Growth, Democracy, and Civil War

Does economic growth affect the likelihood of civil war? Answering this question requires dealing with reverse causation. Our approach exploits that international commodity prices have a significant effect on the income growth of Sub-Saharan African countries. We show that lower income growth makes civil war more likely in non-democracies. This effect is significantly weaker in democracies; as a result, we find no link between growth and civil war in these countries. Our reducedform results also indicate that lower international commodity price growth has no effect on civil war in democracies, but raises the likelihood of civil war incidence and onset in nondemocracies.

Politische Ökonomie des Wirtschaftswachstums in defekten Demokratien : eine empirische Untersuchung im Vergleich zu Demokratien und Autokratien

Die Arbeit untersucht das Wirtschaftswachstum von defekten Demokratien im Vergleich zu Autokatien und liberalen Demokratien mittels multiple Regressionsanylsen. Theoretischer Hintergrund sind die Arbeiten Mancur Olsons und Bruce Bueno de Mesquitas. Die Messung defekter Demokratien wird mittels dem Freedom House Freedom in the World Index und dem Electoral Democracy Index unternommen. Ergebnis der Analyse ist, dass defekte Demokratien rund ein Prozentpunkt schneller wachsen als liebrale Demokratien. Im Vergleich zu Autokratien besteht kein signifikanter Unterschied.

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Diplocaulus : a study in growth and variation / Everett Claire Olson --

v.11:no.2(1951)

Democracy and growth in pre-industrial countries

This paper distinguishes three types of countries (rich, middle-income, and pre-industrial) and focus on the latter, which, in contrast to the other two, didn’t complete their industrial and capitalist revolutions. Can pre-industrial countries be governed well and embody the principles of consolidated democracies? Today these countries are under pressure from the imperial West to eschew institutions and developmental strategies that, in the past, allowed rich and middle-income countries to industrialize. At the same time, they are pressured by these same Western parties (and by its own people) to be democratic, even though their societies are not mature enough to fulfill that. In fact, no country completed its industrial and capitalist revolution within the framework of even a minimal democracy, suggesting that such demands are unfair. Added to this, pre-industrial countries are extremely difficult to govern because they usually don’t have a strong nation and capable states. This double pressure to renounce development strategies that have worked for the West while being required to become a democracy represents a major obstacle to their development.

Democracy or despotism in the American capital; a story of the growth and government of the District of Columbia, from the founding of the republic to the adoption of the Organic act of 1878,

Mode of access: Internet.

The political economy of inequality and growth: Essays on sovereign debt, democracy and saving

This dissertation addresses three issues in the political economy of growth literature. The first study empirically tests the hypothesis that income inequality influences the size of a country's sovereign debt for a sample of developing countries for the period 1970–1990. The argument examined is that governments tend to yield to popular pressures to engage in redistributive policies, partially financed by foreign borrowing. Facing increased risk of default, international creditors limit the credit they extend, with the result that borrowing countries invest less and grow at a slower pace. The findings do not seem to support the negative relationship between inequality and sovereign debt, as there is evidence of increases in multilateral, countercyclical flows until the mid 1980s in Latin America. The hypothesis would hold for the period 1983–1990. Debt flows and levels seem to be positively correlated with growth as expected. ^ The second study empirically investigates the hypothesis that pronounced levels of inequality lead to unconsolidated democracies. We test the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and democracy for a sample of Latin American countries for the period 1970–2000, where democracy appears to consolidate at some intermediate level of inequality. We find that the nonmonotonic relationship holds using instrumental variables methods. Bolivia seems to be a case of unconsolidated democracy. The positive relationship between per capita income and democracy disappears once fixed effects are introduced. ^ The third study explores the nonlinear relationship between per capita income and private saving levels in Latin America. Several estimation methods are presented; however, only the estimation of a dynamic specification through a state-of-the-art general method of moments estimator yields consistent estimates with increased efficiency. Results support the hypothesis that income positively affects private saving, while system GMM reveals nonlinear effects at income levels that exceed the ones included in this sample for the period 1960–1994. We also find that growth, government dissaving, and tightening of credit constraints have a highly significant and positive effect on private saving. ^

