Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Exclusive contracts in bilaterally duopolistic industries

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. With highly differentiated products exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium.

Exclusive contracts with vertically differentiated products

In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the upstream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that firms prefer to deal exclusively with retailers. If the extent of consumers' heterogeneity is small, manufacturers offer exclusive contracts unilaterally. On the other hand, if consumers' valuations differ significantly both manufacturers engage in exclusive contracting.

Reciprocally Exclusive Contracts and Endogenous Quality

Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive duopolies. First we show that using a limited set of feasible contracts, exclusive dealing and purchasing is going to be preferred, regardless of the level of product differentiation. In the next step, we make the choice of quality endogenous and derive the equilibrium conditions for qualities under the aforementioned contractual arrangement. Our final proposition shows that in this case the choice of quality depends exclusively on the valuation of the median consumer.

Exclusive contracts with private information in successive differentiated oligopolies

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. In contrast with the previous literature, exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers selling highly differentiated products, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that exclusive contracts decrease both consumer and social welfare.

Competition policy costs to firms

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Competition policy costs to firms

The existence of competition policy forces companies to adjust their behaviour. This is also costly. Using a database from a company on contracts, I will try to estimate if a specific competition policy disposition, supply contracts cannot be longer than 60 months, has costs for the coffee suppliers operating in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market. The estimation method used in this paper will be OLS. The results suggest that limiting the duration of exclusivity contracts to 60 months can be harmful to the coffee suppliers and it can even seriously affect the market functioning. Key

Gestão da cadeia de fornecimento :um estudo em empresas de construção certificadas com a ISO 9000

The aim of this present research is to investigate about aplication of the supply chain management in Civil Construction, through perception of brasilian building companies directors. Research purpose includes potential benefits and main dificults analysis in supply chain management, beyond to identify decision criterions for suppliers and sales chain (commission agent and real state agency) choice and reduction, to facilility management in companies. The methodology used in this work considers the application of a questionnaire with scales of the type Likert being constituted of variables that compose the aspects of evaluation and of behaviors, beyond questions to identify the market profile of the respondents. For analysis statistics is used the descriptive, clusters and variance, ANOVA, analysis last two to verify the connections between variables. The results show more perception as for long terms contracts with suppliers for purchase of materials and services being decisive for companies nowadays (40%) than as for exclusive contracts with commission agents (30%). There is a positive appraisal about viability of hipotetic situations showed, but more caution as for disposition to apply them too. Another results aim for biggers dificults in management of chain links formed by commission agents and real state agencies, than chain links formed by anothers suppliers of materials and services. The companies for study were chosen among to those with ISO 9000 certificate until november 2001, considering that these companies have the best management systems, probably

Exclusive dealing and vertical integration : the efficiency of contracts in the tuna industry /

Item 535

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

First cases of exclusive paternal care in stink bugs (Hemiptera: Pentatomidae)

We describe paternal care in two pentatomid bugs, Lopadusa (Lopadusa) augur Stål, 1860 and Edessa nigropunctata Berg, 1884. Field and laboratory observations showed that males remain with their eggs and early hatched nymphs, while females abandon the eggs after oviposition. Guarding males defensive behaviors towards their clutches were similar to those described for guarding females of pentatomids. Since there is no detailed information on the internal phylogeny of Pentatomidae, it is not possible to make a robust inference on whether paternal care in L. augur and E. nigropunctata has arisen independently or not. If the latter, the two new cases of paternal care we describe here represent the fifth event of independent evolution of this rare behavioral trait in Heteroptera.

Exclusive vector meson production in electron-ion collisions

We calculate the nuclear cross section for coherent and incoherent vector meson production within the QCD color dipole picture, including saturation effects. Theoretical estimates for scattering on both light and heavy nuclei are given over a wide range of energy.

Bayesian ratemaking procedure of crop insurance contracts with skewed distribution

Over the years, crop insurance programs became the focus of agricultural policy in the USA, Spain, Mexico, and more recently in Brazil. Given the increasing interest in insurance, accurate calculation of the premium rate is of great importance. We address the crop-yield distribution issue and its implications in pricing an insurance contract considering the dynamic structure of the data and incorporating the spatial correlation in the Hierarchical Bayesian framework. Results show that empirical (insurers) rates are higher in low risk areas and lower in high risk areas. Such methodological improvement is primarily important in situations of limited data.