Developmental Readiness in the Understanding of Own and Other’s False Beliefs

One of the most important milestones in the development of theory of mind is the understanding of false beliefs. This study compares children’s understanding of representational change and others’ false beliefs and evaluates the effectiveness of an appearance-reality training for improving children’s false belief understanding. A total of 78 children ranging in age from 41 to 47 months were trained in three sessions and evaluated in a pretest and in a posttest. The results show that for children it is easier to understand representational change than false beliefs in others, and that the improvement after training was greater when starting from a higher score in the pretest. The implications of this for training in false belief understanding are discussed

Drawing insight from pictures: The development of concepts of false drawing and false belief in children with deafness, normal hearing, and autism

Theory-of-mind concepts in children with deafness, autism, and normal development (N = 154) were examined in three experiments using a set of standard inferential false-belief tasks and matched sets of tasks involving false drawings. Results of all three experiments replicated previously published findings by showing that primary school children with deafness or autism, aged 6 to 13 years, scored significantly lower than normal-developing 4-year-old preschoolers on standard misleading-container and unseen-change tests of false-belief understanding. Furthermore, deaf and autistic children generally scored higher on drawing-based tests than on corresponding standard tests and, on the most challenging of the false-drawing tests in Experiment 2, they significantly outperformed the normal-developing preschoolers by clearly understanding their own false intentions and another person's false beliefs about an actively misleading drawing. In Experiment 3, preschoolers; outperformed older deaf and autistic children on standard tasks, but did less well on a task that required the drawing of a false belief. Methodological factors could not fully explain the findings, but early social and conversational experiences in the family were deemed likely contributors.

Digitally manipulating memory:effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings. © 2009 The Psychonomic Society, Inc.

Children’s reasoning about other’s intentions: False-belief and counterfactual conditional inferences

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Mindreading and moral awareness in popular and rejected preschoolers

This study sought to examine links among young children's peer relations, their moral understanding in terms of the ability to distinguish lies from mistakes, and their theory-of-mind development. Based on sociometric measures, 109 children with a mean age of 4.8 years were divided into groups of popular and rejected preschoolers. Rejected children who had a stable mutual friend scored higher on measures of moral understanding and theory of mind than did rejected children without such friendships. Similarly, popular children who had a stable mutual friendship outperformed other popular children on mindreading, although their moral understanding was no better than that of the popular group who lacked mutual friends. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that peer popularity was a significant independent predictor of children's moral understanding after any effects of verbal maturity, age and theory-of-mind were statistically controlled. Moreover, having a reciprocal stable friendship made a significant independent contribution to the explanation of individual differences in mindreading, over and above age and verbal maturity, which also contributed significantly. These results are discussed in terms of conversational, cognitive, and emotional processes in the development of social cognition.

Habilidades de cognición social en niños y niñas con el síndrome de Down: resultados de un estudio preliminar

The understanding of false belief is one of the most important milestones in the development of social cognition in children. Many studies have been conducted on this kind of cognition in children with a typical development. Despite being a key point for improving their welfare and quality of life, there are few studies in children with Down's syndrome. The aim of the present work is to carry out an in-depth study of social cognition in children with Down's syndrome. For this purpose, we used 6 tasks, with 3 levels of difficulty, in a group of 9 children aged between 4 and 14 years. Six of these children had a genetic diagnosis of Down's syndrome. The results of our research corroborate previous studies suggesting difficulties in the development of social cognition in children with Down's syndrome, and more specifically in tasks involving false beliefs

Pragmatic abilities of high-functioning Greek-speaking children with autism

This paper reports on the findings of the pragmatic abilities of Greek-speaking children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Twenty high functioning children with ASD and their typically developing age and vocabulary controls were administered a pragmatics task. The task was based on the Diagnostic Evaluation of Language Variation (DELV) in the context of a larger study targeting the grammar of Greek-speaking children with autism, and assessed the children’s abilities in communicative role taking, narrative, and question asking. The children with ASD showed an uneven profile in their pragmatic abilities. The two groups did not differ in communicative role taking and question asking. However, the children with ASD had difficulties on the narrative task, and more specifically, on the items assessing reference contrast and temporal links. Yet, they performed similarly on the mental state representations and the false beliefs items. Despite their good performance on mental states and false beliefs, the ASD children’s lower performance on reference contrast can be interpreted via Theory of Mind deficits if we assume that the former involve an additional level of complexity; namely, quantifying the amount of information available to the listener. Lower performance on temporal links is in line with the ASD children’s attested difficulties in organizing events into a coherent gist. Their overall profile, and, in particular, the dissociation between the different sections of the task, does not support single deficit accounts. It rather indicates that the deficits of individuals with ASD stem from distinct deficits in core cognitive processes (Happé & Frith, 2006).