Growth of Long Range Forward-Backward Multiplicity Correlations with Centrality in Au plus Au Collisions at root s(NN)=200 GeV

Forward-backward multiplicity correlation strengths have been measured with the STAR detector for Au + Au and p + p collisions at root s(NN) = 200 GeV. Strong short- and long-range correlations (LRC) are seen in central Au + Au collisions. The magnitude of these correlations decrease with decreasing centrality until only short-range correlations are observed in peripheral Au + Au collisions. Both the dual parton model (DPM) and the color glass condensate (CGC) predict the existence of the long-range correlations. In the DPM, the fluctuation in the number of elementary (parton) inelastic collisions produces the LRC. In the CGC, longitudinal color flux tubes generate the LRC. The data are in qualitative agreement with the predictions of the DPM and indicate the presence of multiple parton interactions.

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

Democracy over governance

Varieties of institutional economics are available to evaluate varieties of capitalism. These methodologies dig behind preferences and technology to arrive at the ground on which agents make choices. The individual is at the foundation of these edifices, neoclassical and otherwise. Consequently, the denouement of all these models is that the market knows best in the absence of effective counterfactuals. A natural corollary is that the task of the government is to set effective mechanisms in place in order to approach the best outcomes. In contrast, we propose a framework which contends with the modern economy as an aggregate that evolves in historical time. Problems like effective demand failures are endemic to capitalist economies. Therefore, systematic State intervention is essential to their functioning. In particular, political economy teaches us that intervention must be in the interest of wage earners. In contrast to the earlier model, the fabric of norms and conventions that facilitate the growth and development of economies must emerge from the consciousness and practices of the working class.

Yesterday’s Games: Contingency Learning and the Growth of Public Spending, 1890-1938

Neither democracy nor globalization can explain the doubling of the peacetime public share in many Western countries between World Wars I and II. Here we examine two other explanations that are consistent with the timing of the observed changes, namely, (1) a shift in the demand for public goods and (2) the effect of war on the willingness to share. We first model each of these approaches as a contingency-learning phenomenon within Schelling’s Multi-Person Dilemma. We then derive verifiable propositions from each hypothesis. National time series of public spending as a share of GNP reveal no unit root but a break in trend, a result shown to favor explanation (2) over (1).

Extreme bounds of democracy

What determines the emergence and survival of democracy? The authors apply extreme bounds analysis to test the robustness of fifty-nine factors proposed in the literature, evaluating over three million regressions with data from 165 countries from 1976 to 2002. The most robust determinants of the transition to democracy are gross domestic product (GDP) growth (a negative effect), past transitions (a positive effect), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development membership (a positive effect). There is some evidence that fuel exporters and Muslim countries are less likely to see democracy emerge, although the latter finding is driven entirely by oil-producing Muslim countries. Regarding the survival of democracy, the most robust determinants are GDP per capita (a positive effect) and past transitions (a negative effect). There is some evidence that having a former military leader as the chief executive has a negative effect, while having other democracies as neighbors has a reinforcing effect.

The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth

Over the past four decades, the number of democracies in the world has increased exponentially. This project considers how democracy and FDI affect economic growth as well as whether the impact of FDI depends on the level of democracy in a country. Thus, I explore two major research questions: 1) Whether increased FDI speeds up economic growth, controlling for political regime type, urbanization and other developmental indicators; and 2) Whether an increase in political freedom helps or hinders economic growth, and specifically whether the impact of FDI varies depending on the political regime in the recipient country. To examine these questions, this paper used data from 150 countries over a period between 1980 and 2010 and utilized several models, testing variables such as institutions, agglomerations, urbanization, FDI and type of political regime, among others, for their impact on economic growth. I found that FDI does have a positive impact on economic growth, and that this impact is often magnified when it interacts with other relevant factors. I also found that, after controlling for other variables, FDI inflows do not have a different impact on economic growth in autocracies than they do in democracies. This may be partially explained by autocratic outliers such as China and the OPEC states, which have recently experienced rapid export-led growth. This suggests that factors such as education could have a greater impact on a country¿s economic growth than does its political system.