The impact of expert testimony on jurors' decisions: Gender of the expert and testimony complexity

The present study investigated whether people used the gender of an expert witness as a heuristic cue to evaluate the evidence presented by the expert. Specifically, the gender of the expert and the complexity of the expert's testimony (low, high) were varied systematically within a simulated civil trial involving an antitrust price-fixing agreement. It was expected that the male expert would be more persuasive than the female expert, but only when the testimony presented was complex. As predicted, this interaction was revealed across a range of dependent measures. Somewhat unexpected was the finding of a female expert advantage in the low-complexity condition. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The law of expert testimony.

Mode of access: Internet.

Negotiating proximity:expert testimony and collective memory in the trials of environmental activists in France and the United Kingdom

This article analyzes the role of expert witness testimony in the trials of social movement actors, discussing the trial of the "Kingsnorth Six" in Britain and the trials of activists currently mobilising against airport construction at Notre Dame des Landes in western France. Though the study of expert testimony has so far overwhelmingly concentrated on fact-finding and admissibility, the cases here reveal the importance of expert testimony not simply in terms of legal argument, but in "moral" or political terms, as it reflects and constitutes movement cognitive praxis. In the so-called climate change defence presented by the Kingsnorth Six, I argue that expert testimony attained a "negotiation of proximity," connecting different types of contributory expertise to link the scales and registers of climate science with those of everyday understanding and meaning. Expert testimony in the trials of activists in France, however, whilst ostensibly able to develop similar bridging narratives, has instead been used to construct resistance to the airport siting as already proximate, material, and embedded. To explain this, I argue that attention to the symbolic, as well as instrumental, functions of expert testimony reveals the crucial role that collective memory plays in the construction of both knowledge and grievance in these cases. Collective memory is both a constraint on and catalyst for mobilisation, defining the boundaries of the sayable. Testimony in trials both reflects and reproduces these elements and is a vital explanatory tool for understanding the narrativisation and communication of movement identities and objectives. © 2013 The Author. Law & Policy © 2013 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary.

Jurors' responses to expert witness testimony: The effects of gender stereotypes

The present study investigated whether the impact of expert testimony was influenced by the congruency between the gender of the expert and the gender orientation of the case. Participants (N = 62) read a trial transcript involving a price-fixing allegation in either a male or female oriented domain. Within the case, the gender of the expert was manipulated. As predicted, the impact of the expert (e.g. damage awards) was greater when the gender of the expert and domain of the case were congruent as opposed to incongruent. Results also indicated that the impact of gender-domain congruency was particularly pronounced following group discussion. In addition, there was evidence that this effect was mediated through participants' evaluations of the expert witness.

Jurors' responses to expert witness testimony: The effects of gender stereotypes

The present study investigated whether the impact of expert testimony was influenced by the congruency between the gender of the expert and the gender orientation of the case. Participants (N = 62) read a trial transcript involving a price-fixing allegation in either a male or female oriented domain. Within the case, the gender of the expert was manipulated. As predicted, the impact of the expert (e.g. damage awards) was greater when the gender of the expert and domain of the case were congruent as opposed to incongruent. Results also indicated that the impact of gender-domain congruency was particularly pronounced following group discussion. In addition, there was evidence that this effect was mediated through participants' evaluations of the expert witness.

Does expert psychological testimony improve juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness?

Previous research has examined the validity of behavioral assumptions underlying the presumed effectiveness of safeguards against erroneous conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness identification. In keeping with this agenda, this study examined juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness in the form of foil, instruction, and presentation biases and whether expert psychological testimony further sensitizes jurors to the factors that influence the likelihood of false identifications. One hundred and sixty jury eligible citizens watched versions of a videotaped trial that included information about the identification of the defendant by an eyewitness and that varied the suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure. In addition, half of the mock-jurors heard the testimony of an expert psychologist regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness. Mock-jurors rendered individual verdicts, rated the defendant's culpability and the suggestiveness and fairness of the identification procedure. Results indicated that jurors are somewhat sensitive to foil bias but are insensitive to instruction and presentation biases. No evidence was found to suggest that expert testimony leads to juror skepticism or juror sensitization. These results question the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identification. ^

Des céphalées, cinq avis spécialisés: les pièges diagnostiques pour la maladie de Horton [Headaches, five expert opinions: the pitfalls involved in the diagnosis of giant cell arteritis].

Giant cell arteritis (GCA) (or Horton's disease) is a systemic disease affecting the vessels of medium and large sizes. The incidence increases with age (the disease develops rarely before age 50) and the etiology remains unknown. Clinical manifestations may vary (including asthenia, temporal headache, visual disturbances, etc.) and GCA can potentially lead to dramatic consequences (permanent loss of vision). Although some anomalies in the investigations may help in the diagnosis of GCA, research and confirmation of the diagnosis of GCA may be difficult, especially when the symptoms presented by patients are spread out in time and appear to be nonspecific at first.

