Pattern of Executive Remuneration in the Manufacturing Public Enterprises in Kerala

The study is undertaken by the researcher with the object of examining the remuneration pattern of executive personnel in the manufacturing public enterprises in Kerala so as to find out whether there is any rationale or criteria involved in remunerating executives. It is also envisaged to find out the pattern of executive remuneration in the various categories of industries and inter—industry disparities among the public sector enterprises. This is considered to be a very fruitful area for investigation, particularly in view of the generally prevailing notion that public sector executives in Kerala are not remunerated properly and glaring inequalities and disparities are existing among the various categories of industries and within the same industry. Therefore the study is to explore the criteria used for the determination of executive remuneration and the relative weightage of various factors such as size of the firm, rate of return sales volume etc of the organisation and various other factors such as qualification, experience, level of job and functions of executives. Further the study is extended to find out the role of 'pay' towards motivation and efficiency of the executive personnel

Corporate governance of executive remuneration with special reference to Bangladesh

This discussion paper focuses on corporate governance issues associated with executive compensation arrangements. An historical perspective is used to demonstrate the absence of a sound empirically-based understanding of good corporate governance practices in relation to share-based payment arrangements. The paper provides an overview of issues including the potential earnings dilution and volatility effects of the introduction of regulations affecting executive remuneration. Potential research questions have been framed addressing each of the major issues identified in this paper. It is concluded that corporate regulators should ensure they are familiar with and that they consider best practice models for corporate governance when developing new or revising existing business regulation. It is proposed that further research to remedy this deficiency would enable a more accurate assessment of the impact of management on accounting regulation and the better design and implementation of regulation.

Executive remuneration, financial performance and corporate governance in UK and Spanish listed firms

This study examines the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the financial performance and corporate governance arrangements of the UK and Spanish listed firms. These countries’ corporate governance framework has been shaped by differences in legal origin, culture and backgrounds. For example, the UK legal arrangements can be defined as to be constituted in common-law, whereas for Spanish firms, the legal arrangement is based on civil law. We estimate both static and dynamic regression models to test our hypotheses and we estimate our regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Estimated results for both countries show that directors’ remuneration levels are positively related with measures of firm value and financial performance. This means that remuneration levels do not lead to a point whereby firm value is reduced due to excessive remuneration. These results hold for our long-run estimates. That is, estimates based on panel cointegration and panel error correction. Measures of corporate governance also impacts on the level of executive pay. Our results have important implications for existing corporate governance arrangements and how the interests of stakeholders are protected. For example, long-run results suggest that directors’ remuneration adjusts in a way to capture variation in financial performance

Executive compensation and corporate governance with special reference to Bangladesh; some emerging issues

This discussion paper considers corporate governance issues associated with executive compensation arrangements. An historical perspective is used to demonstrate the absence of a sound empirically-based understanding of good corporate governance practices in relation to share-based payment arrangements. The paper provides an overview of issues including the potential earnings dilution and volatility effects of the introduction of regulations affecting executive remuneration. Potential future research questions have been framed addressing each of the major issues identified in this paper. We conclude that corporate regulators should ensure they are familiar with and consider best practice models for corporate governance when developing new, or revising existing business regulation. It is proposed that further research to remedy this deficiency would enable a more accurate assessment of the impact of management on accounting regulation and the better design and implementation of regulation.

The value of executive director share ownership and discretionary accruals

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between the value of executive director share ownership and discretionary accruals.

Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a dataset of 1,173 firm-year observations drawn from 188 Australian listed companies for the period 2000-2006. The analysis is based on multivariate regression analysis and ordinary least square models were used to investigate the relation between the value of managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. The issue of potential endogeneity is addressed by using a simultaneous equation system.

Findings – A negative relation is found between value of managerial share ownership and discretionary accruals at lower levels of value of ownership, which is consistent with the theorised incentive alignment that as the managers commit more resources to their firms, stakeholders impose less contractual constraints specified in terms of accounting numbers and managers make lower accrual adjustments. After a certain level of value of ownership is attained, a positive relations seen, consistent with increased discretionary accrual adjustments associated with stakeholders anticipating managerial entrenchment. Also, it is found that these results are driven by firms with income increasing, as opposed to income decreasing, discretionary accruals.

Practical implications – Shares and options are forming an increasing proportion of executive remuneration that continues to be the subject of much debate amongst regulators and in the media. Showing that the value of share ownership may be an effective internal governance mechanism to help align incentives adds to the debate and has policy implications.

