Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

La lucha contra los paraísos fiscales: realidad o apariencia

[ES]La globalización y el libre movimiento de los capitales han facilitado el funcionamiento de los paraísos fiscales. Estos territorios de baja o nula tributación se caracterizan por ofrecer ventajas fiscales y legales a sus usuarios, así como por la posibilidad de ocultar la titularidad de las transacciones realizadas. Los grandes patrimonios y las multinacionales los utilizan para evadir impuestos, los gobiernos para esconder los fondos provenientes de la corrupción y las asociaciones criminales para camuflar el dinero proveniente de actividades ilícitas. Son varios los autores que defienden la existencia de estos territorios como medio para el aumento de la competitividad, pero lo cierto es que reducen la recaudación fiscal, crean inestabilidad en el sistema financiero internacional y hacen vulnerables a las democracias. En los últimos años se ha intensificado la lucha contra los paraísos fiscales, pero la implantación de las medidas no está teniendo la eficacia esperada.

Health, security and foreign policy

McInnes, C., Lee, K. (2006). Health, security and foreign policy. Review of International Studies, 32 (1), 5-23. RAE2008

La responsabilité des intermédiaires techniques en droit pénal canadien, à la lumière des pratiques internationales

La question de la responsabilité pénale des intermédiaires techniques est un enjeu central et actuel dans la réglementation du cyberespace. Non seulement les implications économiques sont énormes mais c'est tout le cadre juridique de la responsabilité pénale des intermédiaires techniques qui est en cause. Or, l'environnement Internet comporte des spécificités qui rendent difficiles l'imputation de responsabilité à l'auteur de l'activité illicite qui peut alors se retrouver hors d'atteinte ou insolvable. La poursuite des intermédiaires techniques devient alors une solution envisageable aux autorités chargées de réprimer les délits, compte tenu de l'état de leur solvabilité et dans la mesure où ils sont plus facilement identifiables. Par le fait même, ces derniers se retrouvent alors pris dans l'engrenage judiciaire pour n'avoir que facilité la commission de l'activité en question, n'ayant aucunement pris part à la réalisation de celle-ci. L'absence dans le corpus législatif canadien d'un régime de responsabilité spécifiquement applicable aux intermédiaires techniques nous oblige à baliser les critères qui emportent leur responsabilité pénale, à partir de «principes directeurs» d'imputabilité se dégageant de plusieurs textes nationaux et internationaux. Dans ce contexte, le mémoire étudiera, dans un premier temps, les conditions d'ouverture de la responsabilité pénale des intermédiaires techniques en droit pénal canadien et, dans un deuxième temps, répondra à la question de savoir si le droit pénal canadien en matière d'imputabilité des intermédiaires techniques est conforme aux principes directeurs ressortant de normes et pratiques internationales.

Impacto del conflicto armado en la frontera colombo-ecuatoriana y las implicaciones en sus relaciones diplomáticas a partir de la implementación del Plan Colombia hasta diciembre de 2009

Históricamente, las fronteras colombianas han sido porosas, frágiles y descuidadas desde una perspectiva política. La extrema pobreza y la ausencia de instituciones estatales han dejado a las poblaciones vulnerables ante diversos actores armados y a merced de las actividades ilícitas, que inevitablemente se desbordan y afectan los territorios vecinos. El desborde de los efectos del conflicto armado a territorio ecuatoriano, los enfrentamientos e incursiones del ejército colombiano, y la presencia de actores no estatales como los grupos al margen de la ley, han hecho que las relaciones bilaterales se minen, dañando lo que alguna vez fue una cordialidad constructiva entre Colombia y Ecuador. Para analizar esta problemática, se utilizaron las teorías de las relaciones internacionales de Interdependencia y seguridad cooperativa.

Análise de eventos de segurança em redes de computadores utilizando detecção de novidade

Pós-graduação em Ciência da Computação - IBILCE

Detecção de eventos de segurança de redes por intermédio de técnicas estatísticas e associativas aplicadas a fluxos de dados

Pós-graduação em Ciência da Computação - IBILCE

Políticas de integração na fronteira trinacional Brasil, Peru e Bolívia

As áreas de fronteiras internacionais constituem espaços altamente complexos, marcados pela grande diversidade de agentes étnicos e de identidade plurinacionais. Na Amazônia Sul Ocidental, tem-se uma área geopolítica estratégica de fronteira trinacional composta pelo Acre (Brasil), Madre de Dios (Peru) e Pando (Bolívia). A preocupação com a segurança nacional, da qual emana a criação de um território especial ao longo do limite internacional continental do país, embora legítima, não tem sido acompanhada de uma política pública sistemática que atenda às especificidades regionais, nem do ponto de vista econômico, nem da cidadania fronteiriça. A integração física do Brasil, como questão central do interesse nacional e do combate às atividades ilícitas, atribui às fronteiras novo papel estratégico. Reativam-se, assim, o interesse pelas fronteiras a partir desse duplo processo, tornando as relações transfronteiriças um tema prioritário das relações internacionais. Com efeito, a busca de um novo significado para as interações do Brasil com seus países limítrofes vem impondo o redirecionamento da ação do Estado brasileiro, com reflexos na geopolítica internacional dessa região da América do Sul. O objetivo central deste estudo é analisar as políticas e ações de integração regional, no processo de desenvolvimento, em uma área de fronteira sob a jurisdição trinacional do Brasil, Peru e Bolívia.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Drug alliance program activities in neighborhood-based illicit drug abuse prevention /

"Submitted under contract number 90-043-1003."

Drug alliance program activities in neighborhood-based illicit drug abuse prevention :

"Submitted under contract number 90-043-1003."

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.