Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

¿Hacia una recentralización en Colombia?: una mirada desde el control fiscal excepcional

En materia de control fiscal territorial, se ha evidenciado la urgencia de una reforma en su estructura orgánica como consecuencia de los casos de corrupción que se han presentado en las entidades territoriales, los cuales han generado la intervención de la Contraloría General de la República en asuntos de carácter territorial, a través de una facultad constitucional denominada control fiscal excepcional. Dicha facultad no es ampliamente conocida y genera inquietud, pues no ha recibido un profundo estudio que permita determinar con claridad su carácter de excepcional, ya que en ciertos casos limita la competencia de las contralorías territoriales que puede traducirse en una nueva centralización. Es entonces que se emprende un análisis desde la perspectiva de la estructura del Estado, en el modelo descentralizado de las funciones de la Contraloría General de la República, donde el carácter limitante del control fiscal excepcional puede ser parte de un fenómeno que se denomina “recentralización. Es así que, a través del primer capítulo se desarrollan los conceptos de control fiscal, terminando con el análisis del modelo en la constitución de 1991, en el cual quedó establecido la facultad excepcional objeto de estudio. En el mismo sentido se estudia los pronunciamientos jurisprudenciales, como también los conceptos de descentralización y centralización para entender la finalidad del objeto de análisis, asimismo se revisó los casos relevantes entorno al control fiscal excepcional. Adicionalmente se construye un marco jurisprudencial para identificar la posición dominante de la Corte Constitucional y del Consejo de Estado, respecto al control fiscal excepcional. En la segunda parte del documento, primero se analiza cómo ha sido el proceso de centralización a la descentralización respecto del control fiscal, asimismo se expondrá el concepto de recentralización. Finalmente, se establece cuáles son los retos que se presentan en el fortalecimiento del control fiscal territorial, el papel en la lucha contra la corrupción y cómo se ha planteado desde otras esferas, un cambio del modelo del control fiscal territorial y una propuesta que recoge las apreciaciones estudiadas a lo largo de los cuatro capítulos de la investigación. Sobre la base de las consideraciones anteriores, se pretende dar un punto de vista diferente a la comunidad académica y además un estudio que permita una visión sobre la necesidad de reforzar el control fiscal territorial, como también frenar el retroceso que ha tenido a través del control fiscal excepcional, y de la misma manera la descentralización en Colombia.

A politica fiscal no Brasil : limites e contradições : o caso do Estado do Espirito Santo

o estudo pretende contribuir para a análise da realidade brasileira, através do caso do Estado do Espírito Santo, no período compreendido entre 1946 a 1980, tentando demonstrar a dependência financeira dos governos estaduais refletida na perda de receitas próprias e da necessária autonomia para a sua utilização. Numa visão retrospect.iva observa-se uma excessiva tendência à centralização manifestada pelo federalismo brasileiro, principalmente, depois da Reforma Tribut.ária de 1967, que estabeleceu um rigoroso controle da União sobre as receitas tributárias e sobre a ação dos Estados- membros, reduzindo sua autonomia em matéria de legislação tributária. A centralização financeira e política fez com que os go- . , . vernos estaduais perdessem 8S prerrogativasanteriorrnente adquiridas e tivessem limitada sua autonomia em;matéria de politica fiscal. Tentou-se compensar a acentuada redução das receitas tributárias estaduais lnstituindo- se o mecanismo das transferências que, a despeito de suas funç5es redIstributi vas, impõe uma série de exig§ncias e determinações para a sua aplicação. A partir dessa constataç50 passa-se a analisar a política fiscal no Estado do Espírito Santo observando-se as administrações estaduais nesse período. Cheg~-se à conclusão de que as sucessivas crises financeiras ocorridas limitaram a formulação de uma política fiscal estadual. Com isso, constat3-se que os estados passaram a ser rneros agentes administrativos reproduzindo as decis5es maiores formuladas pelo governo federal. Em linhas gerais, tentou-se comprovar a dependência fi--

California's School Finance Reform: An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism

The 1971 ruling of the California Supreme Court in the case of Serrano v. Priest initiated a chain of events that abruptly ended local financing of public schools in California. In seven short years, California transformed its school finance system from a decentralized one in which local communities chose how much to spend on their schools to a centralized one in which the state legislature determines the expenditures of every school district. This paper begins by describing California's school finance system before Serrano and the transformation from local to state finance. It then delineates some consequences of that transformation and draws lessons from California's experience with school finance reform.

Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.

A gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal nemzetek fölötti centralizációja és a közösségi gazdaságtan. Az adóverseny elméletének néhány tanulsága (Supranational centralization of economic policy-making and community economics: some lessons from the theory of tax competition)

Mennyiben képes jelenleg a közösségi gazdaságtan az adópolitikák nemzetek fölötti centralizációjára vonatkozó politikai döntések megalapozására? Válaszunk röviden az lesz, hogy a közösségi gazdaságtan főárama - noha számos releváns gazdasági és politikai tényező hatását sikeresen elemzi - jelenleg nem kínál kielégítőnek tekinthető döntési kritériumokat a döntéshozók számára. Ennek oka, hogy központi szerepet játszik benne egy, a modellek szempontjából exogén és a közgazdasági elmélettől idegen tényező: a kormányzatok jóindulatára, pontosabban annak mértékére vonatkozó premissza. Tanulmányunk az adóverseny fiskális föderalista elméletét vizsgálja, és megpróbál általánosabb szinten is a közszektor gazdaságelméletének jelenlegi állapotára, valamint továbbfejlesztésére vonatkozó tanulságokat levonni. A kiutat az elméleti zsákutcából a kormányzati működés és döntéshozatal, valamint a kívánatos gazdaságpolitikai döntések elméletének összekapcsolása jelentheti. Erre megtörténtek az első kísérletek, de a szisztematikus és átfogó elemzés egyelőre várat magára. / === / How far can community economics provide a basis for political decision-making on supranational centralization of taxation policies? The short answer here will be that although the mainstream of community economics succeeds in analysing many relevant economic and political factors, it fails at present to provide satisfactory criteria for decisionmakers. This is because a central role is played in it by a factor exogenous to the models and alien to economic theory: the premise of the measure of goodwill from governments. The study examines the fiscal federalist theory of tax competition. It tries to draw conclusions, on a more general level, about the present state of the economic theory of the public sector and future development of it. The way out of the theoretical blind alley could be to link the theories of government operation and decision-making and of desirable economic-policy decision-making. The first attempts to do so have been made, but a systematic and comprehensive analysis is still awaited.

Interaction Between Fiscal And Monetary Policy In A Dynamic Nonlinear Model.

The objective of this study is to verify the dynamics between fiscal policy, measured by public debt, and monetary policy, measured by a reaction function of a central bank. Changes in monetary policies due to deviations from their targets always generate fiscal impacts. We examine two policy reaction functions: the first related to inflation targets and the second related to economic growth targets. We find that the condition for stable equilibrium is more restrictive in the first case than in the second. We then apply our simulation model to Brazil and United Kingdom and find that the equilibrium is unstable in the Brazilian case but stable in the UK case.

Cardiopulmonary effects and eyeball centralization with low-dose atracurium in spontaneously breathing, anesthetized dogs

The objective was to determine the cardiopulmonary effects and eyeball centralization time obtained with 15 or 30µg kg-1 of atracurium in anesthetized dogs under spontaneous breathing. Eighteen healthy adult mixed-breed dogs were used, which received 0.1mg kg-1 acepromazine and 0.5mg kg-1 morphine IM, followed by 4mg kg-1 propofol IV and maintained on isoflurane anesthesia with spontaneous breathing. Animals received 1mL 0.9% NaCl IV (CG), 15µg kg-1 (G15) or 30µg kg-1 (G30) of atracurium IV. Eyeball centralization time was measured; heart rate (HR), systolic (SAP), mean (MAP) and diastolic (DAP) arterial pressures, respiratory rate (RR), tidal volume (Vt) and minute volume (Vm) were determined every 5min, and pH, arterial CO2 pressure (PaCO2 ), arterial O2 pressure (PaO2 ), hemoglobin oxygen saturation (SaO2 ), bicarbonate (HCO3-) and base excess (BE) every 15min until 60min. Both doses of atracurium produced a similar period of eyeball centralization. Vt in groups treated with atracurium was lower than in CG up to 15min. Vm in G15 differed from CG up to 10min and in G30 up to 25min. No differences were observed for cardiovascular parameters, RR, SaO2, PaO2, HCO3- and BE. pH decreased in CG between 30 and 60min and in G15 and G30 at 15min. G30 differed from CG between 15 and 30min. PaCO2 in GC differed from baseline between 30 and 60min and in G15 differed at 15min. Atracurium at the dose of 15µg kg-1 is adequate for short corneal procedures in inhalant-anesthetized dogs under spontaneous breathing.

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm chooses to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value of the factory may differ among jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdictions compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infrastructure, commitments to spend on infrastructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that the expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements is the same. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that is, the mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.

Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities

This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the influence of public expenditures on the probability of mayors` reelection. We examine Brazilian municipal elections from 1988 to 2000 using a logit fixed-effects model. The results suggest that mayors who spend more during their terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or of a successor of the same political party. In particular, higher capital spending over the years preceding elections and current expenditures in election years are beneficial to Brazilian incumbent mayors.