There must be more to development of mindreading and metacognition than passing false belief tasks

We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' Model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.

Mind and body: Concepts of human cognition, physiology and false belief in children with autism or typical development

This study examined theory of mind (ToM) and concepts of human biology (eyes, heart, brain, lungs and mind) in a sample of 67 children, including 25 high functioning children with autism (age 6-13), plus age-matched and preschool comparison groups. Contrary to Baron-Cohen [1989, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(4), 579-600], most children with autism correctly understood the functions of the brain (84%) and the mind (64%). Their explanations were predominantly mentalistic. They outperformed typically developing preschoolers in understanding inner physiological (heart, lungs) and cognitive (brain, mind) systems, and scored as high as age-matched typical children. Yet, in line with much previous ToM research, most children with autism (60%) failed false belief, and their ToM performance was unrelated to their understanding of. human biology. Results were discussed in relation to neurobiological and social-experiential accounts of the ToM deficit in autism.

Resting state morphology predicts the effect of theta burst stimulation in false belief reasoning:ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in false belief reasoning

When required to represent a perspective that conflicts with one's own, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) suggests that the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rvlPFC) supports the inhibition of that conflicting self-perspective. The present task dissociated inhibition of self-perspective from other executive control processes by contrasting belief reasoning-a cognitive state where the presence of conflicting perspectives was manipulated-with a conative desire state wherein no systematic conflict existed. Linear modeling was used to examine the effect of continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) to rvlPFC on participants' reaction times in belief and desire reasoning. It was anticipated that cTBS applied to rvlPFC would affect belief but not desire reasoning, by modulating activity in the Ventral Attention System (VAS). We further anticipated that this effect would be mediated by functional connectivity within this network, which was identified using resting state fMRI and an unbiased model-free approach. Simple reaction-time analysis failed to detect an effect of cTBS. However, by additionally modeling individual measures from within the stimulated network, the hypothesized effect of cTBS to belief (but, importantly, not desire) reasoning was demonstrated. Structural morphology within the stimulated region, rvlPFC, and right temporoparietal junction were demonstrated to underlie this effect. These data provide evidence that inconsistencies found with cTBS can be mediated by the composition of the functional network that is being stimulated. We suggest that the common claim that this network constitutes the VAS explains the effect of cTBS to this network on false belief reasoning. Hum Brain Mapp, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in “theory of mind”: neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task

Perspective taking is a crucial ability that guides our social interactions. In this study, we show how the specific patterns of errors of brain-damaged patients in perspective taking tasks can help us further understand the factors contributing to perspective taking abilities. Previous work (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005) distinguished two components of perspective taking: the ability to inhibit our own perspective and the ability to infer someone else’s perspective. We assessed these components using a new nonverbal false belief task which provided different response options to detect three types of response strategies that participants might be using: a complete and spared belief reasoning strategy, a reality-based response selection strategy in which participants respond from their own perspective, and a simplified mentalising strategy in which participants avoid responding from their own perspective but rely on inaccurate cues to infer the other person’s belief. One patient, with a self-perspective inhibition deficit, almost always used the reality-based response strategy; in contrast, the other patient, with a deficit in taking other perspectives, tended to use the simplified mentalising strategy without necessarily transposing her own perspective. We discuss the extent to which the pattern of performance of both patients could relate to their executive function deficit and how it can inform us on the cognitive and neural components involved in belief reasoning.

Children’s reasoning about other’s intentions: False-belief and counterfactual conditional inferences

Dados suplementares associados com o artigo e epígrafe estão disponíveis em: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.08.007

Children’s attributions of belief to humans and God: cross-cultural evidence

The capacity to attribute beliefs to others in order to understand action is one of the mainstays of human cognition. Yet it is debatable whether children attribute beliefs in the same way to all agents. In this paper, we present the results of a false-belief task concerning humans and God run with a sample of Maya children aged 4–7, and place them in the context of several psychological theories of cognitive development. Children were found to attribute beliefs in different ways to humans and God. The evidence also speaks to the debate concerning the universality and uniformity of the development of folk-psychological reasoning.

