Rio Branco, grand strategy and naval power

This article addresses Baron of Rio Branco's grand strategy and the role played by the naval reorganization program (1904-1910) in this context. The ensuing case study determined the domestic and international constraints that affected the program, as well as the worldview of the patron of Brazilian diplomacy regarding military power's instrumentality to foreign policy.

EU Grand Strategy: Optimism is Mandatory. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 36, July 2012

The Arab Spring, the American pivot, and the global crisis: these affect all of EU external action, but also present opportunities for EU action. A debate on grand strategy remains necessary.

Beyond the American century: Walter Lippmann and American grand strategy, 1943-1950

As the United States became a world Power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after the Second World War, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine, and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country's ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America's growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann's concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of “ends” as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.

The shaping of foreign policy: Vietnamese grand strategy after the Cold War

This study examines the case of Vietnam and uses the method of process tracing to explore the sources of foreign policy choice and change. Foreign policy is derived from grand strategy, which refers to the full package of a state’s domestic and foreign policies. I argue that a state’s grand strategy results from the interaction of four factors—its society’s historical experience, social motivation, international power, and political contest among domestic groups. Grand strategies emerge as a response to perceived shifts in the balance of international economic, political, and military power. However, this is not to say that international pressures and incentives are translated into foreign policy. Rather, pressures and incentives are given meaning by worldviews, which reflect a society’s historical experiences of its place in the international system at traumatic junctures of its encounter with the outside world. Strategic changes in foreign policy follow what I call the “strategic algorithm,” which incorporates four major mechanisms—balancing against threat, bandwagoning with power, learning, and survival by transformation. This case study generates hypotheses for a theory of strategic choice, a theory of foreign policy transformation, and a theory of grand strategy emergence.

Sharing power? Prospects for a U.S. concert-balance strategy

The Pax Americana and the grand strategy of hegemony (or “Primacy”) that underpins it may be becoming unsustainable. Particularly in the wake of exhausting wars, the Global Financial Crisis, and the shift of wealth from West to East, it may no longer be possible or prudent for the United States to act as the unipolar sheriff or guardian of a world order. But how viable are the alternatives, and what difficulties will these alternatives entail in their design and execution? This analysis offers a sympathetic but critical analysis of alternative U.S. National Security Strategies of “retrenchment” that critics of American diplomacy offer. In these strategies, the United States would anticipate the coming of a more multipolar world and organize its behavior around the dual principles of “concert” and “balance,” seeking a collaborative relationship with other great powers, while being prepared to counterbalance any hostile aggressor that threatens world order. The proponents of such strategies argue that by scaling back its global military presence and its commitments, the United States can trade prestige for security, shift burdens, and attain a more free hand. To support this theory, they often look to the 19th-century concert of Europe as a model of a successful security regime and to general theories about the natural balancing behavior of states. This monograph examines this precedent and measures its usefulness for contemporary statecraft to identify how great power concerts are sustained and how they break down. The project also applies competing theories to how states might behave if world politics are in transition: Will they balance, bandwagon, or hedge? This demonstrates the multiple possible futures that could shape and be shaped by a new strategy. viii A new strategy based on an acceptance of multipolarity and the limits of power is prudent. There is scope for such a shift. The convergence of several trends—including transnational problems needing collaborative efforts, the military advantages of defenders, the reluctance of states to engage in unbridled competition, and hegemony fatigue among the American people—means that an opportunity exists internationally and at home for a shift to a new strategy. But a Concert-Balance strategy will still need to deal with several potential dilemmas. These include the difficulty of reconciling competitive balancing with cooperative concerts, the limits of balancing without a forward-reaching onshore military capability, possible unanticipated consequences such as a rise in regional power competition or the emergence of blocs (such as a Chinese East Asia or an Iranian Gulf), and the challenge of sustaining domestic political support for a strategy that voluntarily abdicates world leadership. These difficulties can be mitigated, but they must be met with pragmatic and gradual implementation as well as elegant theorizing and the need to avoid swapping one ironclad, doctrinaire grand strategy for another.

Raiders of the Lost Art: Strategy-Making in Europe. Security Policy Brief No. 40, November 2012

Have Europeans lost the art of making grand strategy? In a reflection process initiated by Sweden, Poland, Italy and Spain, they are invited to rediscover it and draft a “European Global Strategy”. This policy brief argues that what the EU needs most is a short set of priorities for collective action, to be reassessed for each term of the High Representative.

