Do financial reforms improve the performance of financial holding companies? The case of Taiwan

We examine the performance of financial holding companies (FHCs) in Taiwan after the financial reform that removes the separation of banking, securities, insurance, and other financial services. Using data envelopment analysis, we find that FHCs fail to improve technical efficiencies in the post-reform era. They also do not outperform independent commercial banks after the financial reform. Lower technical efficiency caused by excess operating expenses appears to be the primary source of inefficiency. While scale efficiency may improve as FHCs grow larger, the benefits are marginal and insufficient to offset the potential costs of organizational diseconomies. Our findings suggest that increasing the size and scope of financial activities alone do not necessarily improve the performance of financial firms.

Investigation of railroads, holding companies, affiliated companies, and related matters.

Mode of access: Internet.

Investigation of lobbying on utility holding company bills : hearings, Seventy-fourth Congress, first session, on H. Res. 288, a resolution authorizing and directing the Committee on Rules to investigate lobbying activities with respect to utility holding companies.

Hearings held July 9-17, 1935.

Investigation of Railroads, holding companies, and affiliated companies.

Reprint. Originally published: Washington : U.S. G.P.O., 1940. (Report / 76th Congress, 3d session, Senate ; no. 1182)

Investigation of holding companies. Hearing before the Committee on rules, House of Representatives, Seventy-first Congress, third session, on H.J. Res. 517, February 25, 1931.

Mode of access: Internet.

Laws relating to Securities Commission, exchanges, and holding companies, with indices.

Mode of access: Internet.

Report of the Public Utilities Division to the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the holding company system of the Commonwealth & Southern Corporation and its subsidiary companies, as to compliance with section 11(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

"File no. 59-8."

Vantagens e desvantagens da estrutura de holding na administração pública: um estudo de caso do Ministério da Defesa

Esse estudo buscou identificar vantagens e desvantagens da estrutura de holding na Administração Pública a partir da análise da constituição e organização do Ministério da Defesa. Realizamos um estudo de caso e, para a preparação do mesmo, partimos de referenciais teóricos que nos permitissem entender a estrutura de holding e controladas, a administração privada, a pública e a diferença entre elas. Foram realizadas doze entrevistas em duas etapas. A primeira abrangeu consultas a especialistas sobre holdings, e a segunda, pessoas com conhecimento sobre o Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas. As respostas das entrevistas foram analisadas tomando como base o que foi apresentado no Referencial Teórico. De forma geral, os entrevistados apresentaram como vantagens de uma holding na administração pública: facilitar maior integração e diálogo entre as partes; centralizar o poder norteando o rumo da organização; facilitar o desempenho estratégico e a visão; fomentar a governança; intensificar o diálogo, pensamento conjunto e atuação sistêmica; identificar maior poder de barganha e representatividade política; gerar maior eficácia por conta do entendimento entre as partes e melhor aproveitamento dos recursos; permitir a tradução de objetivos em diretrizes; aumentar a possibilidade de reduzir as desigualdades quando não pensa só no lucro; e buscar o benefício público. Como desvantagens foram citados o aumento de problemas no compartilhamento entre as controladas; a intensificação da possibilidade de choques de culturas diferentes; a possibilidade de cada gestor se voltar mais para sua organização quando os recursos são limitados; o maior esvaziamento da discussão de assuntos importantes na controlada; brecha para a ocorrência de retrabalho; possibilidade de atrasos na entrega das compras, que agora são centralizadas; maior exposição à politização e influência política; insuficiência de mecanismos de controle de desempenho; limitação das decisões e da gestão pelo que é estabelecido pela lei; existência de Forças políticas atuando e negociando; inexistência de carreiras civis em certas áreas aumentando essa exposição; falta de blindagem política e ingerência política; capacitação e estruturação não satisfatórios.

Características e tributação das sociedades " holding" no Brasil

A presente monografia tem por objetivo servir de introdução ao estudo sistemático de um tipo de sociedade cada vez mais difundida nacional e internacionalmente: a "holding". Assim, ao invés de optarmos por um estudo teórico mais profundo dos aspectos jurídicos do instituto, preferimos uma aproximação mais prática, que permitisse a aplicação dos conceitos expostos na área da administração de empresas. Esta diretriz decorreu naturalmente da área de concentração a que se vincula a monografia, qual seja, Direito Aplicado à Administração.

General rules and regulations and forms under the Public utility holding company act of 1935.

At head of title: 1937- Securities and exchange commission, Washington, D.C.

Report of the Public Utilities Division to the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to Northern New England Company and New England Public Service Company as to compliance with section 11(b)(2) of the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935.

"File no. 59-15."

Public utility holding company act of 1935.

Mode of access: Internet.

Ownership, corporate governance and liquidity in Caribbean firms

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to stock liquidity in the Caribbean. Based on panel data of 71 firms from three selected Caribbean markets − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago − results show that firms with concentrated ownership are associated with lower liquidity. The identity of the largest shareholder also matters: family firms and firms with foreign holding companies are more liquid than government firms. Although the second largest shareholding does not appear to matter to liquidity, there is some evidence showing that firms with foreign holding companies as the second largest shareholder are less liquid. Caribbean firms suffer from poor corporate governance but this study is unable to establish a significant relationship between corporate governance and liquidity.

Audit fees and asset securitization risks

The thesis investigates “where were the auditors in asset securitizations”, a criticism of the audit profession before and after the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC). Asset securitizations increase audit complexity and audit risks, which are expected to increase audit fees. Using US bank holding company data from 2003 to 2009, this study examines the association between asset securitization risks and audit fees, and its changes during the global financial crisis. The main test is based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, which is adapted from the Fields et al. (2004) bank audit fee model. I employ a principal components analysis to address high correlations among asset securitization risks. Individual securitization risks are also separately tested. A suite of sensitivity tests indicate the results are robust. These include model alterations, sample variations, further controls in the tests, and correcting for the securitizer self-selection problem. A partial least squares (PLS) path modelling methodology is introduced as a separate test, which allows for high intercorrelations, self-selection correction, and sequential order hypotheses in one simultaneous model. The PLS results are consistent with the main results. The study finds significant and positive associations between securitization risks and audit fees. After the commencement of the global financial crisis in 2007, there was an increased focus on the role of audits on asset securitization risks resulting from bank failures; therefore I expect that auditors would become more sensitive to bank asset securitization risks after the commencement of the crisis. I find that auditors appear to focus on different aspects of asset securitization risks during the crisis and that auditors appear to charge a GFC premium for banks. Overall, the results support the view that auditors consider asset securitization risks and market changes, and adjust their audit effort and risk considerations accordingly.