Multiple roles for executive control in belief-desire reasoning:distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning

Belief-desire reasoning is a core component of 'Theory of Mind' (ToM), which can be used to explain and predict the behaviour of agents. Neuroimaging studies reliably identify a network of brain regions comprising a 'standard' network for ToM, including temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex. Whilst considerable experimental evidence suggests that executive control (EC) may support a functioning ToM, co-ordination of neural systems for ToM and EC is poorly understood. We report here use of a novel task in which psychologically relevant ToM parameters (true versus false belief; approach versus avoidance desire) were manipulated orthogonally. The valence of these parameters not only modulated brain activity in the 'standard' ToM network but also in EC regions. Varying the valence of both beliefs and desires recruits anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting a shared inhibitory component associated with negatively valenced mental state concepts. Varying the valence of beliefs additionally draws on ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, reflecting the need to inhibit self perspective. These data provide the first evidence that separate functional and neural systems for EC may be recruited in the service of different aspects of ToM.

Understanding theory of mind in children who are deaf

Research on theory of mind began in the context of determining whether chimpanzees are aware that individuals experience cognitive and emotional states. More recently, this research has involved various groups of children and various tasks, including the false belief task. Based almost exclusively on that paradigm, investigators have concluded that although ``normal'' hearing children develop theory of mind by age 5, children who are autistic or deaf do not do so until much later, perhaps not until their teenage years. The present study explored theory of mind by examining stories told by children who are deaf and hearing (age 9±15 years) for statements ascribing behaviour-relevant states of mind to themselves and others. Both groups produced such attributions, although there were reliable differences between them. Results are discussed in terms of the cognitive abilities assumed to underlie false belief and narrative paradigms and the implications of attributing theory of mind solely on the basis of performance on the false belief task.

A influência da linguagem para o raciocínio de crenças falsas em Teoria da Mente: uma análise em pacientes afásicos agramáticos

O termo Teoria da Mente diz respeito à habilidade que os seres humanos adquirem de compreender seus próprios estados mentais e os dos outros e predizer ações e comportamentos dentro de uma interação social. As principais questões da pesquisa em Teoria da Mente são: determinar qual o tipo de conhecimento que sustenta essa habilidade, qual sua origem e desenvolvimento e em que momento se manifesta. (Astington e Gopnik, 1991). Ao levar em consideração que a língua pode ser vista como instrumento da cognição (Spelke, 2003), através da qual o falante adquire suporte para o planejamento de ações, contribuindo para o desempenho de tarefas cognitivas complexas (Corrêa, 2006), de Villiers (2004, 2005, 2007 e subsequentes), no que diz respeito à Teoria da Mente, argumenta que o seu desenvolvimento depende do desenvolvimento linguístico, estando diretamente ligado à aquisição de verbos de estado mental, como pensar, por exemplo, pelo fato de que esses verbos subcategorizam uma sentença encaixada. Para ela, o domínio dessa estrutura possibilita que o raciocínio de crenças falsas da Teoria da Mente seja efetivamente realizado. A presente dissertação tem como objetivo verificar em que medida há uma influência direta e necessária da linguagem para a condução de tarefas de Teoria da Mente. Para tanto, focamos nossa atenção em pessoas que estão, por algum motivo, destituídas parcialmente da capacidade linguística, mas que mantêm intacta a capacidade cognitiva, os afásicos. Por meio de uma pesquisa realizada com dois pacientes afásicos de Broca, selecionados pelos critérios clássicos, procuramos entender se a habilidade de predizer ações está intacta nestes pacientes ou se tal habilidade foi perdida, assim como a linguagem. Para tanto, aplicamos dois testes de crença falsa em Teoria da Mente. O primeiro utilizou-se de suporte verbal, uma narração de eventos e expectativas dos personagens envolvidos. A pergunta-teste foi manipulada em função do grau de complexidade por meio do cruzamento de dois fatores: sentenças simples ou complexas e QU-in situ ou movido. O segundo teste seguiu o padrão não-verbal, sendo constituído de uma sequência de imagens, sendo que o sujeito deveria decidir entre duas últimas imagens apresentadas, aquela que coerentemente finalizava a história. Uma vez que houvesse influência direta da linguagem na condução de tarefas de Teoria da Mente, esperar-se-ia que a dificuldade no teste verbal refletisse o grau de complexidade das questões apresentadas. Adicionalmente, o desempenho no teste não-verbal também deveria ser insatisfatório, dado o comprometimento linguístico apresentado pelos sujeitos testados. Para o primeiro teste, o desempenho dos pacientes foi aleatório e inferior ao do grupo controle, já para o segundo teste, o aproveitamento foi de 100%. Em geral, os resultados sugerem que o raciocínio de crenças falsas em Teoria da Mente é alcançado por esses sujeitos, haja vista o desempenho plenamente satisfatório no teste não-verbal. Os resultados do teste verbal, por outro lado, atestam tão somente a dificuldade linguística característica dessa população. Desse modo, conclui-se que uma vez desenvolvida a habilidade em Teoria da Mente, esta permanece intacta na mente destes pacientes, mesmo que destituídos parcialmente da capacidade linguística

