12 resultados para F00
Resumo:
Introducción: Uno de los aspectos con mayor variación durante la adolescencia es el sueño, el cual se ve afectado por factores biológicos así como por los estados afectivos y emocionales. En esta etapa, los individuos establecen sus primeras relaciones sentimentales románticas, vínculos esenciales para la maduración de las relaciones sociales y psicosexuales. Este trabajo busca determinar la asociación existente entre las relaciones sentimentales románticas y sus características, con la calidad sueño percibida por los jóvenes. Metodología: Estudio realizado en una población de 1794 estudiantes de ciencias de la salud entre los 18 y 25 años de edad en Bogotá, Colombia, entre 2012 y 2013. Se obtuvo una muestra probabilística con asignación proporcional de 443 sujetos, estratificada por programa académico y sexo. Utilizando dos cuestionarios de auto reporte se exploraron las características de las relaciones sentimentales y la calidad de sueño percibida. Resultados: El 64% (IC 95%: 59,4-68,9%) de la población estudiada se encontró en una relación sentimental romántica. Estos sujetos tuvieron latencias de sueño prolongadas con menor frecuencia que quienes no tenían en una relación (p <0,05). La calidad de sueño percibida se asoció al nivel de satisfacción que tuvieron los sujetos en su relación, así como la atracción por su pareja. Rasgos obsesivos, ansiosos, temerosos y evitativos en la relación disminuyeron la calidad de sueño percibida. Conclusión: Las relaciones sentimentales románticas y sus características se asocian con la calidad de sueño percibida por los individuos. Se requieren estudios que determinen causalidad en esta asociación y definan potenciales estrategias de intervención al respecto.
Resumo:
The Lincoln–Petersen estimator is one of the most popular estimators used in capture–recapture studies. It was developed for a sampling situation in which two sources independently identify members of a target population. For each of the two sources, it is determined if a unit of the target population is identified or not. This leads to a 2 × 2 table with frequencies f11, f10, f01, f00 indicating the number of units identified by both sources, by the first but not the second source, by the second but not the first source and not identified by any of the two sources, respectively. However, f00 is unobserved so that the 2 × 2 table is incomplete and the Lincoln–Petersen estimator provides an estimate for f00. In this paper, we consider a generalization of this situation for which one source provides not only a binary identification outcome but also a count outcome of how many times a unit has been identified. Using a truncated Poisson count model, truncating multiple identifications larger than two, we propose a maximum likelihood estimator of the Poisson parameter and, ultimately, of the population size. This estimator shows benefits, in comparison with Lincoln–Petersen’s, in terms of bias and efficiency. It is possible to test the homogeneity assumption that is not testable in the Lincoln–Petersen framework. The approach is applied to surveillance data on syphilis from Izmir, Turkey.
Resumo:
This paper aims to explain the historical development of Australia's foreign economic policy by using an analytical framework called a 'state-society coalition' approach. This approach focuses on virtual coalitions of state and society actors that share 'belief systems' and hold similar policy ideas, goals and preferences, as basic units (policy subsystems) of policy making. Major policy changes occur when a dominant coalition is replaced by another. The paper argues that, in Australia, there have been three major state-society coalitions in the foreign economic policy issue area: 'protectionists', 'trade liberalisers' and 'optional bilateralists'. The rise and fall of these coalitions resulted in distinctive shifts of Australia's foreign economic policy in the 1980s towards unilateral and multilateral liberalisation and in the late 1990s towards bilateral trade and investment arrangements.
Resumo:
One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate.