Poéticas da visualidade em João Cabral de Melo Neto e Joan Miró: a poesia como crítica de arte

A tese focaliza alguns dos principais poemas de João Cabral de Melo Neto desenvolvidos como crítica poética. O mote da investigação é a construção de uma lírica crítico-discursiva, uma produção artística que avalia a arte com os termos, os instrumentos da própria arte. Esta perspectiva analítica é deflagrada pelos primeiros românticos (Schlegel e Novalis) e expande-se em duas direções: tanto o poema escrito a partir de uma reflexão sobre a arte ou a natureza (crítico em sua gênese), quanto a crítica, transmutada em poesia. A abordagem comparativa de estâncias do poeta com obras picturais nelas referenciadas evidencia o constante diálogo do poeta com as poéticas da visualidade e com as concepções estéticas da modernidade, mormente com a poética de Joan Miró. Através da abordagem comparativa, materializam-se dois caminhos privilegiados de experimentação estética: o percurso do poético ao plástico, em João Cabral; o caminho inverso, na obra do pintor catalão do plástico ao poético. Para ambos os artistas, os processos de exploração das linguagens artísticas ocasionam, como consequência extrema, a dissolução do plástico e do poético, rumo ao inefável na pintura e na poesia. Para Miró, os signos plásticos são poéticos, porque guardam em si um universo de possibilidades significativas que transcendem a ordem da própria coisa em si. E o alcance das transformações que a sua poética empreende afetará a poesia de modo análogo: os signos poéticos mostram-se plenamente poéticos, ao transcenderem a forma e o sentido, no âmbito da plasticidade da palavra. Se a palavra pode se tornar matéria (passar da abstração para a concreção), a matéria pintada pode ser poesia. Integram a constelação teórica desta investigação os principais filósofos que discutem o caráter crítico da poesia, desde os filósofos do primeiro romantismo (Schlegel e Novalis), até aqueles cujo pensamento está relacionado à modernidade ou à pós-modernidade (Benjamin, Adorno, Lyotard, Blumenberg e Agamben)

Filozofia antyczna wobec problemu interpretacji. Rozwój alegorezy od przedsokratyków do Arystotelesa

