Dinámicas de las relaciones políticas franco-alemanas en el marco de la Unión Europea. Un análisis en el contexto de la crisis griega. Período 8 de diciembre del 2009- 21 de febrero del 2012

La crisis griega no condicionó de manera especial la manera de negociar de Francia y Alemania. Si se comparan las ruedas de negociación para votar los salvavidas económicos y las negociaciones que se dieron para la firma del Tratado de Maastricht, se puede concluir que, en general, negociaron de una manera similar.

Greece in crisis: austerity, populism and the politics of blame

Within the broader debate on the Greek crisis, the theory of ‘populist democracy’ postulates that populism is fundamental to the sustenance of the Greek political system and is at the heart of Greece's endemic domestic weaknesses. This article tests this assumption empirically through the use of a sophisticated framing analysis of speeches delivered by the leaders of the five parties in the Greek parliament in the period 2009–11. The findings confirm that populism: (a) is expressed through the narratives of political actors; (b) is observed across the party system; (c) is expressed in the forms of blame-shifting and exclusivity; and (d) differs depending on position in the party system. The article contributes to the debate by testing and building on the theory of democratic populism, providing a novel way of measuring and operationalizing populism and identifying a new typology that distinguishes between mainstream and fringe populism.

Metáforas da crise cotidiana: os media e a veiculação da crise grega

A partir da forma como nos media portugueses são veiculadas as relações de oposição e negociação entre a Grécia e a União Europeia, pode verificar-se a importância e a força que a metáfora conceitual possui como mecanismo linguístico e cognitivo de construção de perceções, defesa de pontos de vista e fundamento de perspectivas ideológicas. Alicerçando-se numa estrutura metafórica de base, a negociação é colocada entre os domínios JOGO e LUTA, evidenciando-se o peso das metáforas como poderosos mecanismos para construir e manipular as perceções que temos sobre a realidade.

A stronger, growth-oriented surveillance for EMU. EuropEos Commentary No. 1, 19 April 2010

This Commentary finds that the recent adjustment measures taken by the Greek government in combination with the financial support proffered by the Eurogroup may not be sufficient to deal with the risk of instability in EMU in the longer term. The author argues that other imbalances, most notably the current account imbalances within EMU, need to be addressed to avoid a deflation spiral that would aggravate sustainability problems in highly indebted countries. The Greek crisis highlights the need to take steps to strengthen the economic governance of the euro area. A key component of these steps would be a stronger, growth-oriented, surveillance.

Post-Summit Commentary – Greece on the brink. EPC Commentary, 29 June 2015

The developments of recent days have been dramatic – the saga of the Greek crisis has probably opened its decisive chapter. Negotiations between Athens and its creditors failed after the Greek government decided to leave the negotiating table and hold a referendum on 5 July. The future of the country in the common currency and the potential consequences for the EU and the euro are uncertain. There are clear signs of fatigue, everywhere. But there is still time to avert the worst, if there is the political will on all sides to work on a new perspective for Greece and for the future of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Escaping the debt trap: peripheral countries in prolonged debt crises and how to exit

This thesis is an interdisciplinary piece of academic research, situated within Critical Theory but engaging with other disciplines, mainly Political Economy and Politics, to tackle the topic at hand; sovereign debt crises. The thesis deals with the Problem of Debt and, more specifically, the Problem of Prolonged Sovereign Debt Crises, which is described in this thesis as the phenomenon of the “Debt Trap”. The specific question that will occupy us in this thesis is why countries appear unable to exit these prolonged debt crises. By exiting a debt crisis, we mean here a state of affairs in which a country has managed to render its debt sustainable, regain its democratic sovereignty, achieve economic recovery and, what is more, mitigate adverse effects of the crisis, especially in what human development, social inequality and poverty rates are concerned. This question is tackled through the use of an interdisciplinary approach that combines critical theory perspectives -which are grouped in two paradigms, the Subjectivity paradigm and the genealogies of Capitalism paradigm- with financialisation literature. The purpose is to form an interdisciplinary intellectual framework that will allow us to analyse with a critical perspective the two case studies of the Greek crisis from 2009 to 2015 and the Argentinean crisis from 1983 to 2005. The aim of the thesis is to develop a theoretical framework that allows us to deconstruct the various ideological approaches to these two particular cases of Debt traps, including neoclassical and neoliberal approaches, Conservative and Keynesian approaches and uncover the political, economic and class relation that underpin the prolonged crises that the two countries have experienced.

