968 resultados para Exclusive Jurisdiction
Resumo:
The following comparison was written for the first meeting of the International Law Association newly established (2010) Committee on Intellectual Property and Private International Law (Chair: Professor Toshiyuki Kono, Kyushu University; Co-Rapporteurs: Professors Pedro de Miguel Asensio, Madrid Complutense University, and Axel Metzger, Hannover University) (hereinafter: ILA Committee), which was hosted at the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon in March 16-17, 2012. The comparison at stake concerns the rules on infringement and exclusive (subject-mater) jurisdiction posed (or rejected, in case of exclusive jurisdiction) by four sets of academic principles. Notwithstanding the fact that the rules in question present several differences, those differences in the majority of cases could be overcome by further studies and work of the ILA Committee, as the following comparison explains.
Resumo:
Okoye, Adaeze, et al, 'Cross-Border Unitization and Joint Development Agreements: An International Law Perspective', Houston Journal of International Law (2007) 29(2) pp.355-425 RAE2008
Resumo:
Alterações normativas são de eficácia limitada quando não acompanhadas do aperfeiçoamento das instituições encarregadas de aplicar, zelar e desenvolver as normas jurídicas. Esse documento contrasta o modelo regulatório brasileiro com dois outros modelos paradigmáticos (o do Reino Unido, baseado em uma agência reguladora própria, e o das Filipinas, um caso inédito de autorregulação reconhecida pelo Estado). A Análise conclui que inexiste, no Brasil, um órgão ou espaço institucional com competência exclusiva para regular o setor, estando as competências regulatórias espalhadas ente vários órgãos (principalmente os Ministérios da Justiça, Desenvolvimento Social, Saúde e Educação), sem uma instância superior de coordenação
Resumo:
This article examines the arising cross-border dispute resolution models (Cooperation and Competition among national Courts) from a critical perspective. Although they have been conceived to surpass the ordinary solution of a Modern paradigm (exclusive jurisdiction, choice of court, lis pendens, forum non conveniens, among others), they are insufficient to deal with problems raised with present globalization, as they do not abandon aspects of that paradigm, namely, (i) statebased Law; and (ii) standardization of cultural issues.
Resumo:
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
Resumo:
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
Resumo:
Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.
Resumo:
We seek to statistically inform the debate regarding the Australian Takeovers Panel’s ‘bright line’ policy towards break fees. Based on 313 takeovers from 2002 to 2006, 85 involving break fees, we find post-bid competition to be unrelated to break fee usage and inversely related to bid success. We also find that break fee usage has a detrimental effect on shareholder wealth as measured by both the final bid premium and abnormal returns. Therefore, although break fees appear to be neither anticompetitive nor coercive within the Australian context, they do appear to have had a deleterious effect on shareholder wealth.
Resumo:
The taxation of multinational banks currently is governed by the general principles of international tax. However, it is arguable that there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant the consideration of a separate taxing regime. This article argues that because of the unique nature of multinational banks, the traditional international tax rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income do not produce a result which is optimal, as it does not reflect economic reality. That is, the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment is considered as an alternative that reflects economic reality by recognising the unique nature of multinational banks and allocating the income to the location of the economic activity. The unique nature of multinational banking is recognised in the fact that formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Starting from this recognition, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior (or optimal) model for the taxation of multinational banks. An optimal regime, for the purposes of this article, is considered to be one that distributes the taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions, while, simultaneously allowing decisions of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept. A neutral tax system is one in which tax rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality. A system that distributes taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country receives its fair share of tax revenue. Given the increase in multinational banking, jurisdictions should be concerned that they are receiving their fair share. Inter-nation equity is concerned with re-determining the proper division of the tax base among countries. Richard and Peggy Musgrave argue that sharing of the tax base by countries of source should be seen as a matter of inter-nation equity requiring international cooperation. The rights of the jurisdiction of residency will also be at issue. To this extent, while it is agreed that inter-nation equity is an essential attribute to an international tax regime, there is no universal agreement as to how to achieve it. The current system attempts to achieve such equity through a combined residency and source regime, with the transfer pricing rules used to apportion income between the relevant jurisdictions. However, this article suggests, that as an alternative to the current regime, equity would be achieved through formulary apportionment. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. Yet these are two separate issues. As such, this article is divided into two core parts. The first part examines the theoretical soundness of the formulary apportionment model concluding that it is theoretically superior to the arm’s length pricing requirement of the traditional transfer pricing regime. The second part examines the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an optimal model with a view to disclosing the issues that arise when a formulary apportionment regime is adopted. Prior to an analysis of the theoretical and practical application of formulary apportionment to multinational banks, the unique nature of these banks is considered. The article concludes that, while there are significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues to overcome, the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm’s length model which applies to multinational banks. This conclusion is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks.
Resumo:
In Woolworths Ltd v Graham [2007] QDC 301 Searles DCJ struck out a pre-proceedings application under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld)on the basis that the material before the Court was not sufficient to attract the jurisdiction of the District Court.The decision serves more broadly as a reminder that the District Court is an inferior court of defined and limited jurisdiction and that any proceedings brought in it must be demonstrably within the jurisdiction conferred on that court by legislation.