The present work examines the beginnings of ancient hermeneutics. More specifically, it discusses the connection between the rise of the practice of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the emergence of the first theory of figurative language, on the other. Thus, this book investigates the specific historical and cultural circumstances that enabled the ancient Greeks not only to discover the possibility of allegorical interpretation, but also to treat figurative language as a philosophical problem. By posing difficulties in understanding the enigmatic sense of various esoteric doctrines, poems, oracles and riddles, figurative language created the context for theoretical reflection on the meaning of these “messages”. Hence, ancient interpreters began to ponder over the nature and functions of figurative (“enigmatic”) language as well as over the techniques of its proper use and interpretation. Although the practice of allegorical interpretation was closely linked to the development of the whole of ancient philosophy, the present work covers only the period from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. It concentrates, then, on the philosophical and cultural consequences of allegoresis in the classical age. The main thesis advocated here has it that the ancient Greeks were in-clined to regard allegory as a cognitive problem rather than merely as a stylistic or a literary one. When searching for the hidden meanings of various esoteric doc-trines, poems, oracles and riddles, ancient interpreters of these “messages” assumed allegory to be the only tool suitable for articulating certain matters. In other words, it was their belief that the use of figurative language resulted from the necessity of expressing things that were otherwise inexpressible. The present work has been organized in the following manner. The first part contains historical and philological discussions that provide the point of departure for more philosophical considerations. This part consists of two introductory chapters. Chapter one situates the practice of allegorical interpretation at the borderline of two different traditions: the rhetorical-grammatical and the hermeneutical. In order to clearly differentiate between the two, chapter one distinguishes between allegory and allegoresis, on the one hand, and allegoresis and exegesis, on the other. While pointing to the conventionality (and even arbitrariness) of such distinctions, the chapter argues, nevertheless, for their heuristic usefulness. The remaining part of chapter one focuses on a historical and philological reconstruction of the most important conceptual tools of ancient hermeneutics. Discussing the semantics of such terms as allēgoría, hypónoia, ainigma and symbolon proves important for at least two crucial reasons. Firstly, it reveals the mutual affinity between allegoresis and divination, i.e., practices that are inherently connected with the need to discover the latent meaning of the “message” in question (whether poem or oracle). Secondly, these philological analyses bring to light the specificity of the ancient understanding of such concepts as allegory or symbol. It goes without saying that antiquity employed these terms in a manner quite disparate from modernity. Chapter one concludes with a discussion of ancient views on the cognitive value of figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Chapter two focuses on the role that allegoresis played in the process of transforming mythos into logos. It is suggested here that it was the practice of allegorical interpretation that made it possible to preserve the traditional myths as an important point of reference for the whole of ancient philosophy. Thus, chapter two argues that the existence of a clear opposition between mythos into logos in Preplatonic philosophy is highly questionable in light of the indisputable fact that the Presocratics, Sophists and Cynics were profoundly convinced about the cognitive value of mythos (this conviction was also shared by Plato and Aristotle, but their attitude towards myth was more complex). Consequently, chapter two argues that in Preplatonic philosophy, myth played a function analogous to the concepts discussed in chapter one (i.e., hidden meanings, enigmas and symbols), for in all these cases, ancient interpreters found tools for conveying issues that were otherwise difficult to convey. Chapter two concludes with a classification of various types of allegoresis. Whilst chapters one and two serve as a historical and philological introduction, the second part of this book concentrates on the close relationship between the development of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the flowering of philosophy, on the other. Thus, chapter three discusses the crucial role that allegorical interpretation came to play in Preplatonic philosophy, chapter four deals with Plato’s highly complex and ambivalent attitude to allegoresis, and chapter five has been devoted to Aristotle’s original approach to the practice of allegorical interpretation. It is evident that allegoresis was of paramount importance for the ancient thinkers, irrespective of whether they would value it positively (Preplatonic philosophers and Aristotle) or negatively (Plato). Beginning with the 6th century B.C., the ancient practice of allegorical interpretation is motivated by two distinct interests. On the one hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects the more or less “conservative” attachment to the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus). The purpose of this apologetic allegoresis is to exonerate poetry from the charges leveled at it by the first philosophers and, though to a lesser degree, historians. Generally, these allegorists seek to save the traditional paideia that builds on the works of the poets. On the other hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects also the more or less “progressive” desire to make original use of the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus) so as to promote a given philosophical doctrine. The objective of this instrumental allegoresis is to exculpate philosophy from the accusations brought against it by the more conservative circles. Needless to say, these allegorists significantly contribute to the process of the gradual replacing of the mythical view of the world with its more philosophical explanation. The present book suggests that it is the philosophy of Aristotle that should be regarded as a sort of acme in the development of ancient hermeneutics. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the Stagirite positively values the practice of allegoresis, rehabilitating, thus, the tradition of Preplatonic philosophy against Plato. And, on the other hand, Aristotle initiates the theoretical reflection on figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Hence, in Aristotle we encounter not only the practice of allegoresis, but also the theory of allegory (although the philosopher does not use the term allēgoría). With the situation being as it is, the significance of Aristotle’s work cannot be overestimated. First of all, the Stagirite introduces the concept of metaphor into the then philosophical considerations. From that moment onwards, the phenomenon of figurative language becomes an important philosophical issue. After Aristo-tle, the preponderance of thinkers would feel obliged to specify the rules for the appropriate use of figurative language and the techniques of its correct interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle ascribes to metaphor (and to various other “excellent” sayings) the function of increasing and enhancing our knowledge. Thus, according to the Stagirite, figurative language is not only an ornamental device, but it can also have a significant explanatory power. Finally, Aristotle observes that figurative expressions cause words to become ambiguous. In this context, the philosopher notices that ambiguity can enrich the language of a poet, but it can also hinder a dialectical discussion. Accordingly, Aristotle is inclined to value polysemy either positively or negatively. Importantly, however, the Stagirite is perfectly aware of the fact that in natural languages ambiguity is unavoidable. This is why Aristotle initiates a syste-matic reflection on the phenomenon of ambiguity and distinguishes its various kinds. In Aristotle, ambiguity is, then, both a problem that needs to be identified and a tool that can help in elucidating intricate philosophical issues. This unique approach to ambiguity and figurative (“enigmatic”) language enabled Aristotle to formulate invaluable intuitions that still await appropriate recognition.

L'eschatologie ouranienne au VIe et au Ve siècle avant J.-C.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Personal recollections of poets, philosophers and statesmen : being 1,001 anecdotes of life in New England, and of the great and eccentric characters celebrated in her history fifty years ago : also giving numerous anecdotes concerning the private life and secret history of many personages illustrious in American public life during the first half of the present century : and an account of men and things I saw in Europe /

Includes index.