Reprisals remembered: German-Greek conflict and car sales during the Euro crisis

During the Greek debt crisis after 2010, the German government insisted on harshausterity measures. This led to a rapid cooling of relations between the Greekand German governments. We compile a new index of public acrimony betweenGermany and Greece based on newspaper reports and internet search terms. Thisinformation is combined with historical maps on German war crimes during theoccupation between 1941 and 1944. During months of open conflict between Germanand Greek politicians, German car sales fell markedly more than those of cars fromother countries. This was especially true in areas affected by German reprisals duringWorldWar II: areas where German troops committed massacres and destroyed entirevillages curtailed their purchases of German cars to a greater extent during conflictmonths than other parts of Greece. We conclude that cultural aversion was a keydeterminant of purchasing behavior, and that memories of past conflict can affecteconomic choices in a time-varying fashion. These findings are compatible withbehavioral models emphasizing the importance of salience for individual decision-making.

Integration or a Greek tragedy?: How crisis spillovers affect Central and Eastern European States

Tutkielma siitä, miten Euroopan entisten sosialistivaltioiden markkinoiden integroituminen on edistynyt Kreikan ja EMU-alueen kanssa euron käyttöönoton ajalta. Tutkimus vertaa maiden markkinoiden reaktioita Kreikasta ja EMU-alueelta kantautuviin sokkeihin ennen ja jälkeen vuonna 2007 alkanutta kriisiä.

Greek politics: economic crisis or crisis of democracy?

Greece’s economic instability has become the Western world’s longest-running monetary crisis. Will Germany allow the EU to keep propping up Greece’s unstable financial system? Will the country leave the eurozone? Will such a departure, if it occurs, unravel the idea of “Europe”? All valid questions. But behind them stands another equally profound social and political crisis that has made Greece the weak man of Europe.

Greek shipping and the crisis of the 1980's

In 1982, Greek shipping plunged into a severe crisis: the size of the fleet declined dramatically and over 30% of the fleet was laid-up. catapulting many shipping companies into bankruptcy. The causes of the crisis were: The world recession, leading to regulation, protectionism, subsidization. and the growth of new competition in the tramp shipping market. The erosion of the cost differential between Greek shipping and other maritime nations of the world. The specialization and containerization of the world fleet. The old age and other characteristics of the Greek fleet, which exacerbated the crisis. Greek shipping, with its long history and the expertise, diligence, and supreme opportunism of its dynamic shipowners, will survive the crisis.

State Transformation and the European Integration Project. Lessons from the financial crisis and the Greek paradigm. CEPS Special Report No. 130/February 2016

The financial crisis that erupted in the eurozone not only affected the EU’s financial governance mechanisms, but also the very nature of state sovereignty and balances in the relations of member states; thus, the actual inequalities between the member states hidden behind their institutional equality have deteriorated. This transformation is recorded in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the member states’ constitutional courts, particularly in those at the heart of the crisis, with Greece as the most prominent example. It is the issue of public debt (sovereign debt) of the EU member states that particularly reflects the influence of the crisis on state sovereignty as well as the intensely transnational (intergovernmental) character of European integration, which under these circumstances takes the form of a continuous, tough negotiation. The historical connection between public debt (sovereign debt) and state sovereignty has re-emerged because of the financial crisis. This development has affected not only the European institutions, but also, at the member state level, the actual institutional content of the rule of law (especially judicial review) and the welfare state in its essence, as the great social and political acquis of 20th century Europe. From this perspective, the way that the Greek courts have dealt with the gradual waves of fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms from 2010 to 2015 is characteristic. The effect of the financial crisis on the sovereignty of the member states and on the pace of European integration also has an impact on European foreign and security policy, and the correlations between the political forces at both the national and European level, thus producing even more intense pressures on European social democracy. In light of the experience of the financial crisis, the final question is whether the nation state (given the large real inequalities among the EU member states) currently functions as a brake or as an engine for future European integration.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion

We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek debt crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in countryspecific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.

Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.