The Impact of International Trade and Domestic Savings on Convergence in China.

Rapport de recherche

Why foreign savings fail to cause growth

Este artigo é uma formalização da crítica à estratégia do crescimento com poupança externa que um de seus autores vem sendo fazendo nos últimos anos. Apesar dos países de renda média serem pobres de capital, os déficits em conta corrente (poupança externa), financiado seja por empréstimos ou por investimentos externos diretos, não irá aumentar a taxa de acumulação de capital ou terá pouco impacto sobre ela, uma vez que os déficits de conta corrente estarão associados taxas de câmbio apreciadas, ordenados e salários aumentados artificialmente e altos níveis de consumo. Consequentemente, a taxa de substituição da poupança externa pela interna será relativamente alta, e o país será obrigado não a investir e crescer, mas a consumir. Apenas quando há grandes oportunidades de investimento, estimuladas por uma ampla diferença entre a taxa de lucro esperada e a taxa de juros de longo prazo, a propensão marginal ao consumo diminuirá suficientemente, a ponto de o lucro adicional originário do fluxo de capital estrangeiro ser usado para investimento, ao invés de para consumo. Neste caso especial, a taxa de substituição de poupança externa pela interna tenderá a ser menor e a poupança interna contribuirá positivamente para o crescimento

Tied aid, unemployment and welfare

The effect of foreign aid on the welfare levels of both the recipient and the donor country has been a much analysed topic for research in both the theory of international trade and development economics. In the development economics literature, concerns have been raised since the 1960s on the possible adverse effect of foreign aid on domestic savings and growth.1 The trade theory literature in this respect is much older and dates back to the 1920s when Professors Keynes and Ohlin debated on the effect of foreign aid on international terms of trade.2 Ever since, the terms of trade effect has been the cornerstone in the analysis of the welfare effect of foreign aid in the trade theory literature.3 After some early confusion, it is now well established that in a Walrasian stable world economy with two countries, a necessary condition for foreign aid to have perverse effects is that there is some distortion in either of the two countries.4 It is also known that, under normality and substitutability of goods, untied aid cannot be strictly Pareto-improving in a tariff distorted world.5

Can Italy and Spain survive rates of 6-7%? CEPS Policy Brief No. 279, 27 July 2012

The sentiment that the euro is now in real danger is based in large part on the widespread conviction that interest rates of 6-7% are simply unsustainable for both Italy and Spain., After taking a closer look at the fundamentals, however, Daniel Gros concludes in this new Policy Brief that both countries should be able to live with this level of interest rates for quite some time, but only if they mobilize domestic savings, which remain strong in both countries. For Spain, some debt/equity swaps are also needed.

How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and per capita income

Corruption is a phenomenon that plagues many countries and, mostly, walks hand in hand with inefficient institutional structures, which reduce the effectiveness of public and private investment. In countries with widespread corruption, for each monetary unit invested, a sizable share is wasted, implying less investment. Corruption can also be a burden on a nation’s wealth and economic growth, by driving away new investment and creating uncertainties regarding private and social rights. Thus, corruption can affect not only factors productivity, but also their accumulation, with detrimental consequences on a society’s social development. This article aims to analyze and measure the influence of corruption on a country’s wealth. It is implicitly admitted that the degree of institutional development has an adverse effect on the productivity of production factors, which implies in reduced per capita income. It is assumed that the level of wealth and economic growth depends on domestic savings, foster technological progress and a proper educational system. Corruption, within this framework, is not unlike an additional cost, which stifles the “effectiveness” of the investment. This article first discusses the key theories evaluating corruption’s economic consequences. Later, it analyzes the relation between institutional development, factor productivity and per capita income, based on the neoclassical approach to economic growth. Finally, it brings some empirical evidence regarding the effects of corruption on factor productivity, in a sample of 81 countries studied in 1998. The chief conclusion is that corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness.

