Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

Effects of Government Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence from Finnish Companies

Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selvittää, miten valtionomistajuus vaikuttaa yrityksen suorituskykyyn suomalaisissa pörssinoteeratuissa valtionyhtiöissä, joissa valtio toimii pää- tai osaomistajana. Suorituskykyä tutkitaan kandella eri menetelmällä. Ensin tutkitaan osaketuottoja Jensenin alfan avulla, jonka jälkeen suoritetaan tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen toimialavertailu. Tutkimuksen teoriaosuudessa esitetään yksityistämisen tuottamia etuja yrityksen taloudelliseen suorituskykyyn, sekä myöskin valtionomistajuuden tuottamia etuja. Lisäksi teoriaosuudessa käsitellään aikaisempien empiiristen tutkimusten tuloksia valtionomistajuuden vaikutuksista. Tämän tutkimuksen empiirisessä osiossa käytettävä data on saatu osakedatan osalta Datastreamista ja tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen osalta Balance Consulting Oy:ltä. Kokonaisosakedataa koskeva tutkimus Jensenin alfalla ei osoittanut valtionyhtiöiden toimivan tehottomasti, vaan osoitti yritysten kyenneen tuottamaan epänormaaleja tuottoja riskitasoonsa nähden. Vuositasolle pilkotun datan analysointi sen sijaan tuotti useita negatiivisia alfoja yrityksille eli merkkejä tehottomuudesta tiettyinä vuosina. Lisäksi tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen analysointi osoitti osan valtionyhtiöistä olleen pääosin omaa toimialaansa tehottomampia, kun taas osa kykenipäihittämään toimialansa.

The government ownership of railways /

Cover title.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

Public ownership, here and abroad, before, during and after the war,

Bibliography: p. 62-63.

Public ownership, here and abroad, before, during and after the war,

Bibliography: p. 70-71.

Public ownership and the telephone in Great Britain : restriction of the industry by the state and the municipalities /

Includes bibliographical references.

CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.

Toward nationalization of industry.

Contains much of the material in the author's The Federal Government and functional democracy, published in 1940.

Newest England;

Mode of access: Internet.

Bulletin.

Includes its Proceedings, 1919-

Privatization in Latin America.

Title from cover.

Democracy and capital,

An argument against socialism and nationalization.

Measuring accounting disclosure in a period of complex changes : the case of Egypt

Significant changes in accounting disclosure are observed in periods of economic change such as those relating to emerging capital markets and programs of privatization. Measurement of the level of accounting disclosure should ideally be designed to capture the complexity of change in order to give insight and explanation to match the causes and consequences of change. This paper shows the added interpretive value in subdividing the disclosure checklist to reflect the requirements of national accounting regulations, the location of disclosure items in the annual report, and limitations on the availability of regulations in official translation to the local language. Defining targeted disclosure categories leads to significance testing of specific aspects of changes in accounting disclosure in the Egyptian capital market in the 1990s. Strong correlation of disclosure with the presence of majority government ownership of the company and the relative activity of share trading supports the applicability of political costs and capital need theories, respectively. The relation between International Accounting Standards (IASs) disclosure and the type of audit firm points to additional theoretical explanations, including relative familiarity with the legislation and compliance features identifiable with the emerging capital market. The approach described in this paper has the potential for enhancing understanding of the complexity of accounting change in other emerging capital markets and developing economies.

Measuring accounting disclosure in a period of complex changes:the case of Egypt

Significant changes in accounting disclosure are observed in periods of economic change such as those relating to emerging capital markets and programs of privatization. Measurement of the level of accounting disclosure should ideally be designed to capture the complexity of change in order to give insight and explanation to match the causes and consequences of change. This paper shows the added interpretive value in subdividing the disclosure checklist to reflect the requirements of national accounting regulations, the location of disclosure items in the annual report, and limitations on the availability of regulations in official translation to the local language. Defining targeted disclosure categories leads to significance testing of specific aspects of changes in accounting disclosure in the Egyptian capital market in the 1990s. Strong correlation of disclosure with the presence of majority government ownership of the company and the relative activity of share trading supports the applicability of political costs and capital need theories, respectively. The relation between International Accounting Standards (IASs) disclosure and the type of audit firm points to additional theoretical explanations, including relative familiarity with the legislation and compliance features identifiable with the emerging capital market. The approach described in this paper has the potential for enhancing understanding of the complexity of accounting change in other emerging capital markets and developing economies.