Dutch Auctions: The case of fish auction in Bermeo

In this work I will analyze fish auctions focusing on a particular case: fish auctions in Bermeo. The purpose is to explain if at present the Dutch auction is the appropriate mechanism in the field of fish auctions or there are better alternatives for the sale of fish. For the fulfillment of this essay, I will first introduce some general notions on auctions and more particularly on Dutch auctions describing their properties and limitations.

What really matters in auction design

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems, and the Anglo-Dutch auction a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. Effective anti-trust policy is also critical. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circum- stances of the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal, but this author (and others) correctly predicted the same for- mat would fail in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Auction design is not one size Þts all . We also discuss the 3G spectrum auctions in Germany, Italy, Austria and Switzerland, and football TV-rights, TV franchise and other radiospectrum auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles.

Bidding For Parking: The Impact of University Affiliation on Predicting Bid Values in Dutch Auctions of On-Campus Parking Permits

Parking is often underpriced and expanding its capacity is expensive; universities need a better way of reducing congestion outside of building costly parking garages. Demand based pricing mechanisms, such as auctions, offer a possible solution to the problem by promising to reduce parking at peak times. However, faculty, students, and staff at universities have systematically different parking needs, leading to different parking valuations. In this study, I determine the impact university affiliation has on predicting bid values cast in three Dutch Auctions of on-campus parking permits sold at Chapman University in Fall 2010. Using clustering techniques crosschecked with university demographic information to detect affiliation groups, I ran a log-linear regression, finding that university affiliation had a larger effect on bid amount than on lot location and fraction of auction duration. Generally, faculty were predicted to have higher bids whereas students were predicted to have lower bids.

A JOINT EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR IN IPO PRICING METHODS

This article jointly examines the differences of laboratory versions of the Dutch clock open auction, a sealed-bid auction to represent book building, and a two-stage sealed bid auction to proxy for the “competitive IPO”, a recent innovation used in a few European equity initial public offerings. We investigate pricing, seller allocation, and buyer welfare allocation efficiency and conclude that the book building emulation seems to be as price efficient as the Dutch auction, even after investor learning, whereas the competitive IPO is not price efficient, regardless of learning. The competitive IPO is the most seller allocative efficient method because it maximizes offer proceeds. The Dutch auction emerges as the most buyer welfare allocative efficient method. Underwriters are probably seeking pricing efficiency rather than seller or buyer welfare allocative efficiency and their discretionary pricing and allocation must be important since book building is prominent worldwide.

Catalogue of ancient and modern pictures, the property of a gentleman : and an assemblage of pictures of the Dutch, Italian and early English schools, from numerous private collections and different sources.

No price list.

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm chooses to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value of the factory may differ among jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdictions compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infrastructure, commitments to spend on infrastructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that the expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements is the same. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that is, the mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.

Auction price anomalies: Evidence from wool auctions in Australia

Using detailed Australian wool auction data we test for further evidence of pricing anomalies at sequential auctions. We find that an anomaly frequently exists and order is frequently endogenously determined. Moreover, prices increase through some sales and decrease through others. We examine whether it is possible to explain the variation in the anomaly across sales and conclude that there is no systematic relationship between the direction of the price anomaly and the characteristics of the wool or the auction. We do, however, find evidence that an anomaly, is more likely in longer sales.

Auction of financial transmission rights in electricity market environment

An auction model is used to increase the individual profits for market players with products they do not use. A Financial Transmission Rights Auction has the goal of trade transmission rights between Bidders and helps them raise their own profits. The ISO plays a major rule on keep the system in technical limits without interfere on the auctions offers. In some auction models the ISO decide want bids are implemented on the network, always with the objective maximize the individual profits for all bidders in the auction. This paper proposes a methodology for a Financial Transmission Rights Auction and an informatics application. The application receives offers from the purchase and sale side and considers bilateral contracts as Base Case. This goal is maximize the individual profits within the system in their technical limits. The paper includes a case study for the 30 bus IEEE test case.

Distributed Model Predictive Control for Housing with Hourly Auction of Available Energy

This paper presents a distributed model predictive control (DMPC) for indoor thermal comfort that simultaneously optimizes the consumption of a limited shared energy resource. The control objective of each subsystem is to minimize the heating/cooling energy cost while maintaining the indoor temperature and used power inside bounds. In a distributed coordinated environment, the control uses multiple dynamically decoupled agents (one for each subsystem/house) aiming to achieve satisfaction of coupling constraints. According to the hourly power demand profile, each house assigns a priority level that indicates how much is willing to bid in auction for consume the limited clean resource. This procedure allows the bidding value vary hourly and consequently, the agents order to access to the clean energy also varies. Despite of power constraints, all houses have also thermal comfort constraints that must be fulfilled. The system is simulated with several houses in a distributed environment.

Distributed MPC for Thermal Comfort and Load Allocation with Energy Auction

This paper presents a distributed predictive control methodology for indoor thermal comfort that optimizes the consumption of a limited shared energy resource using an integrated demand-side management approach that involves a power price auction and an appliance loads allocation scheme. The control objective for each subsystem (house or building) aims to minimize the energy cost while maintaining the indoor temperature inside comfort limits. In a distributed coordinated multi-agent ecosystem, each house or building control agent achieves its objectives while sharing, among them, the available energy through the introduction of particular coupling constraints in their underlying optimization problem. Coordination is maintained by a daily green energy auction bring in a demand-side management approach. Also the implemented distributed MPC algorithm is described and validated with simulation studies.

Long-term memory in financial prices: evidence from the Dutch stock market returns

Prepared for presentation at the Portuguese Finance Network International Conference 2014, Vilamoura, Portugal, June 18-20

Cultural adaptation of websites: a comparative study of portuguese and dutch corporate websites

Master Thesis Presented at Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto for obtaining the Master’s degree in Digital Marketing under the supervision of Professor José de Freitas Santos

A matter of time: Phases of customer co-creation community participation and their impact on customer behavior

Despite the growing relevance of co-creating customer communities only little scientific evidence is available on their impact on transactional behavior of participants. Previous research has mostly used self-reported data or distinguished only between during and pre-community phases obtaining mixed results. However, the author proposes that co-creating community activity takes place in five distinguishable phases and changes in transactional behavior are limited to certain phases. Using 33 months of transactional data of a Dutch online auction provider a study was conducted covering all five phases of the community co-creation process from community planning over community set-up, co-development and co-testing to post-launch. The overall results indicate mixed effects of community participation on the different transactional variables during the co-creation process. Community participation had positive effects on auctions listing behavior at the community set-up, co-development and post-launch phases, whereby the number of auctions listed peaked during the community set-up phase. These results suggest that the impact on transactional behavior differs between co-creation phases and different psychological mechanism limited to certain phases might trigger the respective changes.