Linguistic determinism and theory of mind in deaf children

DeVilliers and DeVilliers (2000, 2005) propose that deaf and hearing children acquire a theory of mind (or the understanding that human behaviour is the product of psychological states like true and false beliefs) as a consequence of their linguistic mastery of a rule of syntax. Specifically, they argue that the syntactic rule for sentential complementation with verbs of speech (e.g., “say”) precedes syntactic mastery of complementation for cognition (e.g., “think”) and both of these developmentally precede and promote conceptual mastery of a theory of mind (ToM), as indexed via success on standard false belief tests. The present study examined this proposition in groups of primary-school-aged deaf children and hearing preschoolers who took false belief tests and a modified memory for complements test that included control questions. Guttman scaling techniques indicated no support either for the prediction that syntactic skill precedes ToM understanding or for the earlier emergence of complementation for “say” than for “think”. Methodological issues and implications for deaf children's ToM development are discussed.

On the persuadability of memory:is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be 'persuaded' to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude-change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events - compatible with a source monitoring approach - would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.

Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts

Many people who drink alcohol have experienced a blackout; whereby they are unable to recall events that occurred during a period of intoxication. Following these blackout episodes individuals may attempt to reconstruct what happened to them. Blackouts therefore afford an excellent opportunity to study the strategies people use to reconstruct forgotten experiences. We conducted a survey of university students to explore how people choose to reconstruct blackouts, and the likely accuracy of these reconstructions. Our findings add to the growing research literature on people's strategies for validating their past experiences, and highlight the important role of external sources in the reconstruction process. The data show that people's desire to "fill in the blanks" can lead them to rely on rather unreliable sources, and may also encourage them to adopt weaker source-monitoring criteria. Indeed, in at least some cases reconstructing blackouts appears to lead to the development of false beliefs or memories. © 2011 Psychology Press.

Can fabricated evidence induce false eyewitness testimony?

False information can influence people's beliefs and memories. But can fabricated evidence induce individuals to accuse another person of doing something they never did? We examined whether exposure to a fabricated video could produce false eyewitness testimony. Subjects completed a gambling task alongside a confederate subject, and later we falsely told subjects that their partner had cheated on the task. Some subjects viewed a digitally manipulated video of their partner cheating; some were told that video evidence of the cheating exists; and others were not told anything about video evidence. Subjects were asked to sign a statement confirming that they witnessed the incident and that their corroboration could be used in disciplinary action against the accused. See-video subjects were three times more likely to sign the statement than Told-video and Control subjects. Fabricated evidence may, indeed, produce false eyewitness testimony; we discuss probable cognitive mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Beliefs And Misbeliefs About Current Interventions During Labor And Delivery In Brazil.

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Beliefs Related To Adherence To Oral Antidiabetic Treatment According To The Theory Of Planned Behavior.

to identify salient behavioral, normative, control and self-efficacy beliefs related to the behavior of adherence to oral antidiabetic agents, using the Theory of Planned Behavior. cross-sectional, exploratory study with 17 diabetic patients in chronic use of oral antidiabetic medication and in outpatient follow-up. Individual interviews were recorded, transcribed and content-analyzed using pre-established categories. behavioral beliefs concerning advantages and disadvantages of adhering to medication emerged, such as the possibility of avoiding complications from diabetes, preventing or delaying the use of insulin, and a perception of side effects. The children of patients and physicians are seen as important social references who influence medication adherence. The factors that facilitate adherence include access to free-of-cost medication and taking medications associated with temporal markers. On the other hand, a complex therapeutic regimen was considered a factor that hinders adherence. Understanding how to use medication and forgetfulness impact the perception of patients regarding their ability to adhere to oral antidiabetic agents. medication adherence is a complex behavior permeated by behavioral, normative, control and self-efficacy beliefs that should be taken into account when assessing determinants of behavior.

BIO Logical Agents: Norms, Beliefs, Intentions in Defeasible Logic

In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention, Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible Logic. We argue, in particular, that the introduction of obligations can provide a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality. Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obligations prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent either requires more complex computations or has some philosophical drawbacks.