Policing expert testimony in a death investigation: Medical opinion as legal fact

Within coronial investigations, pathologists are called upon to given evidence as to cause of death. This evidence is given great weight by the coroners; after all, scientific ‘truth’ is widely deemed to be far more reliable than legal ‘opinion’. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ontological and epistemological status of that evidence, from the perspectives of both the pathologists and the coroners. As part of an Australian Research Council Linkage Grant, interviews were conducted with seven pathologists and 10 coroners from within the Queensland coronial system. Contrary to expectations, and the work of philosophers of science, such as Feyerabend (1975), pathologists did not present their findings in terms of unequivocal facts or objective truths relating to causes of death. Rather, their evidence was largely presented as ‘educated opinion’ based upon ‘the weight of evidence’. It was actually the coroners who translated that opinion into ‘medical fact’ within the proceedings of their death investigations, arguably as a consequence of the administrative necessity to reach a clear-cut finding as to cause of death, and on the basis of their own understanding of the ontology of medical knowledge. These findings support Latour’s (2010) claim that law requires a fundamentally different epistemology to science, and that science is not entirely to blame for the extravagant truth-claims made on its behalf

'The witness who saw, /He left little doubt' : a comparative consideration of expert testimony in mental disability law cases in common and civil law systems

The question of how courts assess expert evidence - especially when mental disability is an issue - raises the corollary question of whether courts adequately evaluate the content of the expert testimony or whether judicial decision making may be influenced by teleology (cherry picking evidence), pretextuality (accepting experts who distort evidence to achieve socially desirable aims), and/or sanism (allowing prejudicial and stereotyped evidence). Such threats occur despite professional standards in forensic psychology and other mental health disciplines that require ethical expert testimony. The result is expert testimony that, in many instances, is at best incompetent and at worst biased. The paper details threats to competent expert testimony in a comparative law context - in both the common law (involuntary civil commitment laws and risk assessment criminal laws) and, more briefly, civil law. We conclude that teleology, pretextuality, and sanism have an impact upon judicial decision making in both the common law and civil law. Finally, we speculate as to whether the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is likely to have any impact on practices in this area. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The law of expert testimony.

Mode of access: Internet.

Negotiating proximity:expert testimony and collective memory in the trials of environmental activists in France and the United Kingdom

This article analyzes the role of expert witness testimony in the trials of social movement actors, discussing the trial of the "Kingsnorth Six" in Britain and the trials of activists currently mobilising against airport construction at Notre Dame des Landes in western France. Though the study of expert testimony has so far overwhelmingly concentrated on fact-finding and admissibility, the cases here reveal the importance of expert testimony not simply in terms of legal argument, but in "moral" or political terms, as it reflects and constitutes movement cognitive praxis. In the so-called climate change defence presented by the Kingsnorth Six, I argue that expert testimony attained a "negotiation of proximity," connecting different types of contributory expertise to link the scales and registers of climate science with those of everyday understanding and meaning. Expert testimony in the trials of activists in France, however, whilst ostensibly able to develop similar bridging narratives, has instead been used to construct resistance to the airport siting as already proximate, material, and embedded. To explain this, I argue that attention to the symbolic, as well as instrumental, functions of expert testimony reveals the crucial role that collective memory plays in the construction of both knowledge and grievance in these cases. Collective memory is both a constraint on and catalyst for mobilisation, defining the boundaries of the sayable. Testimony in trials both reflects and reproduces these elements and is a vital explanatory tool for understanding the narrativisation and communication of movement identities and objectives. © 2013 The Author. Law & Policy © 2013 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary.

Jurors' responses to expert witness testimony: The effects of gender stereotypes

The present study investigated whether the impact of expert testimony was influenced by the congruency between the gender of the expert and the gender orientation of the case. Participants (N = 62) read a trial transcript involving a price-fixing allegation in either a male or female oriented domain. Within the case, the gender of the expert was manipulated. As predicted, the impact of the expert (e.g. damage awards) was greater when the gender of the expert and domain of the case were congruent as opposed to incongruent. Results also indicated that the impact of gender-domain congruency was particularly pronounced following group discussion. In addition, there was evidence that this effect was mediated through participants' evaluations of the expert witness.

