What explains the Great Moderation in the US? A structural analysis

This paper investigates what has caused output and inflation volatility to fall in the USusing a small scale structural model using Bayesian techniques and rolling samples. Thereare instabilities in the posterior of the parameters describing the private sector, the policyrule and the standard deviation of the shocks. Results are robust to the specification ofthe policy rule. Changes in the parameters describing the private sector are the largest,but those of the policy rule and the covariance matrix of the shocks explain the changes most.

On the sources of the Great Moderation

The remarkable decline in macroeconomic volatility experienced by the U.S. economy since the mid-80s (the so-called Great Moderation) has been accompanied by large changes in the patterns of comovements among output, hours and labor productivity. Those changes are reflected in both conditional and unconditional second moments as well as in the impulse responses to identified shocks. That evidencepoints to structural change, as opposed to just good luck, as an explanation for the Great Moderation. We use a simple macro model to suggest some of the immediate sources which are likely to be behindthe observed changes.

Do expectations matter? The Great Moderation revisited

We examine the role of expectations in the Great Moderation episode. We derive theoretical restrictions in a New-Keynesian model and test them using measures of expectations obtained from survey data, the Greenbook and bond markets. Expectations explain the dynamics of inflation and of interest rates but their importance is roughly unchanged over time. Systems with and without expectations display similar reduced form characteristics. Including or excluding expectations hardly changes the economic explanation of the Great Moderation. Results are robust to changes in the structure of the empirical model.

The Great Moderation and the Relationship between Output Growth and Its Volatility

This study examines the effect of the Great Moderation on the relationship between U.S. output growth and its volatility over the period 1947 to 2006. First, we consider the possible effects of structural change in the volatility process. In so doing, we employ GARCH-M and ARCH-M specifications of the process describing output growth rate and its volatility with and without a one-time structural break in volatility. Second, our data analyses and empirical results suggest no significant relationship between the output growth rate and its volatility, favoring the traditional wisdom of dichotomy in macroeconomics. Moreover, the evidence shows that the time-varying variance falls sharply or even disappears once we incorporate a one-time structural break in the unconditional variance of output starting 1982 or 1984. That is, the integrated GARCH effect proves spurious. Finally, a joint test of a trend change and a one-time shift in the volatility process finds that the one-time shift dominates.

Is the Great Moderation Ending? UK and US Evidence

The Great Moderation, the significant decline in the variability of economic activity, provides a most remarkable feature of the macroeconomic landscape in the last twenty years. A number of papers document the beginning of the Great Moderation in the US and the UK. In this paper, we use the Markov regime-switching models of Hamilton (1989) and Hamilton and Susmel (1994) to document the end of the Great Moderation. The Great Moderation in the US and the UK begin at different point in time. The explanations for the Great Moderation fall into generally three different categories -- good monetary policy, improved inventory management, or good luck. Summers (2005) argues that a combination of good monetary policy and better inventory management led to the Great Moderation. The end of the Great Moderation, however, occurs at approximately the same time in both the US and the UK. It seems unlikely that good monetary policy would turn into bad policy or that better inventory management would turn into worse management. Rather, the likely explanation comes from bad luck. Two likely culprits exist . energy-price and housing-price shocks.

The Great Moderation Flattens Fat Tails: Disappearing Leptokurtosis

Recently, Fagiolo et al. (2008) find fat tails of economic growth rates after adjusting outliers, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. This paper employs US quarterly real output growth, showing that this finding of fat tails may reflect the Great Moderation. That is, leptokurtosis disappears after GARCH adjustment once we incorporate the break in the variance equation.

