Relatório de estágio no departamento central de investigação e acção penal

The means of obtaining evidence, the amount of evidence obtained, the number of defendants related to each criminal case and the gravity of the crimes for which the magistrates of the Department are holders of penal action, define its real importance to the Rule of Law. I have deeply studied the subject of the institution of hierarchical intervention required by the assistant and the application of an opening statement by the defendant, starting from a hypothetical case, provided when the query of an investigation with the subject of the crime of active corruption, where this institution was called as a reaction to the archiving dispatch delivered by the Public Ministry. I have study about the implementation of the institution of provisional suspension of the process, specifically in the scope of fiscal criminality, analyzing the effective satisfaction of the purposes of the sentences in two slopes: general prevention and special prevention. I went for my first time to a Central Court of Criminal Instruction, where I attended the measures of inquiry and instructive debate of a process that culminated with the prosecution and pronunciation of the defendants. In addition to this criminal experience, I have deepened and consolidated the academic knowledge with the study of various criminal cases from various fields in the scope of criminality investigated by the Department. I could therefore check the basis of procedural delays, regarding to our legal system, especially in this type of crime, raising issues that I analyzed and discussed, always in a critical and academic way. I had the opportunity to attend and witness a seminar in the Lisbon Directorate of Finance as well of entering the Centre for Judicial Studies to attend a conference on the International Anti-Corruption Day. Focus on the investigatory importance of the international judicial cooperation, through the various organs, with special interest to EUROJUST. I comprehended the organization and functioning of these communitarian organs and means of communication of procedural acts, in particular, the rogatory letters and european arrest warrants. This involvement is motivated by the moratorium factor of the investigations where rogatory letters are necessary for the acquisition of evidence or information relevant to the good continuation of the process. For this reason the judicial cooperation through the relevant communitarian organs, translates a streamlined response between the competent judicial authorities of the Member States, through the National Member that integrates EUROJUST. This report aims to highlight some of the difficulties and procedural issues that Public Prosecutors of DCIAP and criminal police bodies that assist them, face in combating violent and organized crime, of national and transnational nature, of particular complexity, according to the specifics of criminal types.

La lucha de la Unión Europea contra el crimen organizado transnacional. Estudio de caso: tráfico ilegal de armas pequeñas y ligeras provenientes de Albania y Kosovo (2001-2005)

En el contexto de la lucha de la Unión Europea contra el crimen organizado transnacional, el tráfico ilegal de armas pequeñas y ligeras proveniente de los grupos criminales albaneses y kosovares, es uno de los delitos a los que la Unión Europea ha tenido que hacer frente. Así pues, esta investigación logró analizar cómo la falta de coordinación de las políticas europeas implementadas para luchar contra el tráfico ilegal de armas pequeñas y ligeras y la corrupción estatal en Albania y Kosovo, fueron los dos factores de mayor influencia para evidenciar el impacto a la efectividad de dichas políticas implementadas. Para esto se debió comprender las dinámicas de los grupos criminales y la influencia de la corrupción en su actuar, y después examinar las políticas implementadas por la Unión Europea y los factores que no permitieron que existiera coordinación entre ellas.

EU Home Affairs Agencies and the Construction of EU Internal Security. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 53/December 2012

Regulatory agencies such as Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, CEPOL as well as bodies such as OLAF, have over the past decade become increasingly active within the institutional architecture constituting the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and are now placed at the forefront of implementing and developing the EU’s internal security model. A prominent feature of agency activity is the large-scale proliferation of ‘knowledge’ on security threats via the production of policy tools such as threat assessments, risk analyses, periodic and situation reports. These instruments now play a critical role in providing the evidence-base that supports EU policymaking, with agency-generated ‘knowledge’ feeding political priority setting and decision-making within the EU’s new Internal Security Strategy (ISS). This paper examines the nature and purpose of knowledge generated by EU Home Affairs agencies. It asks where does this knowledge originate? How does it measure against criteria of objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability and accuracy? And how is it processed in order to frame threats, justify actions and set priorities under the ISS?

The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks. Liberty and Security in Europe No. 84, 27 November 2015

This paper examines the EU’s counter-terrorism policies responding to the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015. It argues that these events call for a re-think of the current information-sharing and preventive-justice model guiding the EU’s counter-terrorism tools, along with security agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Priority should be given to independently evaluating ‘what has worked’ and ‘what has not’ when it comes to police and criminal justice cooperation in the Union. Current EU counter-terrorism policies face two challenges: one is related to their efficiency and other concerns their legality. ‘More data’ without the necessary human resources, more effective cross-border operational cooperation and more trust between the law enforcement authorities of EU member states is not an efficient policy response. Large-scale surveillance and preventive justice techniques are also incompatible with the legal and judicial standards developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The EU can bring further added value first, by boosting traditional policing and criminal justice cooperation to fight terrorism; second, by re-directing EU agencies’ competences towards more coordination and support in cross-border operational cooperation and joint investigations, subject to greater accountability checks (Europol and Eurojust +); and third, by improving the use of policy measures following a criminal justice-led cooperation model focused on improving cross-border joint investigations and the use of information that meets the quality standards of ‘evidence’ in criminal judicial proceedings. Any EU and national counter-terrorism policies must not undermine democratic rule of law, fundamental rights or the EU’s founding constitutional principles, such as the free movement of persons and the Schengen system. Otherwise, these policies will defeat their purpose by generating more insecurity, instability, mistrust and legal uncertainty for all.

The issue of data protection and data security in the (pre-Lisbon) EU third pillar

The key functional operability in the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar of the EU is the exchange of intelligence and information amongst the law enforcement bodies of the EU. The twin issues of data protection and data security within what was the EU’s third pillar legal framework therefore come to the fore. With the Lisbon Treaty reform of the EU, and the increased role of the Commission in PJCCM policy areas, and the integration of the PJCCM provisions with what have traditionally been the pillar I activities of Frontex, the opportunity for streamlining the data protection and data security provisions of the law enforcement bodies of the post-Lisbon EU arises. This is recognised by the Commission in their drafting of an amending regulation for Frontex , when they say that they would prefer “to return to the question of personal data in the context of the overall strategy for information exchange to be presented later this year and also taking into account the reflection to be carried out on how to further develop cooperation between agencies in the justice and home affairs field as requested by the Stockholm programme.” The focus of the literature published on this topic, has for the most part, been on the data protection provisions in Pillar I, EC. While the focus of research has recently sifted to the previously Pillar III PJCCM provisions on data protection, a more focused analysis of the interlocking issues of data protection and data security needs to be made in the context of the law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard to those which were based in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. This paper will make a contribution to that debate, arguing that a review of both the data protection and security provision post-Lisbon is required, not only in order to reinforce individual rights, but also inter-agency operability in combating cross-border EU crime. The EC’s provisions on data protection, as enshrined by Directive 95/46/EC, do not apply to the legal frameworks covering developments within the third pillar of the EU. Even Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, which is supposed to cover data protection provisions within PJCCM expressly states that its provisions do not apply to “Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS)” or to the Customs Information System (CIS). In addition, the post Treaty of Prüm provisions covering the sharing of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and vehicle registration data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, are not to be covered by the provisions of the 2008 Framework Decision. As stated by Hijmans and Scirocco, the regime is “best defined as a patchwork of data protection regimes”, with “no legal framework which is stable and unequivocal, like Directive 95/46/EC in the First pillar”. Data security issues are also key to the sharing of data in organised crime or counterterrorism situations. This article will critically analyse the current legal framework for data protection and security within the third pillar of the EU.