27 resultados para Federalisme
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Rapport de recherche
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Tal vez las ideas dominantes no sean exactamente las de las clases dominantes, pero el trabajo parte de la idea de que las ideas dominantes en las clases tienen una gran influencia. Por ello se estudia la versión que se da del federalismo por parte de los autores más influyentes en el derecho público español desde el siglo XIX hasta nuestros días. Se concluye que del rechazo generalizado y del elogio del centralismo, tras la Constitución de 1978 se pasa a proponer el federalismo como la pauta más favorable para la evolución del Estado autonómico. Ahora bien, se propone la versión más centralizadora del federalismo, cual es la del federalismo cooperativo
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La legge costituzionale 1/1999 per le Regioni ordinarie (e la successiva 2/2001 per le Speciali) ha rappresentato un punto di svolta fondamentale del regionalismo italiano. Essa ha stabilito il principio dell’elezione popolare diretta del Presidente della Regione, a cui si collega un premio di maggioranza nel Consiglio regionale secondo il cosiddetto modello neo-parlamentare. Qualsiasi interruzione del rapporto fiduciario per dimissioni del Presidente o approvazione di una mozione di sfiducia porterebbe a nuove elezioni, cosa che rappresenta un serissimo deterrente alle crisi. La riforma prevedeva anche la possibilità per le Regioni di derogare col proprio Statuto a tali scelte tornando all’elezione consiliare e a sostituzioni della maggioranza. Nonostante alcuni tentativi di sfuggire alla regola del governo di legislatura utilizzando tale deroga in modo esplicito o surrettizio, seguendo vecchi retaggi assemblearisti, l’elezione diretta si è imposta ovunque, garantendo a tutte le Regioni analoghi e inediti standards di governabilità.
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The search for political determinants of intergovernmental fiscal relations has shaped much of the recent literature on the economic viability of federalism. This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. The author tests these models using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. It is shown that overrespresented provinces ruled by governors who belong to opposition parties can bring into play their political overrepresentation to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria and to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase fiscal co-responsibilty. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.
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La organización política de un país tiene importantes consecuencias sobre la política económica. El desarrollo de los distintos tipos de federalismo, en particular el federalismo asimétrico, tiene su traslación a diferencias en las políticas comerciales La organización política de un país tiene importantes consecuencias sobre la política económica. El desarrollo de los distintos tipos de federalismo, en particular el federalismo asimétrico, tiene su traslación a diferencias en las políticas comerciales implementadas entre los diversos territorios. Cabe preguntarse las consecuencias económicas de estas diferencias. El presente trabajo intentar aproximarse al problema, evaluando la posible existencia de efectos diferenciados sobre la estructura del comercio.
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Estudi realitzat a partir d’una estada a l’Institut Desenvolupat a School of Comparative American Studies adscrit a la University of Warwick, Regne Unit, entre 2011 i 2012. Aquest projecte analitza en primer lloc la mobilització popular del primer liberalisme i la formació de les primeres organitzacions polítiques liberals que es constituïren a partir de les societats secretes i es propagaren a través dels principals centres de sociabilitat liberal: les societats patriòtiques. En segon lloc mitjançant l’estudi de la mobilitat dels liberals entre l’Espanya metropolitana i el virregnat de Nueva Espanya demostra com es dibuixà un nou model polític basat en el federalisme. El tercer aspecte d’anàlisi és com els exiliats catalans a Anglaterra reberen el suport de la Foreign Bible Society perquè havia mantingut contactes des dels primers anys vint amb l’alt clergat espanyol. El darrer aspecte de la recerca abasta l’estudi de l’espai urbà en relació amb les pràctiques polítiques dels ciutadans a partir de l’anàlisi de la formació i ampliació de les places de la ciutat de Barcelona durant la primera meitat del segle XIX.
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Federal Capitals often have special statutes. Compared with member states, they often enjoy a lower degree of self-government and a lesser share in the governing of the federation. Why do actors choose such devices, and how can they be justified in a liberal democracy? Surprisingly, the burgeoning literature on asymmetric federalism (to which our research group has contributed significantly) has overlooked this important feature of a de iure asymmetry, perhaps because political theory up to now has concentrated on cases of multicultural and plurinational federations. However, comparative literature is also rare. This paper is the first step to filling in this gap by comparing some federal capitals. The Federal District model (Washington) is compared to capitals organized as member-states (Berlin and Brussels), and capitals that are cities belonging to a single member state (Ottawa in Ontario). The different features of de iure asymmetry will thereby be highlighted. Some light will be shed on the possible motives, reasons and justifications for the choice of each respective status. The paper opens the door to further research on such status questions by analysing public and parliamentary debates, for example. It paves the way for more thorough research. Sicne the author has been awarded a grant by the Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, this research will be carried out soon.
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This paper explores an overlooked issue in the literature on federations and federalism: the relationship between federalism and democracy. Starting from the assumption that federalism per se is not enough to guarantee cooperative intergovernmental dynamics between different levels of governments, this article analyzes how democracy reinforces cooperative intergovernmental relations under a federal design. Drawing from empirical evidence of federations in the making – Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Spain – this article shows that in countries where the federal design was built under democratization, namely Brazil, Spain and South Africa, intergovernmental dynamics evolved under an increasingly cooperative mode of interaction.