Does expert psychological testimony improve juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness?

Previous research has examined the validity of behavioral assumptions underlying the presumed effectiveness of safeguards against erroneous conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness identification. In keeping with this agenda, this study examined juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness in the form of foil, instruction, and presentation biases and whether expert psychological testimony further sensitizes jurors to the factors that influence the likelihood of false identifications. One hundred and sixty jury eligible citizens watched versions of a videotaped trial that included information about the identification of the defendant by an eyewitness and that varied the suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure. In addition, half of the mock-jurors heard the testimony of an expert psychologist regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness. Mock-jurors rendered individual verdicts, rated the defendant's culpability and the suggestiveness and fairness of the identification procedure. Results indicated that jurors are somewhat sensitive to foil bias but are insensitive to instruction and presentation biases. No evidence was found to suggest that expert testimony leads to juror skepticism or juror sensitization. These results question the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identification. ^

Juror need for cognition and sensitivity to methodological flaws in expert evidence

Two studies investigated the influence of juror need for cognition on the systematic and heuristic processing of expert evidence. U.S. citizens reporting for jury duty in South Florida read a 15-page summary of a hostile work environment case containing expert testimony. The expert described a study she had conducted on the effects of viewing sexualized materials on men's behavior toward women. Certain methodological features of the expert's research varied across experimental conditions. In Study 1 (N = 252), the expert's study was valid, contained a confound, or included the potential for experimenter bias (internal validity) and relied on a small or large sample (sample size) of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). When the expert's study included trucking employees, high need for cognition jurors in Study 1 rated the expert more credible and trustworthy than did low need for cognition jurors. Jurors were insensitive to variations in the study's internal validity or sample size. Juror ratings of plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. In Study 2 (N = 162), the expert's published or unpublished study (general acceptance) was either valid or lacked an appropriate control group (internal validity) and included a sample of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). High need for cognition jurors in Study 2 found the defendant liable more often and evaluated the expert evidence more favorably when the expert's study was internally valid than when an appropriate control group was missing. Low need for cognition jurors did not differentiate between the internally valid and invalid study. Variations in the study's general acceptance and ecological validity did not affect juror judgments. Juror ratings of expert and plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. The present research demonstrated that the need for cognition moderates juror sensitivity to expert evidence quality and that certain message-related heuristics influence juror judgments when ability or motivation to process systematically is low. ^

Evaluating and improving the opposing expert safeguard against junk science

In Daubert, the Supreme Court opined that opposing expert testimony is an effective safeguard against junk science in the courtroom. Although jurors maybe unable to identify flaws in scientific research without some assistance, social psychological research suggests that people can be trained to make more sophisticated judgments about scientific quality. Further, previous research demonstrated that an opposing expert who addresses the methodology of proffered expert testimony may not enable jurors to evaluate scientific validity. In three studies, I tested why this safeguard was ineffective using a variety of stimulus materials. In the first study, I examined the mediating effect of attitudes on juror decisions within the context of a sexual harassment trial. In the second study, I examined the moderating effect of the presentation of expert credentials on participant decisions regarding child suggestibility literature. In the third study, I tested several improvements to the safeguard using improvements designed to correct for the effects of attitudes and credential presentation on juror decisions within the context of a first-degree murder trial. I found that while opposing expert testimony may have potential as a safeguard, in its current form it is ineffective. That is, a traditional opposing expert caused jurors to be skeptical of all expert testimony rather than sensitizing them to the validity of the research presented at trial. Further, while the improvements tested in this study may have potential to assist jurors in making scientifically sound decisions, more research is needed to further test and refine these improvements. ^

