Price-setting dynamical duopoly with incomplete information


Autoria(s): Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio; Pinto, Alberto A.
Data(s)

04/01/2016

04/01/2016

2011

Resumo

We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms’ expected profits with the ex-post firms’ profits.

Identificador

978-90-481-9883-2

978-90-481-9884-9

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/7299

10.1007/978-90-481-9884-9_46

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Springer Netherlands

Relação

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-90-481-9884-9_46

Direitos

closedAccess

Palavras-Chave #Game theory #Industrial organization #Optimization uncertainty
Tipo

bookPart