Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Price-setting dynamical duopoly with incomplete information

We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms’ expected profits with the ex-post firms’ profits.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

On optimal dividend strategies with deficit or incomplete information

Rapport de synthèse Cette thèse consiste en trois essais sur les stratégies optimales de dividendes. Chaque essai correspond à un chapitre. Les deux premiers essais ont été écrits en collaboration avec les Professeurs Hans Ulrich Gerber et Elias S. W. Shiu et ils ont été publiés; voir Gerber et al. (2006b) ainsi que Gerber et al. (2008). Le troisième essai a été écrit en collaboration avec le Professeur Hans Ulrich Gerber. Le problème des stratégies optimales de dividendes remonte à de Finetti (1957). Il se pose comme suit: considérant le surplus d'une société, déterminer la stratégie optimale de distribution des dividendes. Le critère utilisé consiste à maximiser la somme des dividendes escomptés versés aux actionnaires jusqu'à la ruine2 de la société. Depuis de Finetti (1957), le problème a pris plusieurs formes et a été résolu pour différents modèles. Dans le modèle classique de théorie de la ruine, le problème a été résolu par Gerber (1969) et plus récemment, en utilisant une autre approche, par Azcue and Muler (2005) ou Schmidli (2008). Dans le modèle classique, il y a un flux continu et constant d'entrées d'argent. Quant aux sorties d'argent, elles sont aléatoires. Elles suivent un processus à sauts, à savoir un processus de Poisson composé. Un exemple qui correspond bien à un tel modèle est la valeur du surplus d'une compagnie d'assurance pour lequel les entrées et les sorties sont respectivement les primes et les sinistres. Le premier graphique de la Figure 1 en illustre un exemple. Dans cette thèse, seules les stratégies de barrière sont considérées, c'est-à-dire quand le surplus dépasse le niveau b de la barrière, l'excédent est distribué aux actionnaires comme dividendes. Le deuxième graphique de la Figure 1 montre le même exemple du surplus quand une barrière de niveau b est introduite, et le troisième graphique de cette figure montre, quand à lui, les dividendes cumulés. Chapitre l: "Maximizing dividends without bankruptcy" Dans ce premier essai, les barrières optimales sont calculées pour différentes distributions du montant des sinistres selon deux critères: I) La barrière optimale est calculée en utilisant le critère usuel qui consiste à maximiser l'espérance des dividendes escomptés jusqu'à la ruine. II) La barrière optimale est calculée en utilisant le second critère qui consiste, quant à lui, à maximiser l'espérance de la différence entre les dividendes escomptés jusqu'à la ruine et le déficit au moment de la ruine. Cet essai est inspiré par Dickson and Waters (2004), dont l'idée est de faire supporter aux actionnaires le déficit au moment de la ruine. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai dans le cas d'une compagnie d'assurance dont la ruine doit être évitée. Dans l'exemple de la Figure 1, le déficit au moment de la ruine est noté R. Des exemples numériques nous permettent de comparer le niveau des barrières optimales dans les situations I et II. Cette idée, d'ajouter une pénalité au moment de la ruine, a été généralisée dans Gerber et al. (2006a). Chapitre 2: "Methods for estimating the optimal dividend barrier and the probability of ruin" Dans ce second essai, du fait qu'en pratique on n'a jamais toute l'information nécessaire sur la distribution du montant des sinistres, on suppose que seuls les premiers moments de cette fonction sont connus. Cet essai développe et examine des méthodes qui permettent d'approximer, dans cette situation, le niveau de la barrière optimale, selon le critère usuel (cas I ci-dessus). Les approximations "de Vylder" et "diffusion" sont expliquées et examinées: Certaines de ces approximations utilisent deux, trois ou quatre des premiers moments. Des exemples numériques nous permettent de comparer les approximations du niveau de la barrière optimale, non seulement avec les valeurs exactes mais également entre elles. Chapitre 3: "Optimal dividends with incomplete information" Dans ce troisième et dernier essai, on s'intéresse à nouveau aux méthodes d'approximation du niveau de la barrière optimale quand seuls les premiers moments de la distribution du montant des sauts sont connus. Cette fois, on considère le modèle dual. Comme pour le modèle classique, dans un sens il y a un flux continu et dans l'autre un processus à sauts. A l'inverse du modèle classique, les gains suivent un processus de Poisson composé et les pertes sont constantes et continues; voir la Figure 2. Un tel modèle conviendrait pour une caisse de pension ou une société qui se spécialise dans les découvertes ou inventions. Ainsi, tant les approximations "de Vylder" et "diffusion" que les nouvelles approximations "gamma" et "gamma process" sont expliquées et analysées. Ces nouvelles approximations semblent donner de meilleurs résultats dans certains cas.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

Dominance Measuring Method Performance under Incomplete Information about Weights.

In multi-attribute utility theory, it is often not easy to elicit precise values for the scaling weights representing the relative importance of criteria. A very widespread approach is to gather incomplete information. A recent approach for dealing with such situations is to use information about each alternative?s intensity of dominance, known as dominance measuring methods. Different dominancemeasuring methods have been proposed, and simulation studies have been carried out to compare these methods with each other and with other approaches but only when ordinal information about weights is available. In this paper, we useMonte Carlo simulation techniques to analyse the performance of and adapt such methods to deal with weight intervals, weights fitting independent normal probability distributions orweights represented by fuzzy numbers.Moreover, dominance measuringmethod performance is also compared with a widely used methodology dealing with incomplete information on weights, the stochastic multicriteria acceptability analysis (SMAA). SMAA is based on exploring the weight space to describe the evaluations that would make each alternative the preferred one.