities to do so, and if they have skills, competence and experience to share their knowledge. A strong knowledge sharing culture in the organization or team also works as a strong incentive for individual level knowledge sharing. The findings suggest that even under uncertain conditions it is possible to encourage people to share their knowledge if uncertainty can be decreased to a bearable level, a robust and personal connection and relationship between the knowledge provider and acquirer can be created and suitable opportunities for knowledge sharing are provided. In addition, based on the results the support and commitment of management and HR in addition to favourable environmental circumstances play an essential role in building a bridge between the knowledge provider and acquirer in order to create a virtual environment and space for knowledge sharing: Ba.

The risk-incentive trade-off in competitive search

Usando a abordagem de competitive search, modelo um mercado de trabalho com trabalhadores heterogêneos no qual há um problema de risco moral na relação entre firmas e trabalhadores. Nesse contexto, consigo prever como contratos reagem a mudanças nos parâmetros do mercado (em particular, o risco de produção), assim como a variação da probabilidade dos trabalhadores serem contratados. Minha contribuição principal é ver que, no nível individual, existe uma relação negativa entre risco e incentivos, mas efeitos de equilíbrio geral implicam que essa relação pode ser positiva no nível agregado. Esse resultado ajuda a esclarecer resultados empíricos contraditórios sobre a relação entre risco e incentivos.

Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies. Cult of the Individual, Integration Patterns and Delinquency

Post-Fordist economies come along with post-welfarist societies marked by intensified cultural individualism and increased structural inequalities. These conditions are commonly held to be conducive to relative deprivation and, thereby, anomic crime. At the same time, post-welfarist societies develop a new ‘balance of power’ between institutions providing for welfare regulation, such as the family, the state and the (labour) market – and also the penal system. These institutions are generally expected to improve social integration, ensure conformity and thus reduce anomic crime. Combining both perspectives, we analyse the effects of moral individualism, social inequality, and different integration strategies on crime rates in contemporary societies through the lenses of anomie theory. To test our hypotheses, we draw on time-series cross-section data compiled from different data sources (OECD, UN, WHO, WDI) for twenty developed countries in the period 1970-2004, and run multiple regressions that control for country-specific effects. Although we find some evidence that the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies to a certain extent prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime, the results are not very robust. Moreover, reservations have to be made regarding the effects of “market” income inequality as well as familialist, unionist and liberalist employment policies that are shown to have reversed effects in our sample: the former reducing, the latter occasionally increasing anomic crime. As expected, the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies generally prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime. Nevertheless, we conclude that the new cult of the individual undermines the effectiveness of conservative and social-democratic integration strategies and drives societies towards more “liberal” regimes that build on incentive as well as punitive elements.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

Hearings on H.R. 10451, Navy nuclear career incentive act, before the Subcommittee on Military Compensation of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session ...

Mode of access: Internet.

Nursing home admissions : the result of an incentive reimbursement experiment /

Cover title.

The effectiveness of federal employee incentive programs : hearing before the Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, second session, May 2, 2000.

Shipping list no.: 2000-0347-P.

The Work incentive (WIN) program and related experiences : a review of research with policy implications /

Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-46).

A commitment/incentive program to increase safety belt use on a university campus. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Computer program for incentives (a description of a computer program that generates incentive contracting visibility tools), May 1970.

Mode of access: Internet.