The tales we tell : exploring the legal stories of Queensland women who kill

The bulk of the homicide research to date has focused on male offending, with little consideration given to women's offending and in particular, their constructions within the courtroom following a homicide-related charge. This thesis examines, in detail, nineteen homicide cases finalised in the Queensland Supreme Courts between 01/01/1997 and 31/12/2002, in order to document and discuss the various legal stories available to women who kill. Predominantly, two “stock stories” are available within the court. The first, presented by the defence, offers the accused woman a victimised position to occupy. Evidence of victimisation is made available through previous abuse, expert testimony from psychologists and psychiatrists, challenges to her mental health, or appeals to her emotional nature. The second stock story, presented by the prosecution, positions the accused woman as angry, full of revenge, calculating and self serving. Such a script is usually supported by witnesses, police evidence, and family members. This thesis examines these competing and contradictory scripts using thematic discourse analysis to examine the court transcripts in detail. It argues that the "truth" of the fatal incident is based on one of these two prevailing scripts. This research destabilises the dominant script of violent female offending in the feminist literature. Most research to date has focussed on explaining the circumstances in which women kill, concentrating attention on the victimisation of the violent offending woman and negating or de-prioritising any volition on her part. By analysing all transcripts of women whose trials were held within the specified period, this research is able to demonstrate the stories used to describe their complex offending, and draw attention to the anger and intent that can occur alongside the victimisation.

Allegations of child sexual abuse in family court cases : a qualitative analysis of psychiatric evidence

Allegations of child sexual abuse in Family Court cases have gained increasing attention. The study investigates factors involved in Family Court cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse. A qualitative methodology was employed to examine Records of Judgement and Psychiatric Reports for 20 cases distilled from the data corpus of 102 cases. A seven-stage methodology was developed utilising a thematic analysis process informed by principles of grounded theory and phenomenology. The explication of eight thematic clusters was undertaken. The findings point to complex issues and dynamics in which child sexual abuse allegations have been raised. The alleging parent’s allegations of sexual abuse against their ex-partner may be: the expression of unconscious deep fears for their children’s welfare, or an action to meet their needs for personal affirmation in the context of the painful upheaval of a relationship break-up. Implications of the findings are discussed.

Recommendations for locus-specific databases and their curation.

Expert curation and complete collection of mutations in genes that affect human health is essential for proper genetic healthcare and research. Expert curation is given by the curators of gene-specific mutation databases or locus-specific databases (LSDBs). While there are over 700 such databases, they vary in their content, completeness, time available for curation, and the expertise of the curator. Curation and LSDBs have been discussed, written about, and protocols have been provided for over 10 years, but there have been no formal recommendations for the ideal form of these entities. This work initiates a discussion on this topic to assist future efforts in human genetics. Further discussion is welcome.

L'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits dans le procès civil

L'utilisation de l'expérience comme un mode de détermination des faits, c'est-à-dire comme un élément qui comble les lacunes dans l'ensemble des éléments de preuve dans le procès civil, est un thème quelque peu tabou. La doctrine est souvent basée sur la prémisse voulant que le décideur rende une décision uniquement en vertu des éléments de preuve et qu'il doit absolument s'abstenir d'insérer aux constatations quoi que ce soit qui n'est pas présent dans les éléments de preuve. Cette vision est éloignée de la réalité juridique. Dans la première partie, nous allons aborder les principes procéduraux qui empêchent l'utilisation de l'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits. Ce sont le principe de la reconstruction de l'événement du passé, le principe de l'abstraction des connaissances acquises hors du procès et le principe de l'exclusion de la preuve par ouï-dire. Ensuite, nous portons notre attention sur les différents types d'expérience, c'est-à-dire l'expérience profane, divisible en bon sens et sens commun, et l'expérience scientifique, ainsi sur leurs modes de fonctionnement dans le procès civil. La première partie se termine par une brève confrontation des différents types d'expérience avec les principes procéduraux. La deuxième partie est consacré à l'analyse de l'expérience dans trois instruments juridiques: la connaissance d'office, la présomption de fait et le témoignage d'expert. Nous nous intéressons principalement à vérifier si l'expérience fonctionne à l'intérieur de ces instruments juridiques comme mode de détermination des faits et ensuite quelles sont les limites que le droit pose à l'expérience dans ce rôle. L'analyse va confirmer que le principal instrument par lequel l'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits pénètre dans le procès civil est la présomption de fait.

Les potentielles sources d’erreurs au niveau des preuves d’ordre scientifique

Travail dirigé présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l’obtention du grade de maîtrise en science (M. Sc.) en criminologie, option criminalistique et information