The great diversification and its undoing

We investigate the hypothesis that macroeconomic fluctuations are primitively theresults of many microeconomic shocks, and show that it has significant explanatorypower for the evolution of macroeconomic volatility. We define ?fundamental? volatilityas the volatility that would arise from an economy made entirely of idiosyncratic microeconomicshocks, occurring primitively at the level of sectors or firms. In its empiricalconstruction, motivated by a simple model, the sales share of different sectors vary overtime (in a way we directly measure), while the volatility of those sectors remains constant.We find that fundamental volatility accounts for the swings in macroeconomicvolatility in the US and the other major world economies in the past half century. Itaccounts for the ?great moderation? and its undoing. Controlling for our measure offundamental volatility, there is no break in output volatility. The initial great moderationis due to a decreasing share of manufacturing between 1975 and 1985. The recentrise of macroeconomic volatility is due to the increase of the size of the financial sector.We provide a model to think quantitatively about the large comovement generated byidiosyncratic shocks. As the origin of aggregate shocks can be traced to identifiablemicroeconomic shocks, we may better understand the origins of aggregate fluctuations.

The past, present and future of central banking

The financial crisis, on the one hand, and the recourse to ‘unconventional’ monetary policy, on the other, have given a sharp jolt to perceptions of the role and status of central banks. In this paper we start with a brief ‘contrarian’ history of central banks since the second world war, which presents the Great Moderation and the restricted focus on inflation targeting as a temporary aberration from the norm. We then discuss how recent developments in fiscal and monetary policy have affected the role and status of central banks, notably their relationships with governments, before considering the environment central banks will face in the near and middle future and how they will have to change to address it.

Financial crisis and quantitative easing: can broad money tell us anything?

When Bank of England (and the Federal Reserve Board) introduced their quantitative easing (QE) operations they emphasised the effects on money and credit, but much of their empirical research on the effects of QE focuses on long-term interest rates. We use a flow of funds matrix with an independent central bank to show the implications of QE and other monetary developments, and argue that the financial crisis, the fiscal expansion and QE are likely to have constituted major exogenous shocks to money and credit in the UK which could not be digested immediately by the usual adjustment mechanisms. We present regressions of a reduced form model which considers the growth of nominal spending as determined by the growth of nominal money and other variables. These results suggest that money was not important during the Great Moderation but has had a much larger role in the period of the crisis and QE. We then use these estimates to illustrate the effects of the financial crisis and QE. We conclude that it would be useful to incorporate money and/or credit in wider macroeconometric models of the UK economy.

How Optimal is US Monetary Policy?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov switching in shock variances, the inflation target and/or rule parameters, the data preferred description of policy is that the US Fed operates under discretion with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. Parameter estimates are similar to those obtained under simple rules, except that the degree of habits is significantly lower and the prevalence of cost-push shocks greater. Moreover, we find that the greatest welfare gains from the ‘Great Moderation’ arose from the reduction in the variances in shocks hitting the economy, rather than increased inflation aversion. However, much of the high inflation of the 1970s could have been avoided had policy makers been able to commit, even without adopting stronger anti-inflation objectives. More recently the Fed appears to have temporarily relaxed policy following the 1987 stock market crash, and has lost, without regaining, its post-Volcker conservatism following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

Are the high-growth recovery periods over?

We present evidence about the loss of the so-called "plucking effect", that is, a high-growth phase of the cycle typically observed at the end of recessions. This result matches the popular belief, presented informally by different authors, that the current recession will have permanent effects, or that the current recession will have an L shape versus the old-time recessions that have always had a V shape. Furthermore, we show that the loss of the "plucking effect" can explain part of the Great Moderation. We postulate that these two phenomena may be due to changes in inventory management brought about by improvements in information and communications technologies.

US Monetary and Fiscal Policies - Conflict or Cooperation?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis ignores fiscal policy and assumes that monetary policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow both fiscal and monetary policy to be described by rules and/or optimal policy which are subject to switches over time. We find that US monetary and fiscal policy have often been in conflict, and that it is relatively rare that we observe the benign policy combination of an conservative monetary policy paired with a debt stabilizing fiscal policy. In a series of counterfactuals, a conservative central bank following a time-consistent fiscal policy leader would come close to mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. However, if policy makers cannot credibly commit to such a regime, monetary accommodation of the prevailing fiscal regime may actually be welfare improving.

The macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks: Why are the 2000s so different from the 1970s?

We characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. Weconclude that all four have played an important role.