Risk management at board level: a practical guide for board members

isk Management today has moved from being the topic of top level conferences and media discussions to being a permanent issue in the board and top management agenda. Several new directives and regulations in Switzerland, Germany and EU make it obligatory for the firms to have a risk management strategy and transparently disclose the risk management process to their stakeholders. Shareholders, insurance providers, banks, media, analysts, employees, suppliers and other stakeholders expect the board members to be pro-active in knowing the critical risks facing their organization and provide them with a reasonable assurance vis-à-vis the management of those risks. In this environment however, the lack of standards and training opportunities makes this task difficult for board members. This book with the help of real life examples, analysis of drivers, interpretation of the Swiss legal requirements, and information based on international benchmarks tries to reach out to the forward looking leaders of today's businesses. The authors have collectively brought their years of scientific and practical experience in risk management, Swiss law and board memberships together to provide the board members practical solutions in risk management. The desire is that this book will clear the fear regarding risk management from the minds of the company leadership and help them in making risk savvy decisions in quest to achieve their strategic objectives.

Uniform policy manual for the use of SER Board members, volunteers, staff /

"Third printing."

Community mental health center board development : a manual for board trainers, board members, CMHC staff, policy-makers /

Contract no. 290-77-0010.

Handbook for Minnesota school board members /

"Editor, Lucy R. Foster"--p. iii.

Manual for school board members, a brief statement of their opportunities, duties and responsibilities.

Mode of access: Internet.

You and your job : a guide for county welfare board members.

"October, 1958."

Guide to public assistance : a handbook for public assistance advisory committees and board members.

"May 1, 1952."

A handbook for welfare board members.

"May, 1954."

Export Behavior and Board Independence in Colombian Family Firms: The Reverse Causality Relationship

In the context of greater market liberalization in Latin America, one issue that merits greater attention for empirical investigation is the international expansion of family-owned business. Specifically, the relationship between export behavior, family control and board composition in the Latin American context is absent in the literature. Using a large and unique database from Colombian firms (33,249 firms in the period of 2008 to 2013), we provide insightful information on the determinants of export behavior of family firms in emerging markets. Our empirical test confirms an endogenous relation between boards’ composition (specifically the presence of independent members) and export behavior in family firms. Firms with a higher participation of independent board members are more likely to exhibit higher levels of exports. A "virtuous cycle" was also detected whereby the introduction of independent members on the board can be expected to boost export behavior, which in turn will encourage the increase of independent members on the board of private firms.

Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Entrepreneurship : Evidence from Family Firms and Venture-Capital Backed Firms

The purpose of this article is to investigate how ownership structure, especially family and/or venture-capital involvement, as well as entrepreneurial activities, defined as strategic change and renewal, help explain the involvement of independent members on boards of directors. The CEOs of 2,455 small and medium-sized, private enterprises from practically all industries were contacted in a telephone survey, resulting in an exceptionally high response rate. The findings reveal that family firms are more reluctant to involve independent directors on their boards than non-family firms that presence of venture capitalists increases the frequency of independent board members and that ownership has an impact on board roles. The results do not support the hypothesised relationship that independent directors enhance entrepreneurial activities. One implication of our study is that the often-argued-for strategic contribution of outsiders to the boards in family firms may be overemphasised. Another implication is that family firms that choose to acquire additional capital should be aware that this could result in a change in the board composition and the loss of control of the business. However, new and external owners’ inclusion on the board seems to be negotiable since there are also venture capitalists that do not insist on board representation.

A participação do conselheiro independente nas companhias listadas no novo mercado da BM&FBovespa em 2012

O tema do presente trabalho é a governança corporativa, especificamente sobre a atuação dos conselheiros independentes das companhias do Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa por meio de um estudo qualitativo para verificar a forma e a dinâmica da participação dos membros independentes no processo de tomada de decisão das companhias onde atuam. O objetivo é contribuir para o campo de finanças e governança corporativa de modo a explicar resultados de diversos estudos quantitativos que apontam não haver uma correlação significativa entre a proporção de conselheiros independentes e o desempenho financeiro das companhias. O questionário distribuído por e-mail foi respondido por 30 dos 361 conselheiros independentes e possibilitou a constatação de que a atuação dos conselheiros independentes avaliados está atualmente mais voltada para o papel consultivo do que propriamente de fiscalização, demonstrando uma dinâmica de alinhamento e não de conflito no processo decisório do conselho de administração. Além disso, o estudo constatou que os conselheiros independentes disponibilizam pouco tempo no exercício das suas funções, situação que pode constituir fator indicativo para a falta de correlação entre proporção de conselheiros independentes e o desempenho financeiro das companhias, conforme apontada por diversos estudos quantitativos. Dessa forma, o estudo sugere que, no ambiente brasileiro de elevada concentração de ações nas mãos de poucos acionistas, os órgãos reguladores estejam mais atentos à sua função fiscalizadora uma vez que os conselheiros independentes não assumem esse papel.

Corporate governance disclosure in the Gulf countries

Corporate governance disclosure is important for countries aiming to attract international investors and reduce companies’ cost of capital. The relationship between corporate governance disclosure (CGD) and its determinants is the main objective of the current research. Accordingly, the research aimed to: (i) assess CGD level in the Gulf countries; (ii) investigate the impact of ownership structure (proportion of institutional, governmental, managerial and family ownership) on CGD; (iii) explore the effect of board characteristics (proportion of independent board members, proportion of family members on board, CEO/chairman duality and board size) on CGD; (iv) examine the relationship between diversity (proportion of foreign and female members on a board and in the senior management team) and CGD; and (v) test the association between firm characteristics (company size, age, liquidity, profitability, leverage, industry and auditor types) and CGD. Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) were selected for the study since they share similar characteristics and represent a relatively homogeneous category in the Middle East and North African region. A CGD index of 232 items was developed and divided into six categories: ownership structure and investor rights; financial transparency and information disclosure; information on auditors; board and senior management structure and process; board committees; and finally corporate behaviour and responsibility. Annual reports available for listed non-financial companies of the Gulf countries were 270 for the year 2009. The maximum CGD level was 63%, whereas the minimum was 5%, with an average disclosure level of 32%. Several regression models were conducted to enhance the robustness of the results and conclusions of the study. The results indicated that five variables had a significant positive relationship with CGD: proportion of independent members on a board, proportion of foreign members on a board, proportion of foreign members in the senior management team, auditor type and profitability. The research contributes to the literature on corporate governance voluntary disclosure in developing countries. Practical contributions consist of several recommendations to policy makers, regulators, and professional institutions in the Gulf countries.

Iowa Child Advocacy Board, 2007 Findings

The Iowa Child Advocacy Board (ICAB) is an independent board composed of nine members appointed by the Governor of Iowa and confirmed by the Iowa Senate. ICAB establishes policies and procedures for two volunteer child advocacy programs: the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) program and the Iowa Citizen Foster Care Review Boards programs.