Juror need for cognition and sensitivity to methodological flaws in expert evidence

Two studies investigated the influence of juror need for cognition on the systematic and heuristic processing of expert evidence. U.S. citizens reporting for jury duty in South Florida read a 15-page summary of a hostile work environment case containing expert testimony. The expert described a study she had conducted on the effects of viewing sexualized materials on men's behavior toward women. Certain methodological features of the expert's research varied across experimental conditions. In Study 1 (N = 252), the expert's study was valid, contained a confound, or included the potential for experimenter bias (internal validity) and relied on a small or large sample (sample size) of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). When the expert's study included trucking employees, high need for cognition jurors in Study 1 rated the expert more credible and trustworthy than did low need for cognition jurors. Jurors were insensitive to variations in the study's internal validity or sample size. Juror ratings of plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. In Study 2 (N = 162), the expert's published or unpublished study (general acceptance) was either valid or lacked an appropriate control group (internal validity) and included a sample of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). High need for cognition jurors in Study 2 found the defendant liable more often and evaluated the expert evidence more favorably when the expert's study was internally valid than when an appropriate control group was missing. Low need for cognition jurors did not differentiate between the internally valid and invalid study. Variations in the study's general acceptance and ecological validity did not affect juror judgments. Juror ratings of expert and plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. The present research demonstrated that the need for cognition moderates juror sensitivity to expert evidence quality and that certain message-related heuristics influence juror judgments when ability or motivation to process systematically is low. ^

Evaluating and improving the opposing expert safeguard against junk science

In Daubert, the Supreme Court opined that opposing expert testimony is an effective safeguard against junk science in the courtroom. Although jurors maybe unable to identify flaws in scientific research without some assistance, social psychological research suggests that people can be trained to make more sophisticated judgments about scientific quality. Further, previous research demonstrated that an opposing expert who addresses the methodology of proffered expert testimony may not enable jurors to evaluate scientific validity. In three studies, I tested why this safeguard was ineffective using a variety of stimulus materials. In the first study, I examined the mediating effect of attitudes on juror decisions within the context of a sexual harassment trial. In the second study, I examined the moderating effect of the presentation of expert credentials on participant decisions regarding child suggestibility literature. In the third study, I tested several improvements to the safeguard using improvements designed to correct for the effects of attitudes and credential presentation on juror decisions within the context of a first-degree murder trial. I found that while opposing expert testimony may have potential as a safeguard, in its current form it is ineffective. That is, a traditional opposing expert caused jurors to be skeptical of all expert testimony rather than sensitizing them to the validity of the research presented at trial. Further, while the improvements tested in this study may have potential to assist jurors in making scientifically sound decisions, more research is needed to further test and refine these improvements. ^

Recommendations for locus-specific databases and their curation.

Expert curation and complete collection of mutations in genes that affect human health is essential for proper genetic healthcare and research. Expert curation is given by the curators of gene-specific mutation databases or locus-specific databases (LSDBs). While there are over 700 such databases, they vary in their content, completeness, time available for curation, and the expertise of the curator. Curation and LSDBs have been discussed, written about, and protocols have been provided for over 10 years, but there have been no formal recommendations for the ideal form of these entities. This work initiates a discussion on this topic to assist future efforts in human genetics. Further discussion is welcome.

Identification concept and the use of probabilities in forensic odontology--an approach by philosophical discussion.

This paper questions the practitioners' deterministic approach(es) in forensic identification and notes the limits of their conclusions in order to encourage a discussion to question current practices. With this end in view, a hypothetical discussion between an expert in dentistry and an enthusiastic member of a jury, eager to understand the scientific principles of evidence interpretation, is presented. This discussion will lead us to regard any argument aiming at identification as probabilistic.

Investigation of Maquoketa's Pit Bull Ban Ordinance and Enforcement, 2006

Case File 0603634 On September 13, 2006, Kelly Wilslef submitted a complaint to the Ombudsman about the Maquoketa City Council (Council). Ms. Wilslef stated a Maquoketa police officer served her an abatement notice for violating the city ordinance preventing owners from keeping pit bull terrier dogs in the city. The Council subsequently determined her dog was a pit bull mix, and ordered her to remove the dog from the city. Ms. Wilslef claimed the Council unreasonably relied on non-expert testimony supporting the city’s position her dog was a pit bull mix. She further claimed that if her dog was in fact a pit bull mix, the city ordinance did not apply to mixed-breed pit bulls; therefore, the Council acted contrary to law when it concluded she violated the city ordinance and ordered her to remove her dog from the city.

L'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits dans le procès civil

L'utilisation de l'expérience comme un mode de détermination des faits, c'est-à-dire comme un élément qui comble les lacunes dans l'ensemble des éléments de preuve dans le procès civil, est un thème quelque peu tabou. La doctrine est souvent basée sur la prémisse voulant que le décideur rende une décision uniquement en vertu des éléments de preuve et qu'il doit absolument s'abstenir d'insérer aux constatations quoi que ce soit qui n'est pas présent dans les éléments de preuve. Cette vision est éloignée de la réalité juridique. Dans la première partie, nous allons aborder les principes procéduraux qui empêchent l'utilisation de l'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits. Ce sont le principe de la reconstruction de l'événement du passé, le principe de l'abstraction des connaissances acquises hors du procès et le principe de l'exclusion de la preuve par ouï-dire. Ensuite, nous portons notre attention sur les différents types d'expérience, c'est-à-dire l'expérience profane, divisible en bon sens et sens commun, et l'expérience scientifique, ainsi sur leurs modes de fonctionnement dans le procès civil. La première partie se termine par une brève confrontation des différents types d'expérience avec les principes procéduraux. La deuxième partie est consacré à l'analyse de l'expérience dans trois instruments juridiques: la connaissance d'office, la présomption de fait et le témoignage d'expert. Nous nous intéressons principalement à vérifier si l'expérience fonctionne à l'intérieur de ces instruments juridiques comme mode de détermination des faits et ensuite quelles sont les limites que le droit pose à l'expérience dans ce rôle. L'analyse va confirmer que le principal instrument par lequel l'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits pénètre dans le procès civil est la présomption de fait.