Réinventer la stratégie d’affirmation de puissance dans le contexte post-Guerre froide : la réponse de la Chine à l’hégémonie américaine

Ce mémoire analyse la stratégie d’affirmation de puissance mise en oeuvre par la Chine dans le contexte post-Guerre froide, caractérisé par la seule superpuissance des États-Unis, en utilisant le cadre théorique du réalisme offensif. Challenger désigné des États-Unis, la Chine a basculé dans le 21ème siècle avec un défi important à relever. La prépondérance américaine continue d’être une donnée essentielle dans le système politique mondial. Les États-Unis produisent plus du quart du total de l’économie mondiale et comptent pour près de la moitié des dépenses militaires. La Chine, de son côté, avec ses 1.3 milliards d’habitants, une croissance économique quasiexponentielle, dotée d’un arsenal nucléaire conventionnel, est la principale puissance émergente, avec le potentiel de rivaliser avec les États-Unis dans les affaires mondiales. Mais, vu l’énorme écart qui les sépare, pour la Chine la question de l’hégémonie américaine se pose sous la forme d’une équation dont la seule variable connue est le potentiel de l’adversaire à affronter. Le principal problème auquel la Chine est confrontée est dès lors sa capacité de penser une stratégie sans toutefois courir le risque de provoquer la seule superpuissance du globe. Par conséquent, cette étude analyse les politiques et actions stratégiques développées par la Chine à la lumière des contraintes que lui impose un environnement international peu favorable. Elle s’intéresse en particulier à la manière dont Beijing a su exploiter avec maestria une des armes les plus redoutables de l’ère post-Guerre froide, sa puissance économique, afin de consolider son ascension au rang de grande puissance. Elle soutient que, tenant compte d’un retard considérable à combler, la Chine a entrepris de balancer la superpuissance américaine d’une manière pragmatique. A cet effet, elle a conçu une stratégie qui comprend deux grands piliers : sur le plan interne, des réformes économiques et militaires ; sur le plan externe, une diplomatie agressive et efficace en adéquation avec ses ambitions de puissance. Nous concluons qu’une telle stratégie vise à éviter à la Chine pour le moment tout risque de confrontation directe qui aurait pour principal effet de nuire à son ascension. Cependant, à mesure que sa puissance s’accroît, elle pourrait afficher une posture plus agressive, quitte à engager également, avec la seule superpuissance du monde, des compétitions de nature sécuritaire en Asie et au-delà de cette région.

Análisis del nuevo concepto de seguridad de China y sus efectos en la diplomacia regional. estudio de caso: creación de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghái (2001 – 2009).

A través de ésta investigación se pretendió analizar algunos elementos característicos de la política exterior China tras el fin de la Guerra Fría y los nuevos supuestos que tiene en materia de seguridad, los cuales se resumen en el Nuevo Concepto de Seguridad (NCS). Es bajo este nuevo contexto internacional y bajo el marco del globalismo en donde China ha redefinido la seguridad y ha establecido las pautas que han guiado su política exterior actual. Con el fin de ampliar el análisis y de llevarlo a un caso concreto, se profundizó en las relaciones que China ha establecido con los estados de la región de Asia Central a través de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghái (OCS).

Análisis del efecto de engranaje generado por la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa el 1 de diciembre de 2009 en el marco de la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa (PCSD) en la Unión Europea

El proceso de integración en Unión Europea se caracteriza por la incorporación de los asuntos de seguridad exterior y defensa, tras el Tratado de Lisboa se enmarcaron en la PCSD. Dicha política por un proceso de integración progresiva, Spillover, ha tenido periodos de reactivación y de letargos.

Incidencia de la Cuenca Amazónica en las relaciones colombo-brasileñas, en materia de seguridad. Periodo 2006-2011

La Amazonía fue por mucho tiempo tan solo un gran espacio selvático, de difícil penetración, con un clima de gran humedad, lejano de los centros de poder y por lo tanto, relegado a un segundo plano en las políticas nacionales. Sin embargo, la región amazónica ha cambiado profundamente en las últimas décadas, lo que a su vez ha generado una profunda transformación en las políticas dirigidas hacia dicho espacio, la atención internacional que la cuenca recibe y las dinámicas e intereses nacionales e internacionales que alrededor de ella se encuentran. Dicha transformación llevó a una multiplicación y a una diversificación de las dinámicas de seguridad e inseguridad en la región y en el continente, modificando las relaciones entre actores internacionales con intereses en la región.