Ancient Philosophers on Mental Illness

This dissertation is about ancient philosophers notions of mental illness, from Plato onwards. Mental illness here means disorders that, in ancient medical thought, were believed to originate in the body but to manifest themselves predominantly through mental symptoms. These illnesses were treated by physical means, which were believed to address the bodily cause of the illness, conceived of as an elemental imbalance or a state of cephalic stricture , for example. Sometimes the mental symptoms were addressed directly by psychotherapeutic means. The first and most important question explored concerns how the ancient philosophers responded to the medical notion of mental illness, and how they explained such illnesses in their theories of physiology and psychology. Although the illnesses are seldom discussed extensively, the philosophers were well aware of their existence and regarded their occurrence an indication of the soul s close dependence on the body. This called for a philosophical account. The second question addressed has to do with the ancient philosophers role as experts in mental problems of a non-medical kind, such as unwanted emotions. These problems were dubbed diseases of the soul , and the philosophers thus claimed to be doctors of the soul. Although the distinction between mental illnesses and diseases of the soul was often presented as rather obvious, there was some vagueness and overlap. There is still a third question that is explored, concerning the status of both mental illnesses and diseases of the soul as unnatural conditions, the role of the human body in the philosophical aetiologies of evil, and the medico-philosophical theories of psycho-physiological temperaments. This work consists of an introduction and five main chapters, focusing on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Galen, and the Sceptics, the Epicureans and later Platonists. The sources drawn on are the original Greek and Latin philosophical and medical texts. It appears that the philosophers accepted the medical notion of mental illness, but interpreted it in various ways. The differences in interpretation were mostly attributable to differences in their theories of the soul. Although the distinction between mental illness and diseases of the soul was important, marking the boundary between the fields of expertise of medicine and philosophy, and of the individual s moral responsibilities, the problematic aspects of establishing it are discussed rather little in ancient philosophy. There may have been various reasons for this. The medical descriptions of mental illness are often extreme, symptoms of the psychotic type excluding the possibility of the condition being of the non-medical kind. In addition, the rigid normativeness of ancient philosophical anthropologies and their rigorous notion of human happiness decreased the need to assess the acceptability of individual variation in their emotional and intellectual lives and external behaviour.

How distinctive is philosophers’ intuition talk?

The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The second examines the use of intuition talk in written academic English. It considers what these studies tell us about the distinctiveness of philosophical language and methods and considers some implications for evaluative and ameliorative methodology.

The British Plutarch : containing the lives of the most eminent divines, patriots, statemen, warriors, philosophers, poets, and artists of Great Britain and Ireland, from the accession of Henry VIII, to the present time.

Includes index.

Modern philosophers,

I. Modern philosophers: First group. Objective-systematic tendency: I. Wilhelm Wundt. II. Roberto Ardig_o. III. Francis Herbert Bradley. IV. Alfred Fouill_ee and contemporary French philosophy. Second group. Epistemologico-biological tendency: I. Philosopher-scientists. II. The natural history of problems. Third group. The philosophy of value: I. Jean Marie Guyau. II. Friedrich Nietzsche. III. Rudolf Eucken. IV. William James.--II. Lectures on Bergson.

French and English philosophers : Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Hobbes ; with introductions and notes.

Discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason and seeking the truth in the sciences, by Rene Descartes.--Letters on the English, by Voltaire.--A discourse upon the origin and the foundation of the inequality among mankind. Profession of faith of a Savoyard vicar. By J. J. Rousseau.--Of man, being the first part of Leviathan, by T. Hobbes.

French and English philosophers : Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Hobbes ; with introductions and notes.

Discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason and seeking the truth in the sciences / by René Descartes -- Letters on the English / by Voltaire -- On the inequality among mankind. Profession of faith of a Savoyard vicar / by J. J. Rousseau -- Of man, being the first part of Leviathan / by Thomas Hobbes.

Exploring first-year academic achievement through structural equation modelling

The purpose of this research was to develop and test a multicausal model of the individual characteristics associated with academic success in first-year Australian university students. This model comprised the constructs of: previous academic performance, achievement motivation, self-regulatory learning strategies, and personality traits, with end-of-semester grades the dependent variable of interest. The study involved the distribution of a questionnaire, which assessed motivation, self-regulatory learning strategies and personality traits, to 1193 students at the start of their first year at university. Students' academic records were accessed at the end of their first year of study to ascertain their first and second semester grades. This study established that previous high academic performance, use of self-regulatory learning strategies, and being introverted and agreeable, were indicators of academic success in the first semester of university study. Achievement motivation and the personality trait of conscientiousness were indirectly related to first semester grades, through the influence they had on the students' use of self-regulatory learning strategies. First semester grades were predictive of second semester grades. This research provides valuable information for both educators and students about the factors intrinsic to the individual that are associated with successful performance in the first year at university.