[Pamphlets on banks and banking law in Great Britain.

[1] Committee of Private Country Banks. Reasons against legislative interference. 1844.--[2] Drummond, Henry. Causes which lead to a bank restriction bill. 1839.--[3] Dun, John. The English bankers' grievance and its proper remedy. 1874.--[4] Greig, J.K. Bank note and banking reform. 1880.--[5] Holdsworth, A.H. A letter to a friend in Devonshire. 1818.--[6] Kinnear, George. Banks and exchange companies. 1847.--[7] A letter to the Right Hon. the Viscount Althorp on his proposed interference with the present system of country banking. 1833.--[8] LLoyds Bank Limited. Permanent staff training. 1919.--[9] [Maclean, A.W.] Additional considerations, addressed to all classes, on the necessity and equity of a national system of deposit-banking and paper currency. 1835.--[10] Nicholson, N.A. The controversy on free banking. 1868.--[11] Steele, F.E. On changes in the bank rate. [1891]--[12] Stirling, James. Practical considerations on banks and bank management. 1865.--[13] Thoughts upon the principles of banks, and the wisdom of legislative interference. 1837.--[14] Watt, Peter. The theory and practice of joint-stock banking. 1836.

Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 : report (to accompany S. 2856).

"May 18, 2006."

Market discipline by depositors : impact of deposit insurance on the Indonesian banking sector

This paper investigates market discipline by depositors in the Indonesian banking sector. Does depositor discipline fulfill its role in Indonesia? Does deposit insurance affect depositor behavior thereby imposing discipline on banks? These questions are empirically examined using panel data on Indonesian commercial banks from 1998 to 2009. In Indonesia deposit insurance was introduced in 2005. Depositor discipline is examined by two measures: change in the amount of deposits and interest rate. The empirical results show that depositors pay attention to bank soundness and riskiness and select banks based on the bank's condition with particular attention paid to equity ratio. It is found that depositors impose discipline on banks, but it varies according to regulatory and economic circumstances.

Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance. CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 3 December 2015

It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. So far, however, agreement has been reached in the EU on only the first two of these functions. The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is an innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function.

The International Banking Facility Deposit Insurance Act : hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, on H.R. 4879 ... November 4, 1981.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

Proposed small saver deposit instruments [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, May 7, 1979.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

Strengthening the supervision and regulation of the depository institutions : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, on reform federal deposit insurance, protect the deposit insurance funds, and improve supervision and regulation of and disclosure relating to federally insured depository institutions ....

"February 26, 1991 ... April 23, 1991"--Vol. 1. "April 25, 1991 ... November 25, 1991"--Vol. 2.

Federal laws affecting national banks, including provisions of U. S. Revised statutes, Federal reserve act, Deposit insurance law, Emergency banking act, Bank conservation act, Banking act of 1933, Banking act of 1935 and other laws affecting the national banking system as of January 1, 1950.

"Compiled to supersede and bring up to date the previous edition, published in 1940."

Federal laws affecting national banks, including provisions of U. S. Revised statutes, Federal reserve act, Deposit insurance law, Emergency banking act, Bank conservation act, Banking act of 1933, Banking act of 1935 and other laws affecting, directly or indirectly, the national banking system, as of January 1, 1936.

On cover: National bank laws as of Jan. 1, 1936

Essays on Banking Crises

This thesis aims at finding the role of deposit insurance scheme and central bank (CB) in keeping the banking system safe. The thesis also studies the factors associated with long-lasting banking crises. The first essay analyzes the effect of using explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), instead of using implicit deposit insurance scheme (IDIS), on banking crises. The panel data for the period of 1980-2003 includes all countries for which the data on EDIS or IDIS exist. 70% of the countries in the sample are less developed countries (LDCs). About 55% of the countries adopting EDIS also come from LDCs. The major finding is that the using of EDIS increases the crisis probability at a strong significance level. This probability is greater if the EDIS is inefficiently designed allowing higher scope of moral hazard problem. Specifically, the probability is greater if the EDIS provides higher coverage to deposits and if it is less powerful from the legal point of view. This study also finds that the less developed a country is to handle EDIS, the higher the chance of banking crisis. Once the underdevelopment of an economy handling the EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is no longer a significant factor of banking crises. The second essay aims at determining whether a country s powerful CB can lessen the instability of the banking sector by minimizing the likelihood of a banking crisis. The data used include indicators of the CB s autonomy for a set of countries over the period of 1980-89. The study finds that in aggregate a more powerful CB lessens the probability of banking crisis. When the CB s authority is disentangled with respect to its responsibilities, the study finds that the longer tenure of CB s chief executive officer and the greater power of CB in assigning interest rate on government loans are necessary for reducing the probability of banking crisis. The study also finds that the probability of crisis reduces more if an autonomous CB can perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition. The costs of long-lasting banking crises are high because both the depositors and the investors lose confidence in the banking system. For a rapid recovery of a crisis, the government very often undertakes one or more crisis resolution policy (CRP) measures. The third essay examines the CRP and other explanatory variables correlated with the durations of banking crises. The major finding is that the CRP measure allowing the regulation forbearance to keep the insolvent banks operative and the public debt relief program are respectively strongly and weakly significant to increase the durations of crises. Some other explanatory variables, which were found by previous studies to be related with the probability of crises to occur, are also correlated with the durations of crises.

Information disclosure and depositor discipline in the Chinese banking sector

We investigate the relationship between information disclosure and depositor behaviour in the Chinese banking sector. Specifically, we enquire whether enhanced information disclosure enables investors to more effectively infer a banking institution's risk profile, thereby influencing their deposit decisions. Utilising an unbalanced panel, incorporating financial data from 169 Chinese banks over the 1998–2009 period, we employ generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation procedures to control for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and persistence in the dependent variable. We uncover evidence that: (i) the growth rate of deposits is sensitive to bank fundamentals after controlling for macroeconomic factors, diversity in ownership structure, and government intervention; (ii) a bank publicly disclosing more transparent information in its financial reports, is more likely to experience growth in its deposit base; and (iii) banks characterised by high information transparency, well-capitalised and adopted international accounting standards, are more able to attract funds by offering higher interest rates.

The determinants of net interest margins & net interest spreads in the Russian & Japanese Commercial Banking sectors

This study presents an empirical investigation of the determinants of net interest margins and spreads in the Russian and Japanese banking sectors with a particular focus on commercial banks. Net interest mar-gins and spreads serve as indicators of financial intermediation efficiency. This paper employed a bank-level unbalanced panel dataset prolonging from 2005 to 2014. My main empirical results show that bank characteristics explain the most of the variation in not only net interest margins but also in spreads. Capi-talization, liquidity risk, inflation, economic growth, private and government debt are important determi-nants of margin in Russia. In Japan to the contrary loan and deposit market concentration along with bank size do predominate. Common significant variables in both countries are the substitution effect, cost effi-ciency and profitability. Turning to net interest spreads, micro- and macro-specific variables are the main significant drivers in Russia. I reach the conclusion that there are no significant determinants of net interest spreads in Japan within the original selection of variables, but operating efficiency and deposits to total funding seem to prevail. In both countries, there are solid differences in the net interest margins as well as spreads once the pre- and the post-crisis periods are considered.

Receivable Management in Non Banking Finance Companies with Special Reference to Vehicle Financing

In the absence of entry barrier or regulatory restrictions, Non Banking Financial Companies frantically grew and accessed the public deposit without any regulatory control. The deposit of NBFCs grew from Rs. 41.9 crore in 1971 to 53116.0 crore in 1997. This growth was the result of a combined effect of increase in the number of NBFCs and increase in the amount of deposits. The deposits amazed as above was invested in various assets especially that in motor vehicles by these asset financing NBFCs. Various tactics were adopted by these NBFCs and their agents for recovering the receivable outstanding from such assets. Both central government and RBI were concerned about the protection of depositors‘ interest and various committees were set up to frame a comprehensive regulation for the functioning of these NBFCs.

Does it pay to be socially responsible? Evidence from spanish retail banking sector

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of strategic competition in retail banking when some of the financial firms are non-profit organisations that invest in social activities. Banking literature about competition is fairly large, but the strategic interaction between profit maximizing and non profit maximizers has not been extensively analysed except for Purroy and Salas (1999). In this paper, a completely different approach is taken. An adaptation of Hotelling’s two stage model of spatial competition is developed to take into account consumer perceptions respect to the two different types of financial institutions. The empirical analysis confirms that consumers take into account other features different from the price, such as social contribution or closer service to make a deposit or mortgage decision. These conclusions are of interest in the debate about a firm’s social or ethical activities. It is shown that if consumers value social activities, firms can improv

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.