3-7岁儿童对情景化习俗道义情境中社会行为的认知发展

Children’s understanding of deontic rules and theory of mind (ToM) were the two research domains for children’s social cognition. It was significant for understanding children’s social cognition to combine the researches in the two domains. Children at 3, 5 and 7years were required to answer three questions according to the stories which happened in children’s familiar context. The three questions were designed to address the three problems:⑴Development of 3-7-Year-old children’s understanding about how the deontic rules were enacted or changed.⑵ Development of 3-7-Year-old children’s understanding about that the deontic rules and the actor’s mental states could impact on his behaviors.⑶ Development of 3-7-Year-old children’s capacity to integrate the deontic rules and mental state to evaluate the actor’s behavior. The results showed that: ① The 3-7-Year-old children had known that deontic rules were established by the authority’s speech act. But there were still some irrelevant factors which influenced the children’s judgments, such as the authority’s desire. ② The children gradually recognized the relationship between actors should do something and they will do the same thing. 3-year-old children could recognize such relationship in a way, but their predictions were usually influenced by some irrelevant factors. The children at 5 and 7 years old understood this relationship more steady. ③ In deontic context, more and more children predicted the actors’ behaviors according to the actors’ mental states as they grown up. The ratio that the 3-7-Year-old children predicted the actors’ behavior according to their false belief about the deontic rules was smaller in deontic context compared with the children’s performance in traditional false belief task. This maybe indicated that the deontic context influenced the children’s inference stronger than the physical context. ④ When they could get the actors’ desires and the deontic rules, all the children could predict the actors’ behaviors according to their desires, but not the deontic rules. It meant that all the children could understand that the actors’ desire mediated between the deontic rules and their behaviors. But when the actors wanted to transgress the deontic rules, all the children’s predications became less accurate. ⑤ When they assigned criticism, more and more children could discriminate different behaviors as a result of diverse mental states although they all transgressed the deontic rules. But the most part of children overweighed the deontic rules but overlooked the actors’ mental state about the deontic rules; their criticism to behaviors which transgressed the deontic rules just differ in quantity according to diverse mental states, that is: if the actors known the rules or want to transgress the rules, then punished more, and if the actors didn’t know the rules or transgress the rules accidentally, then punished a little.

Attention during social interaction in children with autism: Comparison to specific language impairment, typical development, and links to cognition

Eye-tracking studies have shown how people with autism spend significantly less time looking at socially relevant information on-screen compared to those developing typically. This has been suggested to impact on the development of socio-cognitive skills in autism. We present novel evidence of how attention atypicalities in children with autism extend to real-life interaction, in comparison to typically developing (TD) children and children with specific language impairment (SLI). We explored the allocation of attention during social interaction with an interlocutor, and how aspects of attention (awareness checking) related to traditional measures of social cognition (false belief attribution). We found divergent attention allocation patterns across the groups in relation to social cognition ability. Even though children with autism and SLI performed similarly on the socio- cognitive tasks, there were syndrome-specific atypicalities of their attention patterns. Children with SLI were most similar to TD children in terms of prioritising attention to socially pertinent information (eyes, face, awareness checking). Children with autism showed reduced attention to the eyes and face, and slower awareness checking. This study provides unique and timely insight into real-world social gaze (a)typicality in autism, SLI and typical development, its relationship to socio-cognitive ability, and raises important issues for intervention.