Originality/value – The paper's primary contribution is finding that the value (as opposed to proportion) of share ownership, typically representing a sizeable proportion of managers' undiversified wealth, is a potentially direct driver of theorised incentive alignment and entrenchment effects associated with share ownership.

How should regulators deal with entrenched company executives?

The regulatory framework for corporate governance, both in Australia and internationally, shifts between rules based regimes and principles based approach. The rules based regimes are typified by legislation that imposes mandated compliance based rules, such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Other regimes, such as Australia’s CLERP 9 and the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s principles, have opted for a disclosure approach. This paper examines these approaches in the context of the non-binding vote rule, which arguably combines aspects of both. The study’s methodology empirically considers evidence relating to actual voting patterns as well as case study examples of the non-binding vote’s effectiveness. Significantly, our analyses show that from its inception, the non-binding vote was effective in motivating management to change the remuneration package to one they perceived as more acceptable to shareholders and that the non-binding vote is an effective regime to manage CEO remuneration (and by extension) executive remuneration.

Women in leadership: An analysis of the gender pay gap in ASX-listed firms

This study provides evidence that after several decades of fighting for equal pay for equal work, an unexplained gender pay gap remains amongst senior executives in ASX-listed firms. After controlling for a large suite of personal, occupational and firm observables, we find female senior executives receive, on average, 22.58 percent less in base salary for the period 2002–2013. When executives are awarded performance-based pay, females receive on average 16.47 percent less in cash bonus and 18.21 percent less in long-term incentives than males. The results are robust to using firm fixed effects and propensity-score matching. Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition results show that the mean pay gap cannot be attributed to gender differences in attributes, including job titles. Instead, the results point to differences in returns on firm-specific variables, in particular firm risk.

Income differentials and corporate performance

Purpose – This paper seeks to make the case for new research into the perceived fairness and impact of executive pay. Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews the literature regarding executive compensation and corporate performance and examines the evidence that a more egalitarian approach to pay could be justified in terms of long-term shareholder value. Findings – There would appear to be no evidence to suggest that the growing gap between the pay of executives and that of the average employee generates long-term enterprise value, and it may even be detrimental to firms, if not the liberal capitalist consensus on which the corporate licence to operate is based. Research limitations/implications – The paper outlines a new approach to tracking income differentials with corporate performance through the development of a corporate Gini coefficient “league table”. Social implications – The proposed research is expected to point towards better practice in executive remuneration, and support the growing momentum for a sustainable and enlightened approach to business, in which the key goal is long-term enterprise value based on a fair distribution of the rewards of business. Originality/value – In producing a deeper understanding of the impact of widening income differentials, the paper should be of interest to senior executives in publicly quoted companies as well as press commentators, government officials and academics.

Principles of contemporary corporate governance

Now in its third edition, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance offers comprehensive coverage of the key topics and emerging themes in corporate governance in the private sector. It explains both the principles of corporate governance systems and their real-world application in an authoritative and engaging manner. This fully updated edition includes a new chapter on shareholder activism and covers developments in the areas of corporate governance in the European Union, reporting, credit rating agencies, executive remuneration and board diversity. It addresses the impact of the GFC on corporate governance and the theoretical and economic aspects of governance, and further includes comparative sections, written by specialist contributors, on corporate governance in China, Indonesia, Japan and South Africa. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance is an indispensable resource for academic researchers, practitioners wanting a deeper understanding of the underlying principles of corporate governance and students of business and law studying corporate governance.

A remuneração dos executivos tem impacto no valor e desempenho das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto?

Este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar se a remuneração dos executivos afeta o valor e desempenho das empresas. Em geral, a literatura sugere que companhias que melhor remuneram seus administradores tendem a apresentar um valor e desempenho superior. Utilizando dados inéditos no Brasil, este trabalho procura testar essa hipótese. A análise de 420 companhias abertas brasileiras no período de 2002 a 2009 indica que existe uma relação positiva e significativa entre remuneração executiva e valor da empresa (price-to-book), ou seja, empresas que pagam mais a seus executivos possuem maior valor de mercado. Por outro lado, não existe evidência significativa que empresas que melhor remuneram seus executivos apresentam um melhor desempenho operacional (retorno sobre ativos e crescimento de vendas).