Determinants of Portuguese bank’s provisioning policies: Discretionary behaviour of generic and specific allowances

In this paper we test for the impact of the regulatory environment on a bank’s discretionary provisioning practices. We develop a model that structures the dynamics of the provision policy for the two classes of provisions: generic provisions and specific provisions. The model is tested using a comprehensive database of all financial institutions operating in Portugal for 1990-2000. This unique dataset comprises banks subject to the Portuguese rules as well as bank subsidiaries subject to their home-country regulation and we were able to identify distinct behaviours between them. Our results show the importance of handling he two types of provisions separately. They support the hypothesis that banks have a discretionary behaviour in setting up their provisions, and find evidence of income smoothing and capital management. We also find that the regulatory regime impacts on discretionary provisioning policies because banks when forced to increase one type of provision react by reducing the iscretionary component of the other, a finding we designated as a substitution effect.

The Relative Efficiency of Automatic and Discretionary Industrial Aid

For the last two decades, the primary instruments for UK regional policy have been discretionary subsidies. Such aid is targeted at “additional” projects - projects that would not have been implemented without the subsidy - and the subsidy should be the minimum necessary for the project to proceed. Discretionary subsidies are thought to be more efficient than automatic subsidies, where many of the aided projects are non-additional and all projects receive the same subsidy rate. The present paper builds on Swales (1995) and Wren (2007a) to compare three subsidy schemes: an automatic scheme and two types of discretionary scheme, one with accurate appraisal and the other with appraisal error. These schemes are assessed on their expected welfare impacts. The particular focus is the reduction in welfare gain imposed by the interaction of appraisal error and the requirements for accountability. This is substantial and difficult to detect with conventional evaluation techniques.

Discretionary Policy in a Monetary Union with Sovereign Debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fi scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with signifi cant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.

Joint estimates of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy for the OECD

Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.

Joint estimates of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy: the OECD 1981-2003

Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.

Joint estimates of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy: the OECD 1981-2003

Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.

Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking

Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple equilibria it is first necessary to understand how an economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper we employ notions of learnability and self-enforceability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest. Central among these criteria are whether the equilibrium is learnable by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. We use two New Keynesian policy models to identify the strategic interactions that give rise to multiple equilibria and to illustrate our methods for identifying equilibria of interest. Importantly, unless the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we find little reason to expect coordination on that equilibrium.

Data Envelopment Analysis and non-discretionary inputs : How to select the most suitable model using multi-criteria decision analysis

Within Data Envelopment Analysis, several alternative models allow for an environmental adjustment. The majority of them deliver divergent results. Decision makers face the difficult task of selecting the most suitable model. This study is performed to overcome this difficulty. By doing so, it fills a research gap. First, a two-step web-based survey is conducted. It aims (1) to identify the selection criteria, (2) to prioritize and weight the selection criteria with respect to the goal of selecting the most suitable model and (3) to collect the preferences about which model is preferable to fulfil each selection criterion. Second, Analytic Hierarchy Process is used to quantify the preferences expressed in the survey. Results show that the understandability, the applicability and the acceptability of the alternative models are valid selection criteria. The selection of the most suitable model depends on the preferences of the decision makers with regards to these criteria.

Estimating the effect of discretionary spending on corruption: evidence from Brazilian municipalities

O presente artigo estuda a relação entre corrupção e discricionariedade do gasto público ao responder a seguinte pergunta: regras de licitação mais rígidas, uma proxy para discricionariedade, resultam em menor prevalência de corrupção nos municípios brasileiros? A estratégia empírica é uma aproximação de regressões em dois estágios (2SLS) estimadas localmente em cada transição de regras de licitação, cuja fonte de dados de corrupção é o Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteio da CGU e os dados sobre discricionariedade são derivados da Lei 8.666/93, responsável por regular os processos de compras e construção civil em todas as esferas de governo. Os resultados mostram, entretanto, que menor discricionariedade está relacionada com maior corrupção para quase todos os cortes impostos pela lei de licitações.

Discretionary-based disclosure: evidence from the Brazilian market

The primary objective of this paper is to identify the factors that explain Brazilian companies level of voluntary disclosure. Underpinning this work is the Discretionary-based Disclosure theory. The sample is composed of the top 100 largest non-financial companies listed in the Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (Brazilian Securities, Commodities, and Futures exchange - BOVESPA). Information was gathered from Financial Statements for the years ending in 2006, 2007, and 2008, with the use of content analysis. A disclosure framework based on 27 studies from these years was created, with a total of 92 voluntary items divided into two dimensions: economic (43) and socio-environmental (49). Based on the existing literature, a total of 12 hypotheses were elaborated and tested using a panel data approach. Results evidence that: (a) Sector and Origin of Control are statistically significant in all three models tested: economic, socio-environmental, and total; (b) Profitability is relevant in the economic model and in the total model; (c) Tobin s Q is relevant in the socio-environmental model and in the total disclosure model; (d) Leverage and Auditing Firm are only relevant in the economic disclosure model; (e) Size, Governance, Stock Issuing, Growth Opportunities and Concentration of Control are not statistically significant in any of the three models.

Discretionary medical reporting of potentially unfit drivers: a questionnaire-based survey in Southeast Switzerland

In Switzerland, every physician has the right to report a patient that is potentially unfit to drive to the licensing authority without violating medical confidentiality. Verified information regarding physicians' attitudes concerning this discretionary reporting and the frequency of such reports are not available. In order to answer these questions, 635 resident physicians were sent a questionnaire. The response rate was 52%. On average, the responding physicians--for all specialties--reported 0.31 patients (SD 0.64, 95% CI 0.24-0.38) in the year before the survey and 1.00 patient (SD 1.74, 95% CI 0.81-1.20) in the past 5 years. Seventy-nine percent of the responding physicians indicated knowing the current legal requirements for driving in Switzerland. In applied logistic regression analysis, only two factors correlate significantly with reporting: male sex (odds ratio 5.4) and the specialty "general medicine" (odds ratio 3.4). Ninety-seven percent of the physicians were against abolishing medical discretionary reporting and 29% were in favor of introducing mandatory reporting. The great majority of the questioned physicians supported the discretionary reporting of drivers that are potentially unfit to drive as currently practiced in Switzerland. The importance and the necessity of a regular traffic medicine-related continuing education for medical professionals are shown by the low number of reports per physician.