Modelling an e-learning environment for learning programming languages

It is widely accepted that solving programming exercises is fundamental to learn how to program. Nevertheless, solving exercises is only effective if students receive an assessment on their work. An exercise solved wrong will consolidate a false belief, and without feedback many students will not be able to overcome their difficulties. However, creating, managing and accessing a large number of exercises, covering all the points in the curricula of a programming course, in classes with large number of students, can be a daunting task without the appropriated tools working in unison. This involves a diversity of tools, from the environments where programs are coded, to automatic program evaluators providing feedback on the attempts of students, passing through the authoring, management and sequencing of programming exercises as learning objects. We believe that the integration of these tools will have a great impact in acquiring programming skills. Our research objective is to manage and coordinate a network of eLearning systems where students can solve computer programming exercises. Networks of this kind include systems such as learning management systems (LMS), evaluation engines (EE), learning objects repositories (LOR) and exercise resolution environments (ERE). Our strategy to achieve the interoperability among these tools is based on a shared definition of programming exercise as a Learning Object (LO).

La influencia de factores educativos y familiares sobre el aprendizaje de una segunda lengua, y los efectos sobre la inteligencia y cognición

Actualmente, la investigación científica acerca de la influencia de los factores educativos y familiares en el aprendizaje de una segunda lengua (L2) es limitada. En comparación, los efectos que tiene la L2 en la inteligencia y cognición han sido más estudiados. Por esta razón, el artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura empírica existente que relaciona lo mencionado anteriormente, ampliando así la temática del bilingüismo. Se buscaron artículos en cuatro bases de datos (PSICODOC, ISI Web of knowledge y SCOPUS), usando palabras claves específicas, en el periodo de 1990 hasta el 2012. De 79 artículos encontrados, 34 cumplieron con los criterios de inclusión para la revisión. Asimismo, se tuvieron en cuenta dos libros, de los cuales se revisó un capítulo por cada uno según los mismos criterios. En conjunto, los resultados arrojaron importantes datos teóricos y de investigación que relacionan el éxito en el aprendizaje de una L2 con la inteligencia y cognición, según la influencia de los factores educativos y familiares. En conclusión, se identificaron más factores educativos que familiares; lo cual a concepto de la autora evidencia la limitada investigación que se ha hecho sobre los factores familiares en el bilingüismo actualmente.

Lenguaje y Teoría de la mente: una aproximación multidimensional

El propósito de este trabajo es realizar una puesta al día sobre las relaciones entre el desarrollo del lenguaje y el desarrollo de la Teoría de la Mente. Entre las hipótesis propuestas para conceptualizar dichas relaciones, realizamos un examen más exhaustivo de aquellos modelos que apoyan una implicación directa entre lenguaje y Teoría de la Mente. En este contexto, en primer lugar subrayamos la necesidad de ampliar dicha noción para incluir habilidades anteriores y posteriores a la comprensión de la falsa creencia. En segundo lugar, examinamos las diferentes hipótesis acerca de los aspectos del lenguaje más vinculados al desarrollo sociocognitivo, y las principales evidencias empíricas que las sustentan. Finalmente, discutimos un modelo de causalidad recíproca donde los vínculos entre lenguaje y Teoría de la Mente variarán según el momento del desarrollo considerado

When enough is not enough: information overload and metacognitive decisions to stop studying information

People are often exposed to more information than they can actually remember. Despite this frequent form of information overload, little is known about how much information people choose to remember. Using a novel “stop” paradigm, the current research examined whether and how people choose to stop receiving new—possibly overwhelming—information with the intent to maximize memory performance. Participants were presented with a long list of items and were rewarded for the number of correctly remembered words in a following free recall test. Critically, participants in a stop condition were provided with the option to stop the presentation of the remaining words at any time during the list, whereas participants in a control condition were presented with all items. Across five experiments, we found that participants tended to stop the presentation of the items to maximize the number of recalled items, but this decision ironically led to decreased memory performance relative to the control group. This pattern was consistent even after controlling for possible confounding factors (e.g., task demands). The results indicated a general, false belief that we can remember a larger number of items if we restrict the quantity of learning materials. These findings suggest people have an incomplete understanding of how we remember excessive amounts of information.