Crítica do crescimento com poupança externa

O presente artigo é uma formalização da crítica à estratégia do crescimento com poupança externa. Apesar dos países de renda média serem pobres em capital, os déficits em conta corrente (poupança externa), financiados por empréstimos ou investimentos diretos externos, não necessariamente farão aumentar a taxa de acumulação de capital ou, mesmo, terão pouco impacto sobre ela, de forma que os déficits em conta serão associados a taxas de câmbio apreciadas, altos salários e ordenados reais e altos níveis de consumo. Conseqüentemente, o país se endividará para consumir, e não para investir e crescer. Apenas quando há grandes oportunidades de investimento, estimulados por uma diferença considerável entre a taxa de lucro esperada e a taxa de juros a longo prazo, o lucro adicional produzido pelo fluxo de capital estrangeiro será usado para investimento, e este trade-off entre a redução da poupança externa e interna não ocorrerá

From old to new developmentalism in Latin America

O fracasso do consenso de Washington e das políticas macroeconômicas, baseadas em altas taxas de juros e taxas de câmbio não-competitivas para promover o crescimento da economia, levou os países da América Latina a formularem estratégias nacionais de desenvolvimento. O novo desenvolvimentismo é uma estratégia alternativa não apenas à ortodoxia convencional, mas também ao antigo nacional-desenvolvimentismo latino-americano. Enquanto o antigo nacional desenvolvimentismo era baseado na tendência à deterioração dos termos de troca e, adotando uma abordagem microeconômica, propunha planejamento econômico e industrialização, o novo nacional-desenvolvimentismo pressupõe que a industrialização foi alcançada, apesar de em diferentes estágios em cada país, e argumenta que, para assegurar rápidas taxas de crescimento e o catch up, a tendência que deve ser neutralizada é a da sobrevalorização da taxa de câmbio. Contrariamente à economia convencional, um estado capaz continua sendo o instrumento chave para assegurar o desenvolvimento econômico, a política industrial continua sendo necessária; mas o que distingue a nova abordagem é principalmente o crescimento com poupança interna, ao invés de com poupança externa. Uma política macroeconômica baseada em taxas de juros moderadas e uma taxa de câmbio competitiva, e não altas taxas de juros e moeda sobreapreciada conforme recomenda a ortodoxia convencional.

Efeitos da taxa de câmbio na poupança interna: análise teórica e evidências empíricas para o caso brasileiro

Este trabalho tem como principal objetivo investigar as relações entre nível da taxa de câmbio real, poupança externa e poupança doméstica no Brasil. Dentro do modelo aqui explorado, casos de sobrevalorização excessiva do câmbio real levam à redução de margens de lucro nos setores de produção de bens comercializáveis, resultando numa queda importante no nível de poupança agregada doméstica, bem como na substituição da poupança doméstica pela poupança externa. A análise econométrica realizada para a economia brasileira indica que há uma relação estável de longo prazo entre taxa de câmbio e poupança interna, e que desvalorizações relativas da taxa de câmbio real têm impactos positivos e significantes sobre a poupança doméstica no período estudado. Além disso, os resultados das estimativas confirmam a existência de substituição de poupança doméstica por poupança externa

Do antigo ao novo desenvolvimentismo na América Latina

O fracasso do Consenso de Washington e das políticas macroeconômicas baseadas em altas taxas de juros e taxas de câmbio não competitivas em gerar crescimento econômico levou a América Latina à necessidade de formular estratégias nacionais de desenvolvimento. O novo desenvolvimentismo é uma estratégia alternativa, não apenas à ortodoxia convencional mas também ao antigo nacional-desenvolvimentismo latino-americano. Enquanto o nacional-desenvolvimentismo se baseava na tendência à deterioração dos termos de troca e, adotando uma abordagem microeconômica, propunha planejamento econômico e industrialização, o novo desenvolvimentismo assume que a industrialização foi alcançada, embora em graus diferentes para cada país, e argumenta que, a fim de garantir taxas rápidas de crescimento e alcançar os países desenvolvidos, o que precisa ser neutralizado é a tendência da taxa de câmbio à sobrevalorização. Contrariamente às alegações do pensamento econômico convencional, um Estado capaz continua sendo o instrumento chave para garantir o desenvolvimento econômico, e a política industrial continua a ser necessária; mas o que distingue a nova abordagem é principalmente o crescimento com poupança interna, em lugar do crescimento com poupança externa, uma política macroeconômica baseada em taxas moderadas de juros e uma taxa de câmbio competitiva, em lugar das altas taxas de juros e das moedas sobrevalorizadas preconizadas pela ortodoxia convencional.

Macroeconomia estruturalista do desenvolvimento

Structuralist development macroeconomics. This paper presents some basic ideas and models of a structuralist development macroeconomics (the tendencies to the overvaluation of the exchange rate and the tendency of wages to grow below productivity, the critique of growth with foreign savings, and a new model of the Dutch disease) that complement and actualize the thought of the Latin-American structuralist school that developed around ECLAC from the late 1940s to the 1960s. On the other hand, it suggests that a new national development strategy based on the experience of fast growing Asian countries is emerging; and argues that only the countries that adopt such strategy based on growth with domestic savings, fiscal and foreign trade responsibility and a competitive exchange rate will be able to catch up.

Why the ‘Rest’ doesn’t need foreign finance

The Rest will be able to catch up and grow faster than the West only if it goes against a “received truth”, namely that capital-rich countries should transfer their capital to capital-poor countries. This intuitive truth is the mantra that the West cites to justify its occupation of the markets of developing countries with its finance and its multinationals. Classical Developmentalism successfully criticized the unequal exchange involved in trade liberalization, but it didn’t succeed in criticizing foreign finance. This task has been recently achieved by New Developmentalism and its developmental macroeconomics, which shows that countries will invest and grow more if they don’t run current account deficits, even when these deficits are financed by foreign direct investment

International finance and Caribbean development

Includes bibliography

The Drivers of Current Account Surplus in Germany and the Politics of Rebalancing in the Eurozone. EU Centre, Singapore Working Paper No. 24, April 2015

Current account deficits have caught the public’s attention as they have contributed to the European debt crisis. However, surpluses also constitute an issue as a deficit in any country must be financed through a surplus in another country. In 2013, Germany, now the world’s largest surplus economy, registered a record high US$273 billion surplus. This paper looks at what accounts for Germany’s surplus, revealing that the major driving factors include strong global demand for quality German exports, domestic wage restraint, an undervalued single currency, high domestic savings rate and interest rate convergence in the euro area. This paper echoes the US Treasury’s view that a persistent German surplus makes it harder for the eurozone as a whole and the southern peripheral economies in particular to recover from the current financial crisis by imposing a Europe-wide “deflationary bias” through pushing up the exchange rate of the euro, exporting feeble German inflation and projecting its ultra-tight macroeconomic policies onto crisis economies. This paper contends that Germany’s trade surplus is likely to endure as Germany and other eurozone countries uphold diverging views on the nature of the surplus engage in a blame-game amidst a sluggish rebalancing process. Prizing the surplus as a reflection of hard work and economic competitiveness, German authorities urge their southern eurozone colleagues to undertake bold structural reforms to correct the imbalance, while the hand-tied governments in crisis-stricken economies call on Germany to do its “homework” by boosting German demands for European goods and services.

The international impact of productivity shocks

Even though many studies have confirmed the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) finding that savings and investment rates are highly correlated, there is no consensus on the major reason for this correlation. The purpose of this dissertation is to develop theoretical models and calibrate and simulate these to compare their implications to explain the observed time-series comovement between savings and investment in an attempt to show that this high correlation may stem from technological shocks.^ The dissertation is comprised of three studies. The first two studies construct overlapping-generations, two-economy models of saving and investment under conditions of perfect international capital mobility. The second study differs from the first by endogenizing the labor supply. Employing simulations, the models are used to generate time-series for savings and investment. These are then compared with the actual data for specific economies. The models show that productivity shocks produce a high correlation between savings and investment. Further, while the model with exogenous labor supply displays monotonic adjustment, the economy with endogenous labor supply adjusts cyclically.^ The third model, on the other hand, constructs a general equilibrium model for a small open economy. The study is based on two important elements: adjustment costs in investment and endogenous, recursive time preferences. Again, the simulation results show that the model generates, at least in a significant part of the adjustment path, a positive correlation between domestic savings and investment in response to a supply shock. ^