Multiple founders and firm value

In this paper, we highlight the existence of multi-founder firms, which were founded by multiple individuals (with no family connections) who are still actively involved in the firm as directors and/or managers. These firms provide a unique setting to shed further light on the net valuation effects of founder involvement. In particular, multi-founder firms provide us with the opportunity to examine the benefits and costs to shareholders of multiple founders involved as directors, CEOs and managers in the same firm. Our analysis indicates that multi-founder firms are more valuable than all other types of firms, including single-founder firms and family firms, with the valuation premium positively related to the number of founders involved in the firm. Further analysis confirms that this valuation premium is linked to the direct involvement of the multiple founders as directors and CEOs. However, further founder involvement in vice president positions has a negative relationship with firm value.

Business in troubled waters : does adverse attitude affect firm value?

This paper investigates the relationship between US MNCs' valuations and anti-Americanism in countries where MNCs' foreign subsidiaries are located. We find that MNCs suffer value-destruction when they enter markets where people express severe anti-Americanism. However, we uncover that geographic diversification into these high anti-Americanism countries significantly increases firm value if the MNC has high levels of intangibles such as technological know-how and marketing expertise. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are greater when barriers to competition are higher.

Outsider board activity, ownership structure and firm value : evidence from Korea

Using a sample of publicly listed firm in Korea from 2002 to 2006, this article examines the impact of board monitoring on firm value and productivity. We use outsider's attendance of board meetings as a proxy for board monitoring. Consistent with the commitment hypothesis, we find that outsider's attendance rate increases firm value, suggesting that attending board meeting itself is a strong signal that reflects outsider's intention to monitor insiders. While ownership of controlling shareholders negatively affects firm value, this relationship is not moderated by increased monitoring by outsiders. Our findings provide further evidence that the outside director system is less effective in chaebol-affiliated firms. Results also indicate that the effect of outsider's board monitoring activity on investor's valuation of the firm is greater than on productivity improvement of the firm. Our conclusions are robust for possible endogeneity in the relationship between firm value and board attendance by outside directors.

Following fashion: Visible progressiveness and the social construction of firm value

A central tenet underlying studies on management fashions is that the diffusion of novel forms, models and techniques is driven by an institutional norm of progress, which is the societal expectation that managers will continuously use 'new and improved' management practices. We add to the literature on management fashions by arguing that, if the display of progressiveness in the manner of managing and organizing is expected of organizations, firms that are visibly progressive would be evaluated more positively by organizational audiences following this institutional prescription. Using article counts of co-occurrences of firms and various fashionable management practices in Wall Street Journal, we hypothesize positive effects of such associations on security analysts' evaluations of these firms. Results support this hypothesis. Our study enriches the management fashion literature by highlighting the consequential relevance of organizational adherence to the norm of progress.

The impact of stock option incentives on investment and firm value

This paper analyzes the relations among firm-level stock option portfolio incentives, investment, and firm value based on a sample of Finnish firms during the time period 1987 – 2000. Utilizing exact and complete information regarding stock option portfolio characteristics, we find some evidence that firm investment is increasing in the incentives to increase stock price (delta) and risk (vega). Furthermore, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between both incentive effects and firm value (Tobin’s Q). In contrast, when we allow for stock option incentives, investment, and firm value to be simultaneously determined, we find no evidence that investment is increasing in incentives. However, even after controlling for endogeneity, we find that both incentive effects arising from stock option compensation display a positive and significant effect on firm value. Finally, in contradiction to earlier findings, we observe that neither Tobin’s Q nor investment drives incentives.

Impact of board size and board diversity on firm value: Australian evidence

The aim of this paper is to provide a preliminary analysis of the relationship between firm market value and the size and gender diversity of a board of directors for a sample of publicly listed Australian firms. Our results show that smaller boards appear to be more effective in representing the shareholders as smaller boards are associated with higher firm value. As board size increases firm value declines, however at a decreasing rate suggesting that the relationship between board size and firm value is not strictly linear. Our findings further indicate that gender diversity promotes shareholders' value as the presence of women directors is associated with higher firm value.

Does the type of derivative instrument used by companies impact firm value?

We explore the relationship between the type of derivative instrument used and firm value, in a sample of Australian firms. Specifically, we examine the impact of the corporate use of swaps, futures, forwards and options, and the extent of such usage, on firm value. Our findings suggest that a 'discount' is most severely imposed on users of swaps.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value: Evidence from China’s civilian-run firms

This paper examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the Chinese stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Our findings imply that the “interest convergence” and “entrenchment” effects of managers’ behaviour in terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant situation of China’s civilian-run firms.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value

This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S& P 500 firm in 2005. The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interst, and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in previous studies. Managerial ownership also drives the capital structure as a nonlinear shape, but with a direction opposite to the shape of firm value. the results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Capital structure is endogenously determined by bith firm value and managerial ownership; while managerial ownership is not endogenously determined by the other two variables.

Managerial entrenchment and firm value: a dynamic perspective

We examine the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value using a dynamic model with firm fixed effects. To estimate the model, we employ the long-difference technique, which is shown by our simulation to deliver the least biased estimates. Based on a large sample of U.S. companies, we document a significantly negative and causal effect of managerial entrenchment on firm value after taking into account omitted variables, reverse causality, and highly persistent endogenous variables. Additional analysis suggests that the causality running from managerial entrenchment to firm value is more pronounced than that for reverse causality.

Stock market liquidity and firm value : an empirical examination of the Australian market

We document a positive relation between stock liquidity and firm value. We examine the mechanism through which stock market liquidity enhances firm value by dividing firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, into three components, namely, operating income to price, leverage, and operating income to assets. Using the switch to broker anonymity as an exogenous shock to market liquidity, we show that the increase in liquidity around the shock leads to an increase in firm value. Our results suggest that higher firm value for more liquid stocks seems to stem from enhanced stock prices rather than from better operating performance.

The value of local partners in Brazil: the effects of ownership clusters and business group membership on firm value in emerging markets

Este estudo analisa como a classe de acionistas afeta o valor das empresas brasileiras listadas na bolsa de valores no ponto de vista da governança corporativa. O trabalho examina a interação entre o valor das empresas e cinco tipos de concentrações acionárias comumente presente em mercados emergentes: famílias, agentes públicos, investidores estrangeiros, executivos e investidores financeiros nacionais. A análise empírica demonstra que o mix e a concentração de participação acionária afeta significativamente o valor das empresas. Utilizando uma compilação única de dados em painel de 2004 a 2008, a presente pesquisa também desenvolve hipóteses sobre o efeito da participação em grupos econômicos para o valor das empresas. A investigação encontra evidências de que, apesar de sua importância para o desenvolvimento de empresas brasileiras, o capital familiar, instituições públicas, e investidores estrangeiros estão cedendo lugar a monitores mais especializados e menos concentrados, como executivos e instituições financeiras nacionais. Estes resultados indicam que a governança corporativa no Brasil pode estar alcançando níveis de maturidade mais elevados. Adicionalmente, apesar de não haver indicação da existência de correlação entre a participação em grupos econômicos e o valor das empresas, os resultados indicam que a presença de um tipo específico de acionista em uma empresa do grupo facilita investimentos futuros desta classe de acionista em outras empresas do mesmo grupo, sinalizando que os interesses acionários são provavelmente perpetuados dentro de uma mesma rede de empresas. Finalmente, a pesquisa demonstra que enquanto o capital familiar prefere investir em empresas com ativa mobilidade do capital, investidores internacionais e instituições públicas procuram investimentos em equity com menor mobilidade de capital, o que lhes garante mais transparência com relação ao uso dos